The Next Steps initiative: The case of the Planning Inspectorate by Brushfield, Jean
        
University of Bath
PHD








Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. May. 2019
THE NEXT STEPS INITIATIVE - THE CASE OF THE PLANNING INSPECTORATE
submitted by Jean Brushfield LLB FRICS FCI Arb
for the degree of PhD of the University of Bath
1995
COPYRIGHT
Attention is drawn to the fact that copyright of this thesis rest with its 
author. This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone 
who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with 
its author and that no quotation from the thesis and no information derived 
from it may be published without the prior consent of the author.
This thesis may be made available for consultation within the University 





INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U601466
Published by ProQuest LLC 2013. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
I ■:•• T'f' &ATtl I
I / *
II / ■ -: : ! |
i* J  * t .  «  w  ■ * ' a /  j! K




The Next Steps Initiative - the case of 
the Planning Inspectorate
The Next Steps Initiative has introduced many civil servants to new 
concepts of efficiency, effectiveness and customer service.
The thesis examines the experience of the Planning Inspectorate in 
progressing to and beyond Agency status, in the context of the 
introduction of the Next Steps Initiative, and by comparison with 
other Agencies which have been created.
Factors relevant to the advent of the Next Steps Initiative are 
considered, including the history of accountability and the methods 
of control used over the past kO years to match the increasing 
complexity of government functions.
In the Inspectorate, the use of statutory powers on behalf of the 
Secretaries of State for the Environment and for Wales has been 
linked for more than 2 decades to the individual decision making 
responsibility and public accountability of Inspectors in most cases 
for making the decisions on appeals against the refusal of planning 
permission in the place of Ministers.
The practices used in carrying out executive functions within the 
Inspectorate and other Agencies established under the Initiative in 
various government departments are examined in the context of changes 
from previous civil service practice, including methods of measuring 
performance and instituting change. The influence of service-wide 
innovations such as the Citizens’ Charter and market testing 
introduced alongside the Next Steps Initiative are assessed.
The thesis concludes with an overview of the achievements to date, 
the problems which remain to be resolved, and the implications for an 
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"Yes, I do think that there is a real dilemma here, in that 
while it has been government policy to regard policy as the 
responsibility of Ministers and administration as the 
responsibility of officials, questions of administrative policy 
can cause confusion between the administration of policy and 
the policy of administration, especially when the 
responsibility for the administration of the policy of 
administration conflicts or overlaps with responsibility for 
the policy of the administration of policy”.
(Lynn and Jay, 1982, page 176).
*
The civil service has evolved from advising the politicians currently 
in government on public policy to becoming a complex organisation 
using similar administrative patterns to cover a wide span of 
functions in a complex modern world. Over the years, various methods 
have been tried to adapt existing methods of bureaucratic control to 
more sophisticated needs and financial regimes, with varying success.
When this study was commenced, the traditional pattern of staffing 
and recruitment in the central civil service had changed very little 
in most areas (Chapter 2); the public were not generally seen as
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"customers”, and change and innovation were, except in rare 
instances, not regarded as comfortable or essential.
There seems to be an inherent potential conflict in public 
administration between formal control, through political and 
practical accountability, and using the most effective methods to 
deliver efficiency and value for money. Accountability is not a new 
concept in government, but the context in which it has to be applied 
is changing over the years, adjusting to significant alterations in 
the structure and scope of government, and increased public interest 
in the way political and financial control is exercised.
To many laymen, the public service is a single entity, carrying out 
governmental functions as prescribed by Parliament. In practice, 
this simple image was probably only true in the early nineteenth 
century, when the state had a "caretaker role", which declined as the 
government became increasingly interventionist in social and economic 
affairs.
Since the Second World War, the role of the state has primarily 
increased in the growth of service provision, with fundamental 
repercussions for the structure and processes of the administrative 
machine. As these activities have increased, the system has relied 
more and more on those controlling these service functions, who have 
been drawn into an advisory and sometimes a promotional role.
Past innovations in the civil service have included the devolution, 
at least in part, of some executive functions to non-Departmental
2
public bodies (also sometimes described as quangoes) and other forms 
of quasi-governmental organisation (Chapter 1), as well as 
transferring some responsibilities to local government. This is one 
method by which these more practical governmental functions have been 
carried out at arms length from the central Departments which are 
under direct political control. Indeed, the more aspects of modern 
life are regulated, the greater the increase in the number of such 
organisations despite the efforts in the past to limit them. Hiving 
off functions in this way is not new, but the practice in itself 
raises issues of accountability, responsibility and control, 
questions about the deficiencies to be remedied, the practices to be 
adopted, and the changes needed to improve control over the 
expenditure of public money.
The Next Steps Initiative is therefore only the latest of these means 
of controlling the ever-increasing range and cost of government 
functions. The Initiative was proposed in 1988, and sought to 
introduce a 2 tier structure, with policy development and the 
organisation of strategic management in the central part of major 
Departments, and operational tasks and direct responsibilities being 
given to the new Agencies (Chapter 1).
The Initiative is thus designed to separate the executive and policy 
roles of central Departments by setting up separate Agencies within 
Departments, each charged with the responsibility for specific 
government tasks. It is also intended to promote the use of relevant 
practices from private industry to improve value for money, whilst
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retaining accountability to Parliament and increasing efficiency and 
effectiveness.
The Initiative seeks to extend accountability and responsibility to 
named permanent officials at lower levels in the civil service 
hierarchy for whom the Chief Executive Officers of the Agencies have 
some responsibility to Parliament (Chapter 8).
For the senior Departmental staff, some of whom have been immersed in 
the cautious and self-contained world of the public service for over 
30 years, involved in negotiating and carrying out these changes, 
this requires a radical re-direction of their accustomed pattern 
(Chapter 2), which has supported their promotion to senior posts in 
the civil service.
In this thesis, the experience of the Planning Inspectorate in 
progressing to Agency status and beyond is considered (Chapters k to 
7), and compared with those from other Agencies which have been 
created (Chapter 9)*
The Planning Inspectorate has the responsibility in most cases for 
making the decisions on appeals against the refusal of planning 
permission in the place of Ministers; Inspectors also deal with other 
types of environmental casework. Due to the nature of its work and 
the origins of some of its staff, the Inspectorate had developed and 
refined over the past 30 years some of the skills now seen as very 
desirable in the modern, more fragmented, civil service before the 
advent of the Initiative (Chapter 4). In several respects, the
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practices adopted have foreshadowed those now being endorsed by 
Ministers for other Agencies.
In the Inspectorate, the operation of statutory powers on behalf of 
the Secretaries of State for the Environment and for Wales has been 
linked for many years to the individual decision making 
responsibility and public accountability of the Inspectors.
Public confidence in the organisation rests very much on Inspectors 
being professionally qualified so that they can exercise their quasi­
judicial powers and duties in an independent, open, fair and 
impartial manner, free from hidden influences from the parent 
Department and the civil service as a whole. This approach seems to 
be increasingly in tune with government policy (Chapter 1) and the 
mood of the public’s view of public service provision generally, 
where the ’’consumer” expects to be able to see what he or she is 
getting, and why.
In the past the Planning Inspectorate, in having a high percentage of 
senior professional staff, in that most Inspectors worked from home, 
in having a very variable workload, and in its considerable 
interaction with the public, has felt that it was regarded as being 
different, and sometimes undesirably divergent, from the pattern in 
the central Department of the Environment.
The implementation of radical change across the civil service raises 
questions about the way its staff operate at present, and whether the
5
practices and relationships established over many years are working 
well in central government in the late 20th century.
In theory at least, the duties and activities of the civil servants 
remaining in the central Departments should have changed as a result 
of the implementation of the Next Steps concept and other initiatives 
such as the Citizen’s Charter and market testing (Chapters 1 and 9). 
In this thesis, we shall examine questions which have arisen as the 
new pattern has been introduced in the civil service. We shall look 
at whether other service-wide innovations such as market testing and
the Citizens’ Charter are directly linked with this. We shall ask
what the problems are in maintaining central control and 
accountability, and maintaining relationships between Agencies and 
parent Departments (Chapters 1 and 8).
The Initiative has introduced many civil servants to new concepts of
efficiency, effectiveness and customer service. The thesis addresses 
whether the new pattern of administration allows the civil service to 
demonstrate that Parliament’s intentions are being carried out, and 
whether the new Agencies can be effective in delivering what their 
’’customers”, the public, want.
Structure of the thesis
The thesis begins with a very brief overview of the hiving-off and 
separation of government functions which led to the Initiative, and 
the recent introduction of market testing and more open government 
and the Citizens’ Charter which have also developed in recent years
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(Chapter 1). Chapter 2 then sets the scene for the succeeding 
chapters, with references to literature sources, by setting out 
aspects of how the civil service has been organised in the past and 
ways of introducing change, together with issues relating to 
accountability, measurement and control.
Chapter 3 explains that the methodology used for the thesis developed 
because the recent timing of many of the innovations under the 
Initiative led to the reading programme used for Chapter 2 being 
supplemented by interviews with senior managers from relevant 
organisations, and my experience within the Planning Inspectorate 
Agency, in order to provide the information needed for the later 
chapters.
Chapters 4 to 7 set out how the Inspectorate operated before Agency 
status, how that status arose, and the effect on accountability and 
control of the Agency’s operations thereafter. Chapter 8 then 
provides a general view of aspects of the Initiative, before Chapter 
9 sets out how other Agencies have changed their practices since 
their new status. Finally, after comments on the examples given for 
the Inspectorate and the other Agencies (Chapter 10), the conclusions 
are set out in the last chapter.
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CHAPTER ONE - THE NEXT STEPS INITIATIVE
"Quasi-government” is a description applied to activities in some way 
supervised by government but distinct from central Departments.
Fringe bodies, public corporations, nationalised industries, 
non-Departmental public bodies and quangos are some of the terms 
which can be used to describe the various organisations which carry 
out functions given to them by the political administration.
From the mid 1950s to the early 1980s, the number of staff in the 
central civil service did not expand dramatically. The extent of 
government involvement in social services and business increased, but 
this was achieved by passing many responsibilities on to local 
government and quasi-governmental bodies (Drewry and Butcher, 1988). 
The shift in this country, as in others, has not so much been from 
pure public bureaucracy to pure private enterprise as from pure or 
classic public bureaucracy towards more hybrid forms of organisation, 
having some of the features of both public and private systems (Hood, 
in Lane (ed), 1987). A wide range of one-off governmental bodies 
have been set up, tailor-made for particular tasks (Drucker,
Dunleavy, Gamble, and Peele, 1983)• This has foreshadowed the 
introduction of the Next Steps Initiative.
The Fulton Report in 1968 supported the establishment of Departmental 
Agencies and hiving off Departmental functions to autonomous non-
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Departmental Agencies not subject to direct ministerial control 
(Greenwood and Wilson, 1989). The Expenditure Committee said in 1977 
said that "hiving off" could diminish control by Ministers and 
adversely affect staff morale. The Government reply at that time was 
that many areas of civil service activity were unsuitable for 
separation within the framework of accountability (Davies and 
Willman, 1991)*
The alternatives to creating a new non-Departmental public body are 
transferring functions to the private or voluntary sector, to another 
government Department, or using an existing non-Departmental public 
body. Conferring functions on a non-Departmental public body should 
follow the recognition that it is the most cost effective means of 
carrying them out, and that some independence from Ministers is 
acceptable and appropriate. The functions need to be clearly defined 
and necessarily done in the public sector. The activities of the 
Planning Inspectorate are in many ways a clear example of this.
Three types of organisation have been established in the past -
(i) executive bodies - usually set up by an Act of Parliament, 
to carry out duties where Ministers do not need to directly 
supervise them; or where a single purpose organisation is most 
appropriate; or where people from outside government need to be 
involved; or where the operations need to be separated from 
party politics (Pliatzky, 1992); or where standard civil 
service management or personnel are not appropriate.
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(ii) advisory bodies, and
(iii) tribunals.
In the decade before 1988, radical changes from this type of civil 
service organisation would probably have been fiercely resisted by 
the civil service unions. However, a more flexible attitude had been 
adopted in the late 1980s, partly due to fuller employment, more 
movement of personnel into and out of the civil service, and a 
greater belief in smaller unit sizes.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the Next Steps Initiative is 
designed to separate the executive and policy roles of central 
Departments by setting up separate Agencies within Departments, each 
charged with the responsibility for specific government tasks. It is 
also intended to promote the use of relevant practices from private 
industry to improve value for money, whilst retaining accountability 
to Parliament and increasing efficiency and effectiveness. The 
rationale behind the Initiative is the recognition that the modern 
government machine is too big and its activities too diverse to be 
managed as one unit. The Initiative seeks to extend accountability 
and responsibility to named permanent officials at lower levels in 
the civil service hierarchy for whom the Chief Executive Officers of 
the Agencies have some responsibility to Parliament.
’The objective of the transfer to Agency status is to bring 
about better management ... better value for money, and a 
better service to the public’
10
(from the Third Report of the Home Affairs Committee on the 
Next Steps Agencies, HMSO 1991).
The Next Steps Initiative was introduced by the Prime Minister in the 
House of Commons on 18 February 1988, with the acceptance of the 
Efficiency Unit's report "Improving Management in Government" (Cmnd 
1261) and the appointment of a Project Manager, Peter Kemp, in the 
Office for the Management of the Civil Service (OMCS) at permanent 
secretary level to head a small team charged with the task of 
implementing the Initiative.
The Initiative's stated main aims are to improve management in 
government, and to deliver services more efficiently and effectively 
within available resources by adopting a more entrepreneurial 
approach within guidelines set out in "framework documents".
The new Agencies were created as units within existing Departments, 
and so without the need for legislation. The Project Team introduced 
the new Agencies incrementally, evolving the format as they went 
along. There was no overall blueprint to which the activities and 
pattern should conform, and the team concentrated on keeping the 
momentum going, and maintaining progress which probably could not 
have come about so quickly using conventional, committee-style, civil 
service procedures. Bearing in mind the significant changes involved 
which amounted to a major reform of the civil service, they were 
implemented very rapidly (Dunsire, 1995)* The first Agency, the 
Vehicle Inspectorate, was launched in August 1988, and 102 Agencies 
had been created by the autumn of 199*+, employing over 268,000 civil
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servants, with another 85,000 civil servants working on Next Steps 
lines in the Customs and Excise and Inland Revenue (Chapter 8).
The Initiative has been described by the Treasury and Civil Service 
Committee as being "the most ambitious attempt at civil service 
reform in the twentieth century" but the Committee saw the role of 
the Treasury and the (OMCS) as being permissive and reacting to 
events rather than positive, with their roles not clearly defined.
The Committee were concerned by these uncertainties (House of 
Commons, 1991) and the lack of a positive policy for the civil 
service as a whole.
The Initiative was intended to evolve a horizontally structured civil 
service into a vertical and federal organisation (Kemp, 1990). The 
idea was very loosely based on the Swedish government’s model. This 
has small central Departments, linked to a large number of semi- 
autonomous Agencies responsible for carrying out policy decisions, 
albeit in that country in the context of a more open government 
system than exists in the United Kingdom (McDonald, 1992). However, 
the Swedish system was established by formal legislation, which has 
led to the system being less able to adapt to changing circumstances, 
and becoming "fossilised". New Zealand has also introduced an 
executive Agency system under formal legislation, which in particular 
is designed to identify what the real costs of government are 
(Boston, Martin, Pallot, and Walsh, 1991; The Economist, August 1992; 
Wistrich, 1992).
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None of the changes introduced in this country appear to be 
specifically authorised by statute, except for some of those relating 
to market testing and contracting out, which apply right across the 
civil service (Chapter 8). Some commentators see it as remarkable 
that such a significant alteration in the pattern of government has 
taken place with so little formal involvement by Parliament.
Peter Hennessy observed in 1989 in his book on Whitehall (page 620) -
"Despite the real achievements of the Rayner years, it (The 
Next Steps Report) showed how little in the way of real 
financial and management responsibility had been devolved down 
the line; how meddlesome the Treasury and Cabinet Office 
remained; how dominant was the Whitehall culture of caution; 
how great was the premium placed on a safe pair of hands; and 
how rarely were proven management skills perceived as the way 
to reach the top of the bureaucratic tree."
Hennessy pointed out that the report had proposed a real devolution 
of power over budgets, manpower, pay, hiring and firing to executive 
Agencies in areas of activity embracing the 93% of the Civil Service 
involved in the delivery of services as opposed to advising ministers 
or policy.
The Next Steps Initiative introduces the concept of a "framework 
document" for each Agency, which sets out the manner in which each is 
to operate. A framework document is thus akin to a written 
constitution for the Agency (the Third Report of the Home Affairs
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Committee on the Next Steps Agencies, HMSO 1991)* A common feature 
of these documents is that the Chief Executive Officer is given the 
responsibility of running the Agency and is made accountable, 
normally through a sponsor in the parent Department, to the 
appropriate Minister and to Parliament (Chapter 8).
Members of Parliament have been concerned to see whether this 
arrangement and indeed Agency status itself will produce
"an improved service to the customer at no extra cost, and 
whether government accountability to Parliament will be 
maintained"
(from the Third Report of the Home Affairs Committee on the 
Next Steps Agencies, HMSO 1991)*
For individual Agencies, their launch was intended to be the 
beginning of a process of continuous development (Goldsworthy, 1991)* 
The Project Team looked at whether tasks in potential Agencies should 
be done by the civil service at all rather than by private companies, 
but they did not examine alternative ways of carrying out tasks more 
cheaply or effectively within the civil service.
Examination of such alternative options by the potential Agencies 
themselves initially appears to have been cursory. Whilst this may 
have been the only practical approach if the Initiative was to be 
introduced quickly, the consequence may be that Agencies apparently
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now well established could be upset by major changes being introduced 
later.
This is because, when the framework document is reviewed after 3 
years, a series of tests are now being applied, known as "Prior 
Options" -
is it necessary, if not, abolish it;
does it need to be in the public sector at all, if not, 
privatise it;
can the function, either wholly or in part, be contractorised ?
(Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 199*0
The Next Steps Initiative’s first Project Manager said that all 
Agencies should have 4 characteristics - a discrete organisation, a 
defined task, a formal agreement setting out tasks to be done, and an 
identifiable chief executive accountable for the work of the Agency.
An inter Departmental study in 1991 by the Efficiency Unit said that 
there were four types of Agencies:
Agencies dealing with mainstream policy (for instance, the 
Employment Service)
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Agencies exercising statutory functions (for example, the 
Planning Inspectorate)
Agencies providing specialist services to Departments, such as 
the government research establishments, and
Agencies outside the main aims of a Department but reporting to 
a particular Minister, such as the Historic Royal Palaces 
Agency.
This typology can be expanded by referring to the nature of an 
Agency's activities, such as regulation, welfare, leisure, production 
of "goods”, providing services to the public, and consultancy 
service. This approach is developed further in Chapter 9*
More relevant to the finances of the Agencies is another typology, 
categorising Agencies as "not self funding", and 2 types of "self­
funding" - with and without a monopoly; these can also be labelled as 
charging or not charging for the services provided (Greer, 1992).
Many Agencies carry out mainly administrative functions in the 
traditional role of the civil service, but there are some Agencies, 
of which the Planning Inspectorate is one, whose staff have a quasi­
judicial role, or who have a regulatory function and deal with other 
types of intellectual property. Comparisons with these Agencies are 
therefore likely to be useful in considering the options open to the 
Inspectorate. Some of them may already have had a more independent
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status, and might be able to make more rapid progress to a more 
effective organisation under the Next Steps Initiative.
The classification of Agencies into types or functions could give an 
indication of whether they are likely to maintain their present 
status, or may be considered for movement into the private sector. 
All these typologies to some extent reflect the emphasis which is 
placed in the framework documents on the various aspects of an 
Agency’s activities. We shall look at typologies in more detail in 
Chapter 9*
Market testing
During the establishment of the Agencies in the Next Steps 
Initiative, practices have been changing in the remainder of the 
civil service at the same time. Inevitably this makes it difficult 
to assess the effects of the Initiative on its own. One innovation 
which has been introduced into the civil service as a whole is the 
advent of market testing.
The Prime Minister is reported to be planning that, overall, 30% of 
Departmental business should be sub-contracted out in a 10 year 
programme, hoping to achieve comparable savings to those achieved by 
a similar initiative in local government (Economist, 1992). A wide 
range of activities is proposed for market testing across the civil 
service, from milk hygiene to nuclear weapons research, job clubs to 
language centres, and the prison service to the national lottery.
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Guidance on market testing issued by the Office of Public Science and 
Service (OPSS) in August 1993 encouraged managers to question all 
current civil service functions and allowed in-house bids to 
volunteer changes in terms and conditions where privatisation was 
proposed (IPMS, 1993)*
About 1000 private sector executives attended 2 government seminars 
in January and March 1993 to hear how their companies could bid for 
civil service work. They were told that the total value of the 
services was £1.6 billion (Holdsworth, 1993); savings of up to 25% 
were expected.
The process of market testing was explained to Department of the 
Environment staff in the magazine Environment World in February 1993* 
First, the feasibility of market testing is assessed for a particular 
decision. A steering group chaired by the head of division includes 
a project manager, members of the Department’s market testing unit 
and personnel, plus users of the service. A user survey is conducted 
whilst the existing service is costed and reviewed to identify where 
efficiency could be improved. Potential private sector suppliers are 
identified, and invited to tender with in-house teams on a detailed 
specification. Bids are evaluated on both quality and cost, and a 
service agreement (for in-house bidders) or a contract is signed and 
regularly monitored, on the basis of user needs and other criteria 
(Environment World, 1993)* From this description, it will be clear 
why the supervision of market testing by central Departments costs 
money - for example, £1.6 million in the Home Office in 1992/93 
(PINS, 1993).
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Guidance on market testing issued by the Office of Public Science and 
Service in August 1993 encouraged managers to question all current 
civil service functions and allowed in-house bids to volunteer 
changes in terms and conditions where privatisation was proposed 
(IPMS, 1993)* We shall look at the effects of market testing in 
Chapters 7 and 9*
Open government and the Citizens' Charters
The office of Parliamentary Commissioner (the Ombudsman) was 
established by legislation in 1967. to investigate maladministration 
in government. His jurisdiction was enlarged in 1987 to cover non- 
Departmental public bodies receiving most of their funds from the 
Exchequer and, in 1990, the actions of officials in courts and 
tribunals appointed by the Lord Chancellor. As part of central 
government, Next Steps Initiative Agencies are also overseen by the 
Ombudsman. Nearly 10% of complaints to him, which are channelled by 
Members of Parliament, are shown to have some justification.
A more recent aspect of the increasing emphasis on open government by 
the current administration is the concept of the Citizens' Charters, 
intended to give consumers of public services the opportunities for 
participation and redress. The Charters aim to give people better 
quality in every public service, more choice, to make sure that 
everyone is told what kind of service they can reasonably expect to 
receive, and what to do if something goes wrong. The underlying 
theme is that every public service should be provided in the most 
appropriate and cost effective way (Management Today, May 199*0*
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The White Paper introducing the Citizens’ Charter was published in 
July 1993t with the intention of restricting access to information 
only where there are good reasons to do so. We shall examine how the 
civil service Agencies and their Departments have adapted to these 
new ideas.
The key principles are:
Publication of the standards of service that the customer can 
reasonably expect, and of performance against those standards.
Taking the views of those who use the service into account.
Clear information in plain language about the range of services 
provided.
Courteous and efficient customer service, from staff who are 
normally prepared to identify themselves by name.
Well-signposted ways to complain if the customer is not 
satisfied, with some means of independent review if possible.
Independent evaluation of performance against standards and a 
clear commitment to providing value for money.
The Citizens’ Charters have been criticised as superficial, cosmetic 
and expensive. For instance, more than £2 million was spent on
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sending the Patients' Charter to every home - a total of 20 million 
copies. The total cost of the Charters is £14 million to date, 
according to the Office of Public Service and Science (199*0*
However, there can be no doubt that some service levels have 
improved, and compensation has been introduced for falling short of 
adequate performance in organisations as diverse as British Rail 
(late trains) and Gas Boards (appointments not met or late).
However, standards can be manipulated, for instance by reducing 2 
year hospital waiting lists at the expense of those waiting longer 
than a year.
In order to establish whether expectations are appropriate to the 
function concerned, users should be consulted about what they wanted, 
as the National Consumer Council said in its annual report in 1992 
(Gliniecki, 1992). In this respect, the implications of the 
Citizens’ Charter overlap with methods being used in the Next Steps 
Initiative, since a number of Agencies have carried out customer 
surveys, and we shall see what their effect has been in later 
chapters.
However, the consideration of the effects of the Next Steps 
Initiative, both generally and in respect of particular Agencies, 
must begin with the pattern of government within which they have been 
introduced, since they have all been created within the structure of 
existing Departments, with the civil servants remaining, at least 
initially, within their previous organisation.
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Clearly, the influence of existing civil service culture and practice 
will be strong in this situation, and we turn to the previous pattern 
of government in Chapter 2.
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CHAPTER 2 - PRINCIPAL ASPECTS OF GOVERNMENT
Any innovation in an organisation will be influenced by the past 
history and practices adopted therein. In this thesis, three 
principal aspects of government will be examined and how they have 
developed within the Next Steps Initiative.
The first is the way in which the civil service has been organiseds 
and how that "culture" may change with the advent of the new 
Agencies. The theoretical aspects of bureaucracy, and the various 
views of civil service organisation taken by political and other 
commentators, will be considered in order to set the scene for the 
changes which may have been introduced as a consequence of the Next 
Steps Initiative.
New theories of public management advocate efficiency and 
responsiveness through some form of decentralisation, and attack the 
traditional bureaucratic model of administrative structure (Gray and 
Jenkins, 1995)* The Next Steps Initiative can be seen as a means of 
changing the ways civil servants are used in government. So people’s 
responses to change, and the introduction of new methods, will be 
examined in order to give a context for the development of new 
practices and procedures in the Agencies.
The second aspect is what accountability the civil service has had, 
in particular to Parliament, and whether those responsibilities have 
changed in the new Agencies.
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One example is having a named individual responsible for the 
activities of a particular Department. The Next Steps Initiative 
takes this approach, and not only by substituting a Chief Executive 
Officer for the Permanent Secretary of a Department in some respects. 
A wider accountability is also developing to other groups and 
customers, and we need therefore to look at how this has been 
interpreted, and what the implications may be of changes to the 
accepted patterns.
The third aspect to be examined is the ways in which the activities 
of Departments and Agencies can be measured and controlled, and how 
these methods fit in with the Next Steps Initiative. This is a 
rapidly changing area, where the views of the public as customers are 
now also being sought. This in turn leads us back to 
responsibilities and accountability, and how the civil service is 
operating with the new pattern.
Bearing in mind that the Next Steps Initiative is intended to 
establish quite a different way of conducting the business of 
government, some attention will be given to the specialist skills 
needed by civil servants, as a basis for considering in later 
chapters how the Next Steps Initiative has affected the role of those 
staff remaining in the core of the civil service Departments. Since 
the Next Steps Initiative is also intended to make government more 
open and accessible, the traditional anonymity of most civil servants 
will be examined, as well as what issues arise as the Next Steps 
Initiative brings more specific identification of personal 
responsibilities and increased scrutiny by outsiders. Finally in
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this section, various aspects of introducing change will be examined 
which underlie the basic purpose of the Next Steps Initiative.
The organisation of the civil service
There are many popular stereotypes of how the civil service operates; 
some of them are true. It is easy to deride repetitive and formal 
procedures, and equally easy to justify customs and practices which 
may have been used for many years. An innovation such as the Next 
Steps Initiative brings a spotlight to bear on many established 
patterns in government, and can challenge assumptions which may 
previously have been accepted with little questioning. We need to 
look at the merits and demerits of the civil service and see which of 
them benefit the public interest. Only then can the need for change 
be evaluated.
"Many civil servants question whether the underlying 
assumptions which mould the way in which government does its 
business have changed"
and
"The aim should be to establish a quite different way of 
conducting the business of government"
(Improving Management in Government - the Next Steps, HMSO
1988).
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These comments are related to existing administrative codes in the 
civil service, which have often been justified in terms of laid down 
procedures or structures, and the allocation of responsibility for 
actions, decisions and costs (Gray and Jenkins, 1985)» rather than by 
the standards of service which should be delivered.
The preference for direct control, uniformly pushing accountability 
upwards and using standardised procedures, have been described as 
deficiencies when change is sought (Stewart and Walsh, 1992). Civil 
servants have expressed concern about the loss of consistency in 
practices and staff mobility within the service if Agencies are 
encouraged to develop their own systems. Conversely, some outside 
commentators see the need to discourage risk adverse behaviour 
(Tomkins and Colville, 1989) in order to innovate and change the 
culture.
It would be surprising if the new priorities being set for Agencies 
did not cause problems in the early years. Some aspects of civil 
servants' conduct have recently been formalised, but many aspects of 
the organisation rely on judgment and discretion, for which there 
are, so far, few if any quantified standards. This contrasts with 
the written framework documents - contracts and agreements - as well 
as the specific targets, being used in the Next Steps Initiative.
A culture where certainty is seen as a virtue may mean that 
relatively minor mistakes are seen as major career deficiencies, and 
fail to recognise innovation and success. Thus management in the 
civil service has historically been directed towards rewarding
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adherence to established patterns rather than innovation and change. 
The civil service organisation can operate in a privileged and often 
monopoly position, without competitors to promote efficiency and 
independent viability, and provide the stimuli needed to improve 
standards. We shall examine later whether the Next Steps Initiative 
has altered this, or led to major changes in the organisation of any 
Agencies.
Adherence to established patterns is unlikely to foster progress, but 
it may indicate the best way of introducing change in an inherently 
cautious organisation. A low-key incremental approach may be the 
best way of overcoming resistance to reform by ’going around" many 
potential opponents rather than facing them head on (Polidano, 1995)* 
Sir Douglas Wass has said that
"the wise innovator is the man who had learned how to seize the 
chance of a small improvement while working incessantly in the 
direction of greater ones"
(Wass, 1984).
Perhaps, when dealing with an organisation such as the civil service, 
dramatic alterations should not be expected in the short term, since 
"small wins" can mean real and perhaps longer lasting gains. As one 
commentator has said, with continuous experimentation encouraged, and 
with the cost of personal failure reduced, the more widely the 
changes are spread, the more they will become the accepted pattern, 
until relatively complete diffusion can be achieved (Bryson, 1988).
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In order to assess what changes have come about, we need to look at 
the traditional role of the generalist civil servant. Birch (1990) 
says that civil servants has 4 roles - to be impartial, to be 
anonymous, to carry out policies and not to initiate change.
”to take and understand the advice of experts in the different 
disciplines on any particular problem, to analyze and assess 
that advice, and to reach a balanced view on the pros and cons 
of different possible courses of action.”
(Sir Basil Engholm, The Guardian, 16 May 1977. quoted in 
Kellner and Crowther Hunt, The Civil Servants, page 34).
It is at this point that the role of the central core of Departments 
diverges from that of the Next Steps Initiative Agencies, since the 
role of the central civil servant is responding to day to day 
parliamentary and public affairs, and to inform and advise Ministers, 
implement their decisions and be accountable to them (Stowe, 1992).
In the new Agencies, the staff are concerned with strategic thinking 
being translated into action, getting results from taxpayers' money, 
and providing specific services to the public.
One of the strengths of the civil service has been the "collegiate 
approach" in which a wide range of views are consulted, documents 
pass through many drafts before approval, and long term effects are 
considered. We will look to see whether this approach has been 
maintained in the processes leading up to the creation of the new 
Agencies.
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Most senior civil servants have been recruited straight from 
university and very few have had experience outside the civil service 
(Sherrif, 1976). This situation may underlie the pressures for 
uniformity in structures and operations throughout the Civil Service 
in the past which have prevented adaptations to tasks and 
environments at Departmental level (Hood and Dunsire, 1981).
The emphasis on policy advice from generalist civil servants may have 
resulted in Ministers being unaware of all the possible options, 
since those advising them do not have the breadth of expertise to 
know whether relevant aspects of a problem have been considered or 
offered by the interest groups involved. The Next Steps Initiative 
Agencies are partly intended to address this difficulty, and we need 
to look at what they have achieved in new initiatives and processes 
to enhance their quality of service.
An examination of the activities of the Treasury (Heclo and 
Wildavsky, 1981) revealed that communications within government rely 
much more on informal coordination between a nucleus of senior civil 
servants who are well known to each other than on technical expertise 
or formal links between Departments. This pattern conflicts with the 
formal relationships between core Departments and the Executive 
Agencies which have been set up under the Next Steps Initiative. How 
these relationships have evolved will be examined, as well as whether 
changes have been introduced within Departments as a result of the 
Next Steps Initiative.
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In the past, many senior civil servants have seen themselves not only 
as experts in drafting policy and advising Ministers, but also as 
generalists in other, more executive, functions. The changes taking 
place in government now may alter this, and encourage civil servants 
in the core of Departments to stress their specialist advisory role, 
using their network of relationships to shape the use of strategic 
resources.
An emphasis on policy skills in the core of central Departments 
should mean a more hands-off approach by the generalist civil 
servants as far as the new Agencies are concerned. That will need a 
radical change in attitudes by staff used to a very different 
situation. If previous experience and practices are relevant, then 
perhaps an organisation such as the Planning Inspectorate should be 
able to manage its affairs more effectively as an Agency than other 
parts of the civil service which had not had an independent status.
Examples of public servants who are already identified as responsible 
for the work they do are rare. They include judges, tribunal 
chairmen and planning inspectors. Thus, where Ministers1 functions 
have been delegated (as to Inspectors holding public planning 
inquiries) doubt has been expressed whether the Minister is 
personally accountable to Parliament (Marshall, 1984).
Where new forms of executive process or organisation, such as the 
Next Steps Initiative, are being introduced to produce more cost 
efficient methods of operation, some existing rules and procedures 
can have a very negative effect (Department of Transport, 1991)*
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These may be reinforced by the tradition of civil service anonymity 
which has been seen as allowing for continuity and the development of 
administrative expertise.
To the extent that Agencies are meant to be more businesslike 
(Chapter 1), it suggests that values will have to change. There may 
be lessons to be learned from the business and professional world as 
more civil servants find themselves in a more visible role.
For instance, the Harvard Business School has defined 16 
characteristics which comprised a person’s professional attitude: 
self-responsibility, determination, self-esteem, commitment, 
sociability, openness, empathy, achievement motivation, status 
awareness, self-organisation, initiative, failure reaction, criticism 
reaction, emotional stability, self confidence and flexibility (Pugh, 
1991*) • If these are important, perhaps there should be some 
incentives for government to encourage characteristics such as 
openness, personal initiative and flexibility throughout the civil 
service.
Civil servants in the future are likely to find that their careers 
are more dependent on their own resources, with more risk, and 
tension between flexibility in the organisation of the civil service 
and their individual security (Kanter, 1989). Thus, part of the 
challenge facing the new executive Agencies, and their ’’sponsors" in 
the parent Departments, is to retain the merits of bureaucratic 
organisation (including the established methods of providing
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accountability) and the confidence of their staff, whilst avoiding 
the disadvantages which are characteristic of such bodies.
One of the tenets underpinning the Next Steps Initiative is the 
assumption that introducing some private sector methods would be 
beneficial. But staff who have left the civil service even for a 
short time to gain experience elsewhere have in the past been 
regarded as having lost ground on the "race to the top", and the 
value of the work or training which they have added to their civil 
service background has not been regarded as equivalent to that they 
left behind. Thus, the idea of exchanges with the private sector or 
local government, although good in principle, may not be carried 
through to best effect. This past reluctance to value private sector 
experience does not augur too well for exchanges of staff between 
central Departments and the Agencies.
This also tends to confirm what Fulton found in 1968, that generalist 
civil servants have a narrowly circumscribed view of what makes a 
likely candidate for senior management, and professionals or anyone 
with a different background may well not qualify. Yet a survey of 
Treasury staff by independent consultants in 199^ said that civil 
servants complained of lack of leadership, poor internal 
communications, inadequate training and too much bureaucracy 
(Maguire, 199*0 • Only 2k% of those responding said that they 
believed what management said or had confidence in their decisions.
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Individual responsibility, outside scrutiny and introducing changes
It is a characteristic of many of the changes currently taking place 
in government that there is increasing outside scrutiny. The 
"Vehicle and General Affair" in 1972 was a rare past example of civil 
servants, rather than ministers, being named (by a tribunal of 
inquiry) as being responsible for negligence in the handling of the 
collapse of an insurance firm (Chapman, 1973)* Now that Select 
Committees of the House of Commons are examining civil servants in 
the course of their deliberations, such identification is becoming 
more likely. So in considering how the introduction of the Agencies 
has been managed, we need to ask whether the Next Steps Initiative 
has led to more open government.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Initiative is intended to promote 
improved value for money and more efficiency and effectiveness, 
whilst retaining accountability to Parliament. In November 1992, the 
Financial Secretary to the Treasury made it clear that the approach 
extended beyond Agencies to the whole of the civil service:
Ministers have decided that in every Department of state we 
must apply the back-to-basics test to every activity of 
government. The conventional question was "what can we sell ?" 
That question must now be turned on its head. Now we ask 
ourselves "What must we keep ? What is the inescapable core of 
government ?"
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If all reforms are changes but not all changes are reforms (Chapman, 
1988), perhaps the most important change needed is a capacity to 
recognise the need for change - not, for instance, the classic 
example of Parliament’s first response to the motor car - limiting 
its speed to 4 miles an hour and requiring it to be preceded by a man 
on foot waving a red flag.
Hunt (in Managing people at work, 1986, p.ll8) said
"The rational model of management is about order, structure, 
defined strategy, management by objectives etc. The behavioral 
model is about creativity, innovation, gut feel, emotion and 
feeling. None of the latter fit well into the rationalist 
model and yet it is the release of such creativity that is 
necessary if staff are to provide better service to the 
customer."
Therefore, modern government does not only require administrators to 
pursue their traditional role and deploy their skills in exploring 
the full range of views on a particular topic and setting them out 
with clarity and accuracy. In the civil service, adherence to the 
public service ethic of loyalty has often been seen to be sufficient, 
and innovative management may have had to rely on an individual 
behaving in a manner uncharacteristic of civil servants in general 
(Howells, 1981).
We therefore need to examine the importance of innovative management 
in the new Agencies. If civil service staff are to be "empowered" to
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act independently to produce the results sought, it is particularly 
important that they are committed to the service they provide. The 
Office for the Management of the Civil Service has promoted ways of 
Chief Executive Officers in the Next Steps Initiative exchanging 
experiences about their Agencies (Chapter 8). Later chapters will 
examine what features the operations of some Agencies may have in 
common.
Frederick Herzberg studied satisfaction in employment, and identified 
motivators operating in the work situation. The five motivators, 
according to Herzberg, are achievement, recognition, responsibility, 
advancement and the nature of work itself. These are all related to 
the content of work (Herzberg, Mausner and Snyderman, 1959)•
The factors mentioned most in the context of dissatisfaction were 
those relating to how work is managed - organisation policy and 
administration, supervision, interpersonal relations with 
supervisors, and working conditions. These can all act to cause 
unease through their absence or inadequacies, and inhibit motivation, 
and are aspects under the control of the new Chief Executive Officers 
in the Next Steps Initiative Agencies.
In addition to motivation, the conditions to promote lasting change 
include alterations to patterns of behaviour, and encouraging the 
culture of efficiency, effectiveness and value for money. Therefore, 
more commitment and effort can be promoted by attention to the design 
of jobs, including increasing variety, giving a person greater 
responsibility for planning their tasks, and more control over the
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way in which the tasks are carried out (Richardson and Richardson,
1989).
Accountability for the civil service
Under this heading, the need is to examine first of all why 
accountability has developed in the civil service initially as a duty 
of Ministers to Parliament. More recently, the concept that someone 
should be responsible to the legislature is extending to 
responsibility to a wider range of people and organisations, 
including the private sector concept of "the customer". In the Next 
Steps Initiative, we need to see whether the duties of the Chief 
Executive Officers mean a potential conflict between their 
responsibilities and those of the Accounting Officers in Departments.
Accountability to Parliament
It is easy to criticise the organisation of the civil service and 
forget that the detailed procedures, the cautious approach to change, 
and the formal hierarchy all have a purpose - to ensure that 
everything is recorded, that events can, if necessary, be traced back 
into the past, and that the system can demonstrate whether 
Parliament's intentions have been carried out.
As mentioned earlier, it is an intended outcome of the Next Steps 
Initiative that administrative staff at the centre or core of the 
civil service Departments should concentrate their efforts on their 
prime abilities to analyse and assess, and advise Ministers, and
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leave the new Agencies to carry out their operations free from too 
much interference. So we also need to examine in later Chapters how 
well the Departments have been able to establish their new role of 
"hands off" supervision in relation to the new Agencies, and how that 
can be balanced with the Permanent Secretary's continuing 
responsibilities as Accounting Officer for the Department.
"A code of accountability is, then a system of signals, 
meanings and customs which binds the parties in a stewardship 
relation and governs the liability of the steward to present an 
account of the conduct of his stewardship"
(Gray and Jenkins, 1985. page 140).
Modern government is no longer the limited and exclusive world which 
began with the responsibility of Ministers reporting directly to the 
Sovereign. The concept of accountability has developed since the 
enfranchisement of the adult population to a social and political 
process, using an agreed language and criteria for assessment. 
Accountability has been said to be the main distinguishing feature of 
public administration, in that it now requires Departments to carry 
out their work in a manner acceptable to Parliament (Stanyer and 
Smith, 1976).
It is a convention that Ministers are accountable through Parliament 
to those who elected them for the actions of the civil servants in 
their Departments. Conventions - moral or other rules - may be 
established from a series of precedents, or by formal agreement, or
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because of some acknowledged principle of government. They may be 
obeyed either because of the political difficulties which follow if 
they are not (Jennings, 1959)5 or because they are considered to be 
obligatory by those concerned with the working of the constitution 
(Wheare, 1951)*
The theory has been "When things go right, ministers take the credit: 
when things go wrong, they take the blame5'. The Crichel Down Affair 
in 1954 is the example which has usually been cited as establishing 
the principle (Drucker, Dunleavy, Gamble, and Peele, 1983)» although 
it has since become clear that the Minister (Sir Thomas Dugdale) 
resigned because he was not prepared to abandon a specific decision 
unacceptable to a significant section of his party, rather than 
because he accepted responsibility for an act of maladministration 
(Hennessey, 1989).
More recently, ever widening Ministerial responsibilities, coupled 
with the limited period of their tenure in Departmental posts, has 
diminished political accountability in practice. It is perhaps 
therefore not surprising that the idea that Ministers are responsible 
for all that Departments do in their name now generally seems to be 
exhausted (RIPA/Peat Marwick McLintock, 1988). In 1977. Sir John 
Hunt told the Expenditure Committee -
"The concept, that because somebody whom the Minister has never 
heard of has made a mistake means that the Minister should 
resign, is out of date and rightly so"
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(Eleventh Report from the Expenditure Committee (The Civil 
Service) HC 535-1 (1977)).
A survey by the Economist showed that, between 19^7 and 1988, 10 out 
of 11 Ministers resigned when there were failures in their 
Departments. By contrast, only half of the 6 Ministers similarly 
identified since 1988 have done so (The Economist, September 1992).
By retreating from some of their responsibilities for the outcome of 
policies, politicians may in practice be increasing the power of the 
civil servants in the Executive, including those in the newly created 
Agencies.
The problems of Ministerial control are compounded by the limited 
time they may serve in a particular post. Their average period of 
tenure in the Department of the Environment has been just 2 years; 
Ministers in the Department of Trade and Industry have lasted an 
average of 16 months before being moved on. In this situation, 
Ministers may not have time to become fully conversant with their 
responsibilities so as to be able to operate effectively, especially 
since they are much less likely than their European counterparts to 
have had previous experience of their subject in a work environment 
(Hibbs, 1991).
Control by Parliament has many limitations. There are restrictions 
on the information which officials may give under the Osmotherly 
Rules, which do not allow civil servants to give details of 
alternative strategies which could have been pursued. Select 
Committee reports can be ignored by government, and in any case only
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3 days a year are allocated in Parliament for discussing all their 
reports (Davies and Willman, 1991). Also, the role of Committees 
must essentially be after the event complained of, since they have no 
input into policy-making.
The First Division Association representing senior civil servants 
argued in evidence to the Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee 
that an extension of the freedom of information would be needed if 
the principle of a clear division of responsibility between Ministers 
and civil servants was to be extended into the sphere of policy 
advice (Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee Interim Report,
1993).
A form of independent appeal for civil servants is now being 
introduced for when they feel that they have been asked to behave 
improperly by Ministers (The Economist, May 199*0. since the present 
appeal is to the Head of the Civil Service who is also, as Cabinet 
Secretary, the Prime Minister's closest adviser.
Developing concepts of accountability
"It is not easy in the Civil Service clearly and distinctly to 
allocate to individuals or units the authority to take 
decisions ... We believe ... that the work of Departments can 
be so organised as to enable responsibility and authority to be 
defined and allocated more clearly than they often are at 
present. Individuals and units could then be called to account 
for performance which is measured as objectively as possible
Hi
... We consider this principle of organisation to be a 
necessary condition for achieving maximum Departmental 
efficiency and for enabling men and women to get greater 
satisfaction from their work.”
This quotation is not from the Next Steps Initiative, but from the 
Fulton Report, which had found that the structure and practices of 
the civil service had not kept up with the changes in the role of the 
administration (Fry, Flynn, Gray, Jenkins and Rutherford, 1988).
Public accountability implies that "someone" should be responsible 
for the way in which the duties of government are performed and the 
costs of doing so. The idea implies a framework for acceptable 
performance, an agreed way of measuring whether it has been achieved, 
a definition of the person or persons to whom the account is to be 
rendered, and a consistency in order and practice. In the past, the 
emphasis was on this political accountability, where those with 
delegated authority are answerable for their actions to the people, 
whether directly in simple societies or indirectly in complex 
societies. The consumer as customer was not a concept which was 
recognised. Now, the range of people and organisations to whom a 
Minister or his civil servants are responsible has widened, and we 
should look to see whether that is one of the most striking aspects 
of the Next Steps Initiative.
In order to be effective, accountability requires easy access to 
information, established procedures for dealing with complaints, and 
independent external monitoring. Modern commentators might also add
k2
that the system should work in practice, to deliver meaningful 
results which can be taken on to improve the organisation whilst 
keeping under constant review the statutory duty and the choice of 
means for its delivery.
In looking at the operation of the Next Steps Initiative, one aspect 
to be examined is to whom civil servants are now to be accountable; 
whether accountability as a concept embraces a range of organisations 
and people to whom civil servants and public servants should be seen 





the public at large
and customers
We shall be looking to see whether these new responsibilities have 
been fully recognised in the new Agencies, and if formal targets and 
aims demonstrate to whom these responsibilities lie. It is in this 
area that Agencies such as the Planning Inspectorate, whose staff
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have long had an independent role and a more public profile, may show 
the way to the future.
If the "customer” is now to be added to the list of those to whom the 
civil servants is to be accountable, this may mean new 
responsibilities for staff in the civil service. If the customers 
themselves are to have an input, through surveys and other ways, 
there need to be methods of showing this and assessing their 
priorities. That also implies an effective means of measuring 
customer satisfaction.
The National Consumer Council has suggested that the minimum 
conditions for accountability are publicity for operations and the 
annual report, commanding public confidence with an "approval 
procedure", strong external design and control, separate operation 
and control from the "industry", full representation by consumers and 
outsiders, a code of principles and standards, a clear complaints 
procedures, sanctions for non-observance, and monitoring for changing 
expectations.
One reason for the increasing influence of specialised interest 
groups is public disenchantment with political parties. The active 
membership of both the Conservative and Labour parties have fallen 
dramatically since the early 1950s (Economist, 1993). and only 1.k% 
of the electorate belonged to a political party in 1990. Politics 
could therefore be said to be a declining sector of the economy 
(Jacques, 1993)-
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It may be that because people have become disillusioned with 
conventional parliamentary politics (Economist, 1992), they have 
found a more effective way to influence government; or that the 
government and politicians may no longer be able to control the way 
facts and discussion are presented to the public.
By involving the public, the Next Steps Initiative could be turning 
what are now termed as "customers” into interest groups with 
semi-formal rights - which could be described as a kind of substitute 
democracy. The same description has been used for the Citizens’ 
Charter (Dunsire, 1995)*
Scrutiny of accountability
"The devolution of responsibility and enhanced freedom for 
Agencies should not compromise Government accountability to 
Parliament"
(from the Third Report of the Home Affairs Committee on the 
Next Steps Agencies, HMSO 1991)*
Since the time of the Crichel Down Affair, there has been an 
increasing use of tribunals of inquiry, Select Committees of the 
House of Commons, and the Ombudsman to look at the separate 
responsibilities of Ministers and civil servants when things go 
wrong.
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Almost all central government Departments are shadowed by a Select 
Committee which examines their expenditure, administration and 
policy. In 1978, reforms to the system were suggested by the Select 
Committee on Procedure, including a more rational structure shadowing 
parts of government and particular policies, with more flexibility 
and administrative support (Drucker, Dunleavy, Gamble and Peele,
1983).
"The key requirement is for a clear distinction between the 
Ministers' and Chief Executives' responsibilities ... The 
theory of Ministerial responsibility for policy and Chief 
Executive responsibility for operational matters is an 
attractive one but not necessarily convincing in practice”
(from the Third Report of the Home Affairs Committee on the 
Next Steps Agencies, HMSO 1991).
We need to examine whether the opportunities for Parliament to 
control the activities of government organisations via ministerial 
responsibilities conflict with the need to allow Chief Executive 
Officers adequate freedom to manage, free from outside direction. In 
the past decade, Select Committees of the House of Commons have 
developed into an effective means of examining the answerability of 
civil servants in managing the execution of government policy. How 
effective is this process in the context of the Next Steps Initiative 
Agencies ?
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Accountability, being about the interpretation of facts and the use 
of judgement (Day and Klein, 1987). may have become one of the basic 
principles seen to underpin the concept of the Next Steps Initiative, 
and autonomy within an Agency may conflict with accountability to 
Parliament. What are the consequences when civil servants have, as 
in some Agencies, a more independent role ?
Accountability depends on an agreed framework of meaning, a common 
vocabulary to which people respond (Day and Klein, 1987). and 
criteria that should be used in assessing them. The Treasury and 
Civil Service Select Committee in their Report on the Role of the 
Civil Service (November 199*0. emphasised the importance of ensuring 
that "the standards and ethics essential to the operation of the 
civil service were well understood", and did not agree with the 
government’s view that this was the case at present.
Decentralising tasks is, in theory at least, one way to identify 
those responsible for particular areas of work. Responsibilities 
need to be clearly defined before people can understand who is 
responsible for what. Better links between management and other staff 
may be needed (Tomkins, and Colville, 1989). and it is important to 
see accountability not only in terms of answerability for policy or 
performance, but as a positive opportunity for improvement.
It is a characteristic of the civil service that there must be a 
procedure for everything. Managerial accountability for civil 
servants has in the past been focused on administrative procedures 
and allocating responsibility for actions and expenditure, with those
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having delegated authority being answerable for carrying out set 
tasks according to agreed criteria of performance. But time expended 
on developing new procedures in Agencies for novel situations cannot 
be used to take the same organisation forward in other ways.
By contrast, hands-on professional management in the private sector 
means accountability, responsibility for individual actions, and 
visible control with clear roles and objectives, stressing results, 
with decentralised budgets, flexible use of proven private sector 
techniques and greater discipline in the use of resources (Hood, 
1991). It is the more progressive concepts in the private firms 
which the proponents of the Next Steps Initiative seek to extend to 
much of the modern-day civil service, allied with more outside 
scrutiny.
The ways in which the activities of Departments and Agencies can be 
measured and controlled
In this and the following sections, the reasons for controlling the 
activities of civil servants will be examined, and the ways in which 
this developed before the advent of the Next Steps Initiative. This 
will give a basis for considering in later chapters the financial 
controls and methods used in the new Agencies, including the role of 
auditing, which is an important feature in controlling the new 
regime, and the recent requirement of a productivity improvement 
which affects both Agencies and other parts of the Departments.
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We shall then move on to other innovations which have been introduced 
in parallel with the Next Steps Initiative and may have influenced 
its development - market testing and the Citizens’ Charters.
Finally, the use of performance indicators will be considered, in 
order to assess in later chapters how effective these indicators are 
as a major feature of control in the new Agencies.
The reasons for control
Accountability, as we saw earlier, is necessary in order to 
demonstrate that Parliament's intentions have been carried out. In 
turn, that implies that the government is operating in a fair and 
effective manner.
Thus, good "governance" has been described as being:
"a public service that is efficient, a judicial system that is 
reliable and an administration that is accountable to the 
public"
(Stowe, 1992, p.388, quoting a World Bank report in 1990)*
In the context of accountability in the public service, the need is 
to demonstrate that efficiency. One issue is whether the nature of 
the work done has a significant effects on the implementation of the 
Initiative. Where casework or demand fluctuates as it does in many 
Agencies, how can that be accommodated effectively and without 
excessive expenditure ?
9^
"The success of the Next Steps Initiative is dependent on an 
improvement in performance by the Agencies"
(from the Third Report of the Home Affairs Committee on the 
Next Steps Agencies, HMSO 1991).
Control has no meaning without some way of demonstrating that it is 
being exercised. Sir George Moseley, when he was Permanent Secretary 
addressing civil servants in the Department of the Environment, said 
that it was necessary to be able to measure performance and 
achievement in a way credible to the staff themselves before it was 
possible to go very far on incentives and rewards.
One definition of control is close to bureaucracy - practices and 
procedures which show how much is being done and by whom. But this 
ignores the issues of why something is being done and for whom. And 
the underlying reason for control must surely be because resources 
are not infinite. So the reason for control is partly to make it 
clear where resources are being used, and hopefully why they are.
How can it be demonstrated to the public that control works, and what 
methods have Agencies used to improve the process ? This is an area 
where the civil service may have difficulty; rapid response and 
participatory action may be unfamiliar to those controlling the 




Thus, control of government activities by Parliament is inevitably 
closely linked to the ability to restrain financial expenditure.
This is not surprising when central government expenditure is close 
to of GDP (Economist, 18 September 1993)* The scale and 
complexity of government operations has expanded in advance of the 
techniques to control and measure it, with the Treasury often trying 
to put more sophisticated controls in place after the activities to 
be controlled have been set in motion. The Treasury depends on the 
Departments to do the work, with the informal hierarchy and many 
channels of communication being the secret of their control, 
co-ordinated by a continuous round of personal contacts (Heclo and 
Wildavsky, 1981).
Over the years, the Treasury's methods of control have developed from 
the cash-based estimates system of the 1950s reviewed by the Plowden 
Committee between 1959 and 1961 on to the PESC system which included 
more comprehensive systems for surveying government expenditure. In 
the Department of the Environment, a detailed Management Information 
System for Ministers (MINIS) was introduced by the then Secretary of 
State, Michael Hesletine, in I98O to secure economy in the use of 
resources including manpower. In a report in 1982, the Treasury and 
Civil Service Select Committee supported the idea that Ministers and 
civil servants would act more as managers of the resources under 
their control and the MINIS approach was then adopted in other 
Departments under different names (Likierman, 1988). MINIS was a 
beginning in introducing accountable management, and led in part to
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the introduction of the computerised management system, now known as 
MAXIS, whereby full costs were identified and allocated to functional 
units.
The development of management control
The Rayner Scrutinies which began in 1979 did not amount to a system 
of management (Harrison, 1989) but focused on the efficiency of 
government programmes linked to cash limits and reducing civil 
service manpower. However, they did have a major impact on the 
thinking and culture of the civil service (Stewart and Walsh, 1992), 
and the opportunities for change which were revealed were direct 
influences on the introduction of the Financial Management Initiative 
(FMI) and the Prior Options Reviews in the Next Steps Initiative.
The FMI aimed to establish a system which has been seen as "a 
surrogate for private-sector stimuli" (Hennessy, 1989 page 607), 
where managers have clear views of their objectives, define 
responsibilities, and measure outputs and performance in relation to 
objectives by providing information on resources. The system was 
intended to cover all kinds of managerial initiatives, and was 
intended to make more effective use of public funds (Likierman, 1988) 
but, without delegation of authority, the FMI did not give real power 
down the line. Rather, it emphasised a responsibility for reducing 
inputs almost regardless of outputs or policy effects. Management 
was regarded primarily as a means of control, based on a simple view 
of private sector management, rather than increasing efficiency 
(Harrison, 1989). Above all, the FMI applied only to that 13% of
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central government expenditure overall that goes on administration.
It did not extend to the expenditure on programmes and most executive 
functions.
These deficiencies led to the production of the paper entitled the 
Next Steps Initiative by the then head of the Efficiency Unit, Robin 
Ibbs in 1987» which proposed to treat the "business" aspects of 
Whitehall as more independent units, with Chief Executive Officers 
being held accountable through their Departmental sponsors to 
Ministers and Parliament.
However, through all the previous changes, the government accounting 
system for most parts of the civil service remains the gross accruals 
method, whereby income and expenditure cannot be carried over from 
year to year. The system does not allow for the rationale for 
investing in capital expenditure to be justified over a period of 
years. Consideration of the financial regime in the new Agencies has 
occupied much time since 1988, and we shall look at the alternatives 
adopted. Setting up the new Agencies has in itself been a lengthy 
exercise, and staffing levels and other factors will be examined in 
later chapters.
The advent of the Next Steps Initiative has resulted in a varied 
pattern of financial accountability - making sure that the cost of 
carrying out Parliament’s intentions have been spent as agreed, in 
accordance with the appropriate rules. In order to create and 
maintain accountability in modern government, new financial and 
management systems are often needed, since it is the flow of
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information which makes accountability a practical proposition. 
Process or efficiency accountability, measuring that the required 
actions have been taken in a cost effective way, is about ensuring 
that the intended result has been achieved (Day and Klein, 1987). 
There have been changes in the financial arrangements between 
Departments and Agencies. Are the methods introduced through the 
Next Steps Initiative resulting in the most effective dispensation of 
public funds ?
Auditing and financial restraint
Auditing is used, both within government organisations, and 
externally by the National Audit Office (NAO), to monitor how public 
services are delivered.
The greatest challenge to the auditing profession in government is 
the assessment of effectiveness (Glynn, 19&5) it is often 
important to find ways of cutting down the amount of paper associated 
with a particular procedure (Cassels, 19&5) which conflicts with the 
practices normally required by the NAO. After all, a successful 
organisation identifies and then meets the demands of its customers 
at the least possible cost in relation to the service or goods 
sought. Can the NAO be expected to promote significant change and 
value for money ?
In the Budget of November 1993. the Chancellor announced a 3 year 
standstill on expenditure (including the civil service pay budget), 
which has implications for contracting-out functions both in Agencies
5^
and elsewhere in the civil service. In March 199^ » the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer reiterated that the fundamental reviews of civil 
service spending would continue, and that savings would be sought to 
make sure that public money is well spent, and that the services 
provided must be done by the State. We need to assess the 
consequences of these decisions in both the Agencies and the 
remaining central core of Departments.
The control of performance
Professor Eric Caines said in evidence to the Treasury and Civil 
Service Select Committee in 1993 that civil service staffing is 
determined too much by the fixed pay and grading system, with posts 
at each intermediate level having to be filled even when that results 
in overlapping of responsibilities attached to each grade.
In looking to improve performance, the authors of the Next Steps 
Initiative said, as we have already seen, that the tasks of the new 
Agencies should be defined, and clear accountability established for 
the way in which the organisations operated. In turn, this implied 
that these responsibilities should be devolved to individual managers 
capable of meeting performance targets. The new Agencies publish 
annual performance indicators, and their ability to achieve these 
each year is used as a basis for re-assessing and, if necessary, 
upgrading the requirements for the future.
Performance indicators and performance management are derived from 
mass production in industry, and a basic assumption is that the
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relevant tasks can be defined and measured. Early performance 
indicators described easily measurable functions, where the inputs 
could be simply aligned with the outputs; however, particular 
difficulty have been found in measuring policy outputs. Studies have 
shown that there has been a tendency for performance indicators to 
stagger between excessive simplicity and impossible complexity, which 
needs to be resisted and managed. There can be a danger of efforts 
being focused on these targets to the exclusion of developing a more 
effective service in other ways (Stewart and Walsh, 1992).
The most common output and performance measures are throughput, 
productivity, cost, quality of service and quality of work (RIPA 
Working Group, 1987). One question that needs to be examined is 
whether Departments as sponsors of Agencies have used the targets to 
good effect, and whether effective means have really emerged for 
assessing performance.
Labour productivity is a common measure of efficiency used in 
Agencies - the output divided by the number of staff. These measures 
need supplementing, as alone they do not take account of changes in 
prices, or lack of control over costs, due to external influences 
such as service-wide decisions on pay levels. Clearly technology can 
help in producing statistics and interpreting the results, if it is 
available.
The emphasis now is on improving the quality of the performance 
indicators (RIPA/Peat Marwick McLintock, 1988), but this can be a 
substitute for performance itself. Properly monitored performance
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indicators should be able to demonstrate value for money and educate 
the public as to their rights in using public services.
Measures which show service to consumers can threaten the providers, 
by leading to higher standards and therefore more pressures; by 
consumers* demands conflicting with the priorities of politicians, 
members or professionals. Thus, it can be difficult to control 
spending where there is increasing commitment to service quality 
(Harrison, 1989). It is too easy to tilt performance towards cutting 
costs rather than achieving and improving quality.
Certainly, performance indicators should not be seen as more than an 
aid to management. Perhaps the real indicators of quality are doing 
the routine things well (Carter, 1991). and that brings us back to 
bureaucracy and one of the virtues of the organisation in the civil 
service.
Summary
This Chapter has looked at three aspects of government - the way the 
civil service has been organised; accountability and changing 
responsibilities; and methods of measurement and control. The 
questions which arise in considering the introduction of the Next 
Steps Initiative can be summarised as:
the consequences of the way in which the Initiative was 
introduced, without statutory measures, and the effect of the 
Prior Options Reviews;
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whether the Initiative itself has led to more open government 
(bearing in mind also the advent of the Citizens' Charter);
the effects of competition and the advent of market testing;
possible changes in the scope and allocation of accountability, 
including the role of the "customer";
the control of Agencies' activities, including the effect on 
the autonomy of the Chief Executive Officers, the role of 
accounting systems, of performance indicators, and fluctuations 
in workload; and the effect of the productivity requirement 
introduced by the Treasury;
the effect of supervision by the NAO, and whether the advent of 
the Initiative has led to better value for money;
the relationships between Departments and Agencies; the 
relevance of traditional civil service methods; the relevance 
of the type of casework or demand for an Agency's services, and 
whether professionals will be affected differently from 
administrative staff.
In the following chapters, the Planning Inspectorate Agency and other 
Agencies in the Next Steps Initiative will be considered in the 
context of these questions.
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CHAPTER 3 - METHODOLOGY
This thesis examines the experience of the Planning Inspectorate in 
progressing to and beyond Agency status, in the context of the Next 
Steps Initiative throughout the civil service, and by comparison with 
the experiences in the other Agencies which have been created.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the Initiative is a relatively new 
innovation in government, although it has been introduced within the 
established, and well documented, pattern of civil service 
organisation and management which was described in Chapter 2. Market 
testing and the Citizens’ Charter are also recent additions to the 
practices used by civil servants (Chapter 1).
The methodology to be used therefore needed to combine the review of 
existing and established practices for maintaining accountability 
and control (Chapter 2) with obtaining information on the developing 
situation in the new Agencies, including the Planning Inspectorate, 
and relationships with the civil servants in the central core of the 
Departments (Chapters 5 to 9). so that the questions raised in 
Chapter 2 could be addressed, discussed (Chapter 10) and conclusions 
drawn (Chapter 11).
I therefore used three complementary sources for this study:
(1) an extended reading programme;
63
(2) a programme of interviews; and
(3) my practical experience as an Inspector, and discussions 
within the Planning Inspectorate.
1. Reading programme
I carried out a full reading programme, using the library at the 
University of Bath for general aspects of government and, for more 
specialised topics, the Department of the Environment Library at the 
Inspectorate’s headquarters in Tollgate House, Bristol.
I first reviewed the general literature on government organisation in 
this country since the last war, and the factors which have 
influenced the way in which the civil service operated prior to 1988. 
These studies have included addressing the conventions of political 
and Parliamentary accountability, and the development of methods of 
control, and particularly financial control.
I then moved on to matters more specific to the Next Steps Initiative 
and the experiences of the Agencies created. In looking at a recent 
innovation in the civil service which has created changes from 
established practices over a short period of time, I have necessarily 
found a range of information in contemporary newspaper and journal 
reports.
Since the creation of the first Agency, the Vehicle Inspectorate, in 
August 1988 there has been no shortage of academic studies and press
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comment. To date, most commentaries on the Next Steps Initiative (as 
well as the Citizens' Charter and market testing) have been in papers 
in learned journals rather than books, and in regular articles in the 
national Press; various commercial organisations have also published 
commentaries on the progress of the Initiative and its Agencies from 
time to time. I have drawn on all these sources.
The Initiative and this study draw not only on previous efforts to 
reform government such as the Fulton Report, but also on experience 
abroad - in particular in Sweden and, further away and more recently, 
New Zealand as briefly mentioned in Chapter 1. I have therefore read 
available literature on the experiences in those countries.
The rest of government has not stood still whilst the Agencies have 
been created. The introduction of market testing, intended to 
promote value for money and move appropriate activities in government 
into the private sector but under central control, affects Agencies 
as much as they do the centre of Departments. Similarly, the 
Citizens' Charters cover the broad sweep of activities that affect 
the public. With market testing, they have been kept under scrutiny 
by the Press, and I have used articles there as my main source for 
the most recent events.
In the past year, the government appears to be supporting more open 
recruitment to senior civil service posts, and a stronger line on 
limiting the size of the central core in the Departments. This 
approach has also been subject to review by the Press.
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In order to understand the way in which these matters have developed, 
and also to anticipate how the Inspectorate’s staff might react to a 
more active management style, I studied the literature relating to 
means of introducing change into organisations, and the pitfalls that 
could be encountered.
In government, the Next Steps Initiative has brought with it the 
introduction of framework documents and performance indicators, and 
other means, such as Annual Reports, Business Plans and Corporate 
Plans, of establishing whether aims and objectives are being met, and 
targets reached. Articles in the national and more specialised press 
are also a useful source of information and comment on recent 
developments in these areas.
More independent studies, such as those by Trosa in 199^ and by 
Massey in 1995 (Chapter 8), are providing an overview of how the Next 
Steps Initiative is working in practice, and examining how the 
relationships between Departments and Agencies are working in 
practice. I have included these aspects of the new administrative 
pattern in this study.
2. Interviews
Published information about the Agencies in the Next Steps Initiative 
and their relationships with other parts of government and commerce 
can only be a snapshot of what is happening, and can be presented by 
government to highlight those aspects of its operations which are 
doing well.
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FIGURE 3.1 - Programme of interviews
(the post mentioned is that held at the date of the interview)
David Aldous, Principal Auditor dealing with Environment issues, 
National Audit Office.
David Beeton, Chief Executive Officer, Royal Palaces Agency.
Stephen Crow, Chief Planning Inspector and Chief Executive Officer, The 
Planning Inspectorate Agency.
John Fitzgerald, member of the Project Team for the Next Steps 
Initiative, Cabinet Office.
Frank Grogan, Audit Manager responsible for Value for Money (VFM) 
training and technical development, National Audit Office.
Stuart Hampson, Chairman, the John Lewis Partnership.
Paul Hartnack, Comptroller General and Chief Executive Officer, The 
Patent Office Agency.
Sir Terry Heiser, Permanent Secretary, Department of the Environment.
Alexander Hermon, Senior Legal Assistant, the Council on Tribunals.
Alan Joyner, District Planning Officer, Northavon District Council.
Sir Peter Kemp, formerly Project Officer, the Next Steps Initiative, 
Cabinet Office.
Judge Timothy Lawrence, President of the Industrial Tribunals.
Rex Mercer, Partner in Charge, Consulting Group, Drivers Jonas, 
Chartered Surveyors.
John Pemberton, Assistant to the Chief Executive Officer, Land Registry 
Agency.
Richard Wakeford, Assistant Secretary, Planning Development Control, 
Department of the Environment.
Ian Watson, member of the Project Team, Next Steps Initiative, Cabinet 
Office.
To obtain information more directly, I therefore decided to carry out 
a programme of interviews with senior executives in relevant 
organisations in government, private professional practice, and 
commerce (Figure 3•1)•
A series of interviews with the people running some of the Agencies 
was a priority, and I arranged to have informal discussions with 
representatives of 3 Agencies - the Patent Office; the Land Registry, 
and the Historic Royal Palaces - as well as with the Chief Planning 
Inspector.
The first two Agencies have regulatory functions which seemed likely 
to give them experiences and problems relevant to some of those 
occurring in the Planning Inspectorate. The Historic Royal Palaces 
Agency operates in a very different field, but has three 
characteristics which are of interest. First, it was previously part 
of the Department of the Environment; secondly, the Agency had been 
moved from supervision by that Department to another (Heritage); and, 
thirdly, its Chief Executive Officer came, unlike those in the other 
2 Agencies, from the private sector (albeit having had very relevant 
previous experience for his new role). I also met the President of 
the Industrial Tribunals, which is a body exercising a quasi-judicial 
role in many ways similar to that of the Inspectorate, but for which 
Agency status was decided to be inappropriate.
Every potential Agency liaises with what was the Next Steps team in 
the Cabinet Office (now part of the Office of Public Service and
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Science). I met the civil servant who was liaising with the Planning 
Inspectorate before its Agency status was formally acquired; and, 
subsequently a second civil servant seconded from the Intervention 
Board to a similar role, together with Sir Peter Kemp (shortly after 
he left the civil service), who as the first Project Officer for the 
Initiative was responsible for much of the impetus behind the 
process.
I discussed the operation of the Next Steps Initiative within the 
Department of the Environment with the then Permanent Secretary, and 
later with another senior administrator who had been in charge of the 
Buying Agency during its formation, as well as having several years' 
experience of dealing regularly with the Planning Inspectorate on 
administrative and planning policy matters.
I also met staff from the National Audit Office (NAO) who were 
responsible for overseeing the finances of the Department of the 
Environment's Agencies, including the audit of the Planning 
Inspectorate; the NAO is funded directly by Parliament, and oversees 
the finances of all the Departments and the Next Steps Initiative 
Agencies, as well as those of other government funded bodies.
Another independent organisation which is concerned with overseeing 
quasi-judicial functions such as the Industrial Tribunals and the 
Planning Inspectorate is the Council on Tribunals; I was able to meet 
their senior legal officer.
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Finally, I met three senior executives, working respectively in 
commerce, private professional practice, and in local government, who 
are each frequently concerned with planning appeals and other 
responsibilities carried out by the Planning Inspectorate.
All the interviews were done on a non-attributable basis; I am 
grateful for the time and courtesy of those who assisted me. In the 
text, I do not attribute any views or quotations to any individual.
From these interviews, I was able to gain valuable insights into the 
background to the Next Steps Initiative; the process of creating new 
Agencies; the relationships between Agencies, their parent 
Departments, and outside bodies; problems of financing, 
accountability and control; and how the Next Steps Initiative is 
really working in practice.
3. Practical experience and discussions
As an Inspector in the Agency at the centre of the study, I have used 
my practical experience, together with discussions and interviews 
with professional and administrative managers and colleagues. I 
discussed the previous history of the Inspectorate, and the creation 
and operations in the new Agency with, (in alphabetical order) Martin 
Brasher, Peter Cheeseman, Malcolm Davey, Jim Dunlop, Mike Forsyth, 
Derek Gough, Donald Harris, Ian James and Steve Meeks.
Where they were available to me, I have used internal documents which 
chart the progress of the Planning Inspectorate towards Agency status
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and since. I have not relied on documents of a confidential nature. 
The opportunities to discuss with the Inspectorate’s staff the 
progression of the Inspectorate during the period between agreement 
that the Agency should be set up and its formal status as such in 
1992 have been invaluable. The Planning Inspectorate has long 
employed staff distanced by the nature of their role at arm's length 
from the centre of the Department, and many of my colleagues have 
added to my experience of the advantages and the practical problems 
which that brings.
Inevitably, having the opportunity to view an Agency from within as 
an employee also has its restrictions. Although the opportunities to 
obtain information are superior to those which someone from outside 
the civil service would enjoy, equally the confidentiality 
requirements which civil servants must observe do not allow some 
information to be disclosed or used. Although they did not prove to 
be an overwhelming constraint, I had to bear these matters in mind 
throughout the study period.
However, there is one practical matter concerning the process of 
finalising this study which does demonstrate a practical impact 
arising from the Next Steps Initiative. The civil service rules 
require that this thesis had to be read and cleared by my employer 
before ’publication". Before April 1992, that would have been by a 
civil servant in the Department of the Environment; but the advent of 
Agency status has meant that this consideration was carried out 
within the Inspectorate by a member of its own staff; I am grateful 
to Alan Payne for his time and patience.
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CHAPTER 4 - THE PLANNING INSPECTORATE BEFORE AGENCY STATUS
We saw in Chapter 2 that there is a long established pattern of 
operations within the civil service as a whole, with the civil 
servants' work carried out largely away from the public gaze in an 
hierarchical organisation.
This pattern of working, which has evolved informally over the years, 
is used by the administrative staff in the Planning Inspectorate who 
work very much in the way other civil servants carry out their 
duties. However, this pattern contrasts strongly with the 
independent role of the Planning Inspectors which has developed over 
the years on a formal legislative basis. This Chapter therefore 
identifies how this very different way of operating by the Inspectors 
has arisen alongside the traditional pattern of the administrative 
procedures.
We begin with, first of all, a short summary on the legal background 
to the Planning Inspectorate’s organisation. We shall note the way 
in which the organisation has been accountable both to Ministers, and 
to those people and organisations who have used its services before 
the Next Steps Initiative was introduced.
Despite the strong legislative framework which has developed for the 
appeal system over the years, we shall also see that those procedures 
directly affecting the interface of the users of the appeal system 
with the Inspectors have often first been introduced successfully on 
an informal basis by agreement with the parties.
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The administrative procedures used by the Inspectorate have been 
reviewed frequently, anticipating the Next Steps Initiative with its 
Prior Options Review process after the first 3 years of Agency 
status.
However, those reviews were done in order to streamline the 
administrative processes; it was rarely that the needs of the 
"customers” were considered important enough to invest time and money 
in consulting them.
History and organisation of the Planning inspectorate
The roots of the present system of development planning and control 
in England and Wales grew from the legislation to regulate the use of 
land by private and public landowners.
It was not until 1909 that legislative interest began to extend 
specifically to the separation of incompatible land uses and the 
supply of land for amenity use. The Housing, Town Planning, etc.,
Act 1909 was primarily concerned with giving powers to local 
authorities to build new houses and clear substandard properties, 
with an underlying purpose being the improvement of public health. 
However, the Act also gave discretionary powers to prepare schemes 
for land for development, and created the Housing and Planning 
Inspectorate to consider them.
An Act of 1919 with the same title was the first to require borough 
and urban district councils with a population of over 20,000 people
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to prepare schemes for land in the course of development or likely to 
be used for building - the forerunner of the present day Structure 
Plans for counties and Local Plans for district council areas.
In 1932, the permissive powers to make a scheme were extended to all 
land in England and Wales, and section 10(5) of the Town and Country 
Planning Act 1932 established the right for an applicant to appeal 
against a local authority’s refusal of planning permission (Telling, 
1990). Further Acts extended these powers, so that by 19^ 3 all land 
was subject to interim control whether or not a "scheme” had been 
made (Town and Country Planning (Interim Development) Act 19^ 3)•
A second Act in 19^ 3 provided for the appointment of a Minister
"charged with the duty of securing consistency and continuity 
in the framing and execution of a national policy with respect 
to the use and development of land throughout England and 
Wales"
(Minister of Town and Country Planning Act 19^ 3)*
The control of land use, beyond purely local amenity and environment, 
was finally introduced by the Town and Country Planning Act 19^ 7. and 
continued in the Acts of 1962, 1968, 1971t 1990 and 1991*
Until the 19^ 7 Act, the landowner had the most effective of all 
planning powers, if he chose to use them. His power over development 
was absolute. Subject to the constraints of the market and human
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behaviour, he could dispose land uses as he pleased (JPEL, 1994, page 
52).
Thus the planning legislation changed the options open to landowners, 
and gave considerable powers to the local authorities to control 
development and, in the event of a dispute, gave a monopoly to the 
Secretary of State to determine appeals as advised by his Inspectors 
after an inquiry. The 1947 Act also introduced a hierarchy of 
planning authorities, who were required to prepare plans for their 
area to show what kind of development would be appropriate and where. 
A right of appeal to the High Court in London on a point of law from 
the Secretary of State's decisions on appeals was introduced by the 
Town and Country Planning Act 1959*
The development of appeal procedures
The planning legislation effectively created an additional level of 
bureaucracy throughout the country, since Local Planning Authorities 
were given powers by the planning legislation to control development 
in their areas and to make decisions on applications made to them for 
planning permission (under what is now section 78 of the Town and 
Country Planning Act 1990).
"(The appeals system) provides the ultimate safeguard against 
unfair or unreasonable decisions by local planning authorities, 
a mechanism whereby the public can obtain an independent and 
impartial hearing beyond the realms of local politics and 
influence.
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It forms a precious part of the democratic decision-making 
process, and for this reason needs to be cherished and 
protected. Without it, the planning system would quickly fall 
into public disrepute.”
(Evidence of the Town and Country Planning Association to the 
Environment Committee (1986); Planning Appeals, Call-In and 
Major Public Inquiries, HC 181 (London: HMSO).)
The grant of planning permission creates a form of "intellectual 
property” - literally a piece of paper which confers rights - in the 
case of a planning permission to the person in control of land or 
property to carry out the specified development within a prescribed 
period (usually 5 years) or to retain development already carried 
out. Agencies producing other forms of intellectual property are 
described in Chapter 9*
Should permission be refused, or no decision made within the 
statutory period laid down (normally 8 weeks) the applicant may 
appeal to the Secretary of State for the Environment. It is the role 
of the Inspectorate to act on behalf of the Secretary of State in 
these appeals, and in allied casework such as compulsory purchase and 
other legislative powers relating to the environment.
The powers to be exercised by local authorities and ultimately the 
Minister were of very wide application. As Wraith and Lamb pointed 
out in 1971 (page 56), quoting Baroness Sharp, Permanent Secretary to 
the Ministry of Housing and Local Government:
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"(planning appeals) cover every variety of subject, from 
provision for a complete new community to the erection of a 
garage in the garden. They defy all attempts at any form of 
generalisation and any but a purely statistical form of 
classif ication.’
In the 1950s, the normal procedures were for the appellant and the 
local planning authority to appear before the Inspector at a local 
inquiry to present their cases; the site was then viewed. The 
Inspector as the Minister’s representative was required to act in 
accordance with the principles of natural justice during the inquiry. 
Thereafter, the appeals were dealt with in a similar fashion to other 
administrative decisions made by civil servants. The Inspector wrote 
a report to the Minister which was confidential to the Department, 
and in due course a short decision letter was sent to the principal 
parties.
However, the central civil servants taking the decision and the 
Minister were free to take into account other policies, to consult 
other civil servants, and they did not publish the Inspector’s 
report. Thus the procedures within government after the inquiry 
followed the traditional pattern of secrecy and anonymity which we 
saw in Chapter 2.
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The Franks' Committee
In an interesting precursor to the 1990s' emphasis on customer 
involvement, as development began to prosper during the 1950s, and 
the number of people affected by planning inquiries increased, the 
way in which the inquiry system operated came into question, 
particularly for those many small-scale appeals where the policy 
content seemed to be limited. The appellants thought that the 
decisions should be based on the outcome of the inquiry at which they 
had been present, and that the evidence given, and the details of the 
Inspector's recommendation, should be published.
This dissatisfaction with administrative processes in general was one 
of the main reasons which led to the setting up of the Committee on 
Administrative Tribunals and Inquiries (the Franks Committee) in 
1955* The Committee's report in 1957 Is regarded as one of the 
turning points in British administrative history (McAuslan, 1980), 
and as a benchmark for what is and is not proper in the 
administrative process.
The civil servants who gave evidence to the inquiry tried to maintain 
the traditional anonymity of their role, as they were not comfortable 
with the more open and accountable approach being urged upon the 
Committee. They said that, in the public interest, Ministers had to 
be free to seek advice elsewhere, that the inquiry was but a small 
part of the total administrative process, and that publication of the 
Inspectors' reports would give them a false importance.
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Virtually all the other evidence to the Committee anticipated the 
Citizens’ Charter approach some 30 years later, and supported public 
participation in the process, more procedural safeguards, more 
openness and more independence for Inspectors.
The Franks Committee gave considerable attention in their inquiry to 
the Planning Inspectorate, which had by far the greatest workload of 
all the organisations scrutinised. The Committee was not so much 
concerned about the procedures used by Inspectors during the 
inquiries, but with the handling of the cases before and afterwards - 
the administrative approach.
The Committee decided that people adversely affected by planning 
proposals did not have sufficient notice of the case they had to 
meet, and should have a right to see the report which the Inspector 
made to the Minister, and on which the decision was based. Wraith 
and Lamb (1971) comment that the Committee was not impressed with the 
civil servants’ attempts to persuade them that publication of the 
Inspectors’ reports could embarrass Ministers if a decision was made 
against the Inspectors’ recommendation.
The Committee decided that the principles of ’openness, fairness and 
impartiality” should be fundamental in the planning inquiry process, 
so as to demonstrate that the procedures had been implemented in 
accordance with the principles of natural justice.
The Committee also spent a considerable amount of time debating 
whether an independent Planning Inspectorate under the Lord
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Chancellor was desirable in view of the quasi-judicial nature of the 
Inspectors’ role, and finally advised that this was preferable to the 
Inspectors being retained within the (then) Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government.
However, after vigorous debate in Parliament in 1958 on the Council 
on Tribunals and Inquiries Bill (H C Deb, 575 and H L Deb, 208), the 
Inspectors was retained within the Ministry, but with the 
appointments and dismissals of the Inspectors being subject to the 
approval of the Lord Chancellor. The activities of the Inspectorate 
were also made subject to the supervision of the Council on Tribunals 
at the same time.
The special characteristics of the Planning Inspectorate
Thus the Inspectorate began to diverge from the standard 
administrative civil service pattern, and the unique and more public 
accountability of the Inspectors began to develop.
A new framework of procedural rules for handling planning appeals was 
brought in by statutory instrument, and the Inspectors’ reports to 
the Secretary of State were published from then onwards. The Inquiry 
Procedure Rules required the Secretary of State to give reasons for 
the decisions. New internal administrative procedures were 
established for handling the papers associated with the appeal 
process.
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However, unlike other administrative procedures in the civil service 
at the time, these procedures were directed towards demonstrating to 
those using and observing the inquiry system that the principles laid 
down in the Franks Report - openness, fairness and impartiality - 
were being met, and acknowledged the need to take into account the 
interest of the appellants, local planning authorities and, 
increasingly, third parties. They also underlined the independence 
of the Inspectors as adjudicators in their professional and practical 
role.
Since the enactment of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1958, which 
followed the Franks Report, other detailed rules and regulations have 
been introduced and regularly updated for most of the work carried 
out by the Planning Inspectorate.
The Ministers' planning policy intentions have been published, first 
in more frequent Circulars and more recently in Planning Policy 
Guidance Notes (PPGs). Applicants in making their proposals for 
development, and local planning authorities, Inspectors and Ministers 
in determining applications and appeals, are expected to have regard 
to these policies. The policies are also the starting point for 
Councils when preparing the development plans for their 
administrative areas.
"Planning policies are seldom in the form of rigid rules or 
tests, and Inspectors apply them and any other material 
considerations in both the professional and political context, 
so that the planning system is essentially discretionary ."
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(Speech of the Chief Planning Inspector to the North West 
Branch of the Royal Town Planning Institute, May 199*0 .
Norman Lewis has observed:
’’Inquiries ... are quintessentially a way of civilising the 
policy making process. They allow discourse and disputation in 
relation to ’political" decisions. They are decisions, in 
reality, of a much more hybrid nature, depending on an amalgam 
of political preference, policy appreciation and factual 
perception. "
(page ix of the preface to Purdue, 1991)
Thus the developing role of Inspectors extended the interface of 
professionals in the civil service to those using the planning appeal 
system, including the public and interested groups, in a very open 
way.
Changes to the Inspector's role
In the 1950s and 1960s, some 97# of appeals had been decided in 
accordance with the Inspectors' recommendations, but the 
administrative procedures in the central policy "core" of the 
Department needed to process the decisions imposed delays on 
thousands of minor cases.
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The powers set out in the Town and Country Planning Act 1968 
therefore also allowed for appeals to be transferred to the 
Inspectors for decision. Some 2,284 appeals for residential 
development were determined by Inspectors in the first year - 44.7# 
of the total number. Subsequently, the jurisdiction in further 
categories of decisions was transferred.
These changes were described by Wraith and Lamb (1971» PP* 336) as of 
constitutional significance, since they gave the Inspectors a new 
status, and made them the final arbiters in decisions, rather than 
just ’reporters" to the Minister (later the Secretary of State).
Another aspect of the Planning Inspectorate’s activities has been the 
use of informal procedures, where the agreement of the principal 
parties could be obtained, in order to save money and reduce delays 
in the system for resolving disputes. In this, the developments 
introduced by the Next Steps Initiative were anticipated to some 
extent.
During the 1950s, as the number of appeals grew and threatened to 
swamp the system, the practice grew up of inviting the parties in 
cases of minor development to waive their legal rights "to be heard" 
at an inquiry, and rely on the exchange of written representations, 
and a site visit by an Inspector. This practice, although entirely 
informal initially, was officially encouraged by Circular 32/65 
issued by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government.
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Since most planning appeals are about relatively small local issues, 
the cheaper and quicker written representations* procedure became 
increasingly popular with appellants. By 1968 just under half of the 
appeal cases that year (just over 4000) used the procedure, which was 
formalised by section 21(6) of the 1968 Town and Country Planning 
Act.
In 1981, another informal procedure was introduced as an alternative 
to inquiries for small-scale appeals. These were (Informal)
Hearings, where the parties agreed to waive some of their rights 
under the Inquiries Procedure Rules and, instead of an inquiry, the 
hearing took the form of a discussion chaired and led by the 
Inspector. This process was usually cheaper and quicker for the 
parties than an inquiry, and less daunting to those private 
individuals who rarely used the appeal system. From 31 hearings in 
1981, the popularity of this method has grown so that for the first 
time there were more hearings than inquiries in 1992/93*
Thus there were 3 procedures in use:
a) inquiries at which the principal parties could be 
represented by barristers and/or solicitors as advocates 
calling witnesses, or appellants may represent themselves or 
use other professionals' knowledgeable about planning; third 
parties could appear with or without formal representation. A 
site visit followed the inquiry.
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b) hearings on straightforward, simple appeals, where the 
Inspector led a discussion between the parties. The appellant 
could represent him/herself, or use a professional adviser. 
Third parties could speak, but legal representatives were not 
present. A site visit followed or formed part of the hearing.
c) written representations, where the Inspector visited the 
site but relied solely on papers submitted by the appellant, 
the local planning authority, and any third parties.
The Justice/All Souls Report of 1988 on Administrative Justice 
confirmed that:
"The essence of the system (of planning appeals) is the 
exercise of discretion informed by policy, rather than the 
application of law. The system employs the machinery of both 
central and local government, drawing on political and 
technical resources, and presents the most open form of our 
public administration." (page 268)
" ...The improvements in speed of decision and the use of 
written representations would have been difficult to achieve if 
the role of the Inspector had not undergone a significant 
change from that of reporting and recommending to that of 
decision taking." (page 288)
"The most obvious effect of transferring the bulk of decisions 
in planning appeals to Inspectors, as the Council on Tribunals
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has pointed out (Annual Report 1979/80 paragraph 6.4l) has been 
to convert the inquiry into a tribunal hearing.” (page 289)
The informal introduction of new procedures continued in 1989 and 
1990 with a trial of "sessional hearings”, by agreement with the 
"customers” (the appellants and the local planning authorities). 
Initially the trial used cases that would have been decided by the 
written representations’ procedures, and then with cases that would 
have used inquiries. In a daily session, 2 or 3 simple appeal cases 
were dealt with at successive hearings, the site visits having taken 
place on the previous day. After a short adjournment, Inspectors 
gave a concise oral decision, which was confirmed in writing by the 
Inspector direct to the parties within a few days (Chief Planning 
Inspector's Annual Report 1989/90).
This allowed the parties to have the outcome of the appeal confirmed 
in writing within a few days of the hearing. A subsequent survey 
established that appellants were willing to participate in the new 
process, but that they were keener on being "heard", and receiving an 
earlier decision, than on the opportunity to hear the outcome orally 
at the time. Not unreasonably, appellants like to know that the 
Inspector has had some time to consider all the representations made 
before coming to the decision. However, sessional hearings involved 
more administrative work than for the other procedures, and some 
extra preparation by Inspectors, without any consequent cost savings 
for the Planning Inspectorate. The use of the procedure was 
therefore discontinued at the end of the trial.
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The combination of the changes brought in following the Franks Report 
mean that the planning appeal system is now one of the most open and 
accountable processes in public administration in this country 
(Norman Lewis, in the foreword to Purdue, 1991)* with the Inspectors 
in the Planning Inspectorate at the interface between administrative, 
legal/judicial considerations, and political/participatory contexts.
As we saw in Chapter 2 in relation to the various commentators’ views 
of government, the general convention that Ministers were responsible 
for everything done in their name has been weakened. In the case of 
the Planning Inspectorate, however, the formal legal position was 
that which operated in practice, as Schedule 6 to the 1990 Town and 
Country Planning Act provided that the Inspector had the same powers 
and duties as the Secretary of State when the determination of the 
appeal was transferred (Purdue, 1991)* The term often used was that 
they ’stand in the shoes of the Secretary of State”. It should be 
noted that these powers were given not to the ’Inspectorate" as a 
body or organisation, but to Inspectors as individuals. They thus 
anticipated, although more formally, the delegation of 
responsibilities which is intended to be an important part of the 
Next Steps Initiative (Chapters 1 and 8).
The planning appeal process has been the only recourse which most 
aggrieved applicants have if planning permission was refused, and in 
that sense the Planning Inspectorate has had a monopoly in the appeal 
process. In that planning appeal decisions have been reported in the 
local press, and in major cases on local television or even in the 
national media, the work of the Planning Inspectors can be said to
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have been much more widely known than that in many other parts of 
government. Thus, the publication of their decisions and reports 
identified them personally with the outcome of each appeal and, where 
planning permission was granted, with the changes that new 
development inevitably brought to a locality.
In as far as the process has been brought into the open, and 
accessible to the public, how the process operates, the Planning 
Inspectorate has been a forerunner of some aspects of the Citizens’ 
Charter, and what is now happening in other Agencies in the Next 
Steps Initiative.
Administrative procedures
At all stages, the process has been open to public participation, 
unlike many other processes in government. The main procedures dealt 
with by the Planning Inspectorate have been -
The appeal is lodged with the Inspectorate and the parties are 
notified.
The administrative staff gather information in accordance with 
the statutory rules and regulations.
Administrative civil servants in consultation with professional 
managers allocate the casework and appoint the Inspectors 
(charting), and sent the file to the Inspector.
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The Inspector carries out the site visit or holds the inquiry 
or hearing.
The Inspector writes the decision letter (or report to the 
Secretary of State).
The letter or report is received and processed by the
administrative staff in the Planning Inspectorate.
The decision is issued (or the report is sent to the decision 
branch in the Department of the Environment for consideration 
before the Minister's decision is issued).
The administrative staff in the Planning Inspectorate have been 
responsible for receiving the completed appeal forms; collating the 
representations to make up the case which is presented to the 
Inspector; and answering queries. Once the visit, hearing or inquiry 
is over, and the decision letter or report has been completed, 
Inspectors have posted the files back to the Planning Inspectorate's
office in Bristol, for the decisions to be sent on, again by post, to
the parties, or for reports to be forwarded to the central Department 
for consideration on behalf of the Secretary of State. We shall see, 
later in this Chapter, how often the parent Department saw it as 
being necessary to review these procedures, long before the Next 
Steps Initiative was introduced.
The Planning Inspectorate's Inspectors can deal with more than 180 


































and Country Planning Act 1990 are the best known to the public. The 
variations in the size of that workload between 1971 and 1994 are 
shown on Figure 4.1, and these sometimes dramatic fluctuations have 
made it impossible for the Planning Inspectorate to keep to the 
quantity targets laid down for the new Agency. Allocating appeal 
casework is a major task, which becomes more complicated if any 
priorities are imposed for particular tasks, as we shall see after 
Agency status came about.
The complexity of the charting process interests most visitors to 
Tollgate House, the Inspectorate's headquarters -
"We were shown the famous chart room with its overtones of a 
Battle of Britain control room. The vast planning battlefield 
was displayed and there were earnest young men and women moving 
markers around and dispatching brave Inspectors into battle.
Sad to say, this famous display is soon going to be superseded 
by IT equipment and the room will then look like a glorified 
Estate Agent’s office.
Perhaps the chart room should be retained*as a planner’s 
shrine. I am sure it could become a visitor attraction in 
Bristol on the lines of the Churchill war rooms in Whitehall."
(Michael Welbank, President, Royal Town Planning Institute, 
1992.)
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The main task of the Planning Inspectorate has not been to decide 
what the priorities for its caseload should be, as to keep up with 
the major task of deciding appeal casework.
Reports to the Secretary of State
As we have seen, Inspectors do not normally work in the hierarchical 
pattern familiar to most civil servants. However, there are a few 
exceptions to that. Although the accountability for appeal decisions 
has effectively been transferred to the Inspectors in most cases, 
there are some few appeals where the jurisdiction is recovered by the 
Secretary of State, because of the political dimension of public 
interest or concern, or because of the scale and implications of the 
development concerned.
The more open approach now being promoted throughout government, for 
instance through the Citizens' Charter, had been anticipated in the 
Planning Inspectorate prior to the Next Steps Initiative. In all 
cases, the reasons for transferring the jurisdiction away from the 
Inspectors to the Minister have been explained to the parties and the 
public - an interesting reversal of the situation in much other 
government business.
Where the decision is to be issued by the Secretary of State, the 
later stages of the consideration of the appeal are usually carried 
out in the regions, in one of the Government Offices shared by the 
Department of the Environment. In the overall context of the all the 
development appeals decided by Inspectors, the percentage of cases
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where the Secretary of State did not support the inspector’s views 
has been very small - between 5# and 8% a year of those few cases 
decided by the Secretary of State instead of the Inspectors.
Local planning authorities grant permission on average for between 
85# and 87% of all planning applications made to them. The 
percentage of planning applications refused or undecided on which 
appeals are then made has been fairly consistent from year to year, 
at about 28%, Thus the Inspectors determine about 3*6# of all the 
applications made to planning authorities in England and Wales each 
year. Of these, about 35# are given planning permission, thus 
reversing the decisions made by the local planning authorities.
About 98# of all section 78 appeals are decided by Inspectors, with 
only 2% the subject of Inspectors’ reports having the decision 
reserved for central civil servants to make on behalf of the 
Secretary of State.
At the end of the 1980s, 83# of Section 78 planning appeal cases were 
dealt with by the written representations’ procedures. Some 94# of 
cases were graded as straightforward. Less than 2% of cases are the 
major appeals dealt with by the most experienced Inspectors, although 
these cases take a much higher percentage of Inspectors' time 
overall.
The Planning Inspectorate's appeal targets for written 
representations and inquiries (11 and 17 weeks), introduced following 
Rayner Scrutinies in 1984 and 1985 assumed minimal queuing of cases 
between stages; co-operation of the parties throughout; and
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availability of Inspector resources. The nearer the Planning 
Inspectorate gets to the target times, the greater are the unit costs 
for each appeal, since less effective scheduling and linking of 
programmes is possible when there is less choice of cases to chart to 
Inspectors at any one time.
The availability of information technology was not a feature of the 
organisation prior to Agency status. Its absence limited the 
organisation's ability to measure the speed and costs of processing 
appeals. In 1989/90, the most sophisticated technology in the 
Planning Inspectorate's administrative procedure groups was carbon 
paper. On the average planning appeal case, the appellant's address 
and site addresses were written out 34 times and the case reference 
48 times.
Other difficulties were the long lead times between recruitment and 
availability of trainee Inspectors for the full range of work. It 
proved to be very difficult to match the variations in the number of 
appeals, which are often linked to the state of the economy, with the 
minimum 2 year period needed to train an Inspector to be able to cope 
with most smaller and medium sized appeals.
Organisation, recruitment and training
It is difficult to be certain whether physical or practical 
circumstances influence the way in which the organisation operates, 
but it would be surprising if this did not have some relevance.
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The Planning Inspectorate in London was located in a different 
building to the policy divisions of the Department of the Environment 
prior to 1978. In that year, the headquarters of the Planning 
Inspectorate moved from London to Bristol, one of the last government 
offices to be moved out of the capital at that time. This distanced 
the organisation from the central core of the Department of the 
Environment physically, and made organising a dispersed group of 
professional staff more onerous because of the less adequate 
communications from Bristol for staff who live all over England and 
Wales.
In its practical day-to-day organisation prior to Agency status, the 
Planning Inspectorate was expected to follow the pattern of other 
parts of the Department of the Environment. Although Inspectors were 
recruited independently via the Civil Service Selection Board, 
administrative officers were appointed by the centre, and all 
staffing and personnel issues were dealt with by the Department in 
London.
To be able to carry out its role effectively, the Planning 
Inspectorate needed to be able to recruit suitable Inspectors when 
needed, and enable them to work effectively to a high professional 
standard. The work of the Planning Inspectorate was described as 
offering potential Inspectors:
"an attractive combination of interest, challenge and 
responsibility. It demands total commitment, self-confidence, 
high intellectual standards, self-motivation and integrity."
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(From Planning Inspectorate recruitment advertisements in the 
1980s)
This phraseology is reminiscent of the list of professional attitudes 
in the Harvard Study, as well as to the motivators identified by 
Herzberg, to which there were references in Chapter 2, but not so 
much the skills traditionally thought to be appropriate for 
generalist senior administrative staff.
Service-wide restrictions on staffing can have a serious effect on 
the ability of an organisation with a variable workload to maintain 
its standards of service and speed of processing.
The recruitment of Inspectors has several unusual characteristics 
which contrast strongly with the normal pattern for the central civil 
service. Whereas young civil servants destined for the more senior 
management grades usually enter the civil service direct from 
college, Inspectors are recruited at a mature age (average about 42 
years), from people professionally qualified and experienced in the 
field of planning law and practice.
In theory, a mixture of private and local or central government 
experience is the ideal; but civil service pay scales do not attract 
many worthwhile applications from the private sector. Although a 
large number of applications is always received to each 
advertisement, there is a shortage of suitable candidates which has 
persisted into the 1990s. This is perhaps now partly due to the 
































uncertain recruitment market following a recession, and perhaps 
because there is a finite number of suitable staff within the 26,000 
or so planning officers employed in local government.
The Planning Inspectorate anticipated the service-wide introduction 
of market testing by several years. Contract Inspectors, paid a 
retaining fee and contracted to work at least 36 weeks a year, were 
introduced in the 1980s to help with a rapid increase in workload at 
a time when the recruitment of full time staff was restricted in the 
civil service. Figure 4.2 shows how the staffing of the Planning 
Inspectorate has changed after I98O; until Agency status, 
fluctuations in the number of administrative staff were almost 
entirely related to the numbers of cases being processed.
When the number of appeals escalated in the late 1980s, retired 
Inspectors also assisted by working part time, and consultant 
Inspectors were also employed when those of a sufficient standard 
could be found. They have been used on the more straightforward 
casework to give more flexible resources to meeting fluctuating 
needs.
Salaried Inspectors are usually recruited into the main Inspector 
grade; promotion to senior Planning Inspector for able staff should 
come within 2 to 4 years. From initial entry and training, the most 
successful Inspectors normally take between 5 and 10 years to reach 
the grade of Principal Planning Inspector, when they regularly take 
major inquiries and become a line manager for others.
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Since it takes at least 2 years to train a new Inspector to be able 
to deal with the majority of straightforward cases, it will be 
appreciated how difficult it has been to cope with dramatic 
fluctuations in the workload in the short term solely by recruitment, 
especially when there have been restrictions placed on this.
Internal studies and reviews
Long before the Next Steps Initiative was introduced, the Planning 
Inspectorate was subject to a series of examinations of its 
procedures, almost entirely conducted from outside the organisation, 
with the priorities being very different from those to which Agencies 
are now subject. Thus the form in which the planning appeal and 
inquiry service was delivered to its "customers” (as they have since 
been described in the Citizen’s Charter) - appellants, their 
advisers, local planning authorities and the public - was given much 
less attention than civil service administrative procedures.
In 1986, Sir George Moseley, recently retired Permanent Secretary to 
the Department of the Environment, looked at the management of the 
Inspectorate, and remarked in his report (September 1986) that, with 
3 reviews between 1980 and 1983* and 9 between 1984 and 1987 -
"the Inspectorate must be one of the most intensively reviewed 
and inspected areas in the Department (of the Environment)".
A short history of these investigations, the majority of which were 
not carried out by the Planning Inspectorate's staff, gives a flavour
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of the constant emphasis on administrative procedures, the repetitive 
nature of some of the findings, and the frequent absence of the needs 
of the customers outside the civil service being perceived as 
important.
An early review, in March 1971. by Sir Wilfred Morton, was appointed 
to review the work of
’those Inspectorates now serving the Department of the 
Environment whose primary duties are to hold inquiries and 
hearings under various statutory powers, to include the 
organisation, qualifications, conditions of service and duties 
of Inspectors".
During the early 1970s a sharp rise occurred in the number of 
planning appeals. So, in 1973. Mr George Dobry QC was appointed to 
review the system of development control in the light of this 
increase, and the consequent delays to the planning control process. 
His final report was published in February 1975. with a host of 
recommendations to improve procedures in local planning authorities 
and the clarification of policies by Government.
The report recorded the considerable public confidence in the 
Inspectorate and the appeal process as a whole. Mr Dobry said that 
the Inspector should play a more active role in inquiries, 
restricting repetition and discussion of irrelevant topics, an 
approach which has been commended to the Inspectorate much more 
recently in discussions with the Planning Bar in 199^ *
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He recommended a two level system, with simpler appeals and those 
conforming to local policy being decided on the basis of limited 
documentation and by an informal procedure without legal 
representation. Mr Dobry said that the use of written 
representations should be encouraged, and take place within a strict 
timetable. Various procedures to improve the information available 
before the inquiry were recommended, and the possibility of holding 
sessions of inquiries recommended for investigation.
These types of recommendations were not always accepted by Ministers, 
and thus it was here. The Government’s response was set out in 
Circular 113/75• The recommendations for two types of appeal case 
classification were not accepted, but stricter timetables were 
supported in part. Improved procedures for handling the 
administration of appeals were agreed, as was the possibility of 
awarding costs more frequently where the conduct of one of the 
parties justified this. However, the Government’s view was that 
sessions of inquiries had mixed results, and were unlikely to be 
suitable for widespread use.
By 1980, about 10% of planning decisions were being transferred to 
Inspectors. In November of that year, consultants were appointed to 
examine the processes by which appeal case work was received and 
dealt with; to seek ways in which, within statutory constraints and 
consistent with the principles of natural justice and the need to 
have regard to economy and the use of resources, the time taken to 
clear individual cases could be reduced and/or throughput could be 
increased (Arthur Andersen & Co, 1981).
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The recommendations made were not fundamental, and some were familiar 
in the context of the recurring examinations of the Planning 
Inspectorate’s activities. The consultants suggested positive 
encouragement to local planning authorities to improve their methods 
of handling appeals; some reorganisation of the Inspectorate and 
changes in working methods, improved management information; and a 
new ’express” form of written representations. In-house working 
parties were set up to investigate and, where appropriate, implement 
these matters.
In the context of the transfer of an increasing number of appeals to 
Inspectors, and the strong Ministerial accountability and interest in 
the planning appeal process, it was decided to commission a internal 
Department of the Environment study on the structure of the Planning 
Inspectorate. Mr Smith looked at the structure of the organisation, 
the distribution of management functions and staff deployment, to 
consider whether the structure was appropriate or efficient, and to 
consider feasible alternatives (November I98I).
The main general weaknesses in the organisation identified were 
familiar - the waste and delays from the very variable workloads, and 
the need to make adjustments to cope with this, including some to the 
professional hierarchy and the supporting functions. However, Mr 
Smith summarised his report by saying that the Planning Inspectorate 
had a flexibly used professional workforce, maintaining high 
standards in professional and in administrative work, the 
organisation was held in high public regard, and had coped well with 
a considerable increase in casework.
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Another familiar theme in the report was the reference to the 
considerable difficulties in forecasting the future workload, and the 
need for the organisation to be able to respond to peaks and troughs 
in the context of annual fixed staff limits.
Mr Smith also saw problems in a lack of a professional management 
hierarchy because of the independence of Inspectors, which seemed to 
him to be an unfamiliar situation for a mainstream civil servant.
The next in the series of studies of the Planning Inspectorate began 
in the winter of 1984/5. A Staff Inspection team from the Department 
of the Environment were dispatched into the Planning Inspectorate, to 
look at the need for the work done, the organisation, the grading and 
the loading of posts.
The subsequent draft report took the view that some administrative 
posts should be surrendered, the reading of Inspectors’ work should 
be reduced, the grading of the group heads should be downgraded from 
Assistant Chief Planning Inspector to Principal Planning Inspector, 
and the easiest appeals should be decided by unqualified staff in 
regional offices.
The Staff Inspection Report was not well received by either the 
professional staff or administrators in the Planning Inspectorate, 
and met with a robust response from all the unions representing them. 
In particular, the Inspectors said that their range of work was 
increasingly wide and complex, their decisions and recommendations 
affected individuals in all walks of life and organisations in every
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sector of the national economy, and the casework was subject to the 
active supervision of the Courts and public bodies. The Inspectors 
suggested that the organisation should consider extending its role 
into other forms of environmental dispute, where its expertise and 
reputation would be of value (IPMS, 1995)* It took 10 years for 
management to pursue this idea (Chapter 6).
It was pointed out that the Staff Inspectors had not consulted any of 
the Planning Inspectorate’s "customers" (appellants, local planning 
authorities and professional advisers), and this discredited the 
whole approach of the report. The Planning Inspectorate was also 
aware of the caution with which local authority associations and 
other interested groups had approached the possibility of employing 
part-time Inspectors even for local plan work, and their preference 
for full-time professional Inspectors (IPCS Response to the Staff 
Inspection Report, 1985)- Little more was heard about the Staff 
Inspection proposals.
The series of internal reviews of the Planning Inspectorate 
continued, as the Department of the Environment decided that the 
pressures of casework on the organisation in the late 1980s made the 
Planning Inspectorate a candidate for investigation by the Rayner 
Scrutinies being used throughout the civil service.
Two of these (Wakeford and Heywood, 1985; and Ash and Heywood, 1986) 
looked at written representations' appeals and inquiries' appeals 
respectively. These reviews were mainly concerned with a 
bureaucratic focus, reducing administrative delays by streamlining
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procedures, proposing minor amendments to legislation, setting 
timetables for the appeal process, and improving links with the 
parties interested in the appeals. Target times were introduced for 
handling casework, and other measures which together anticipated the 
Citizens’ Charter some years later.
For the Planning Inspectorate, the nearer that the targets of 11 
weeks for written representations' cases and 17 weeks for inquiries 
are approached, the higher are the unit costs of having sufficient 
"slack" in resources to cope with unexpected eventualities and keep 
to the timetables. Having no queues means less efficient programming 
of Inspector resources, and more travel and subsistence to reach 
isolated sites. Therefore, in practice, the targets have been 12 to 
18 weeks for written representations, and 22 to 30 weeks for 
inquiries.
Sir George Moseley's own investigation into the management of the 
Planning Inspectorate in 1986 (mentioned at the beginning of this 
section) supported the Inspectors' suggestion that field based 
Principal Planning Inspectors should assist with management.
Customer surveys
In all these internal reviews, we have seen that little attention was 
paid to the customers of the appeal process outside the civil 
service; the emphasis of the Next Steps Initiative on this and the 
introduction of the Citizens' Charter seems a long distant prospect.
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However, three customer surveys were undertaken in 1981 by the 
Department of the Environment to ascertain the views of local 
planning authorities, volume appellants and their Agents on the 
Inspectorate’s activities. They generally favoured the established 
procedures and the maintenance of professional standards. The 
authorities supported the transfer of more cases to Inspectors for 
decision and the streamlining of procedures. The outcome was 
incorporated into a new Circular and the handbook for prospective 
appellants.
The only other customer survey done before the Next Steps Initiative 
was introduced was in 1934, when Oxford Polytechnic assessed the 
needs and preferences of individuals using the planning appeal 
process, following on the 1981 studies of larger appeal users. This 
survey report indicated a good level of satisfaction, but a 
preference to ”be heard”, although many appellants chose the written 
representations' procedure as being cheaper and quicker.
Accoun tabi1i ty
The planning appeal system enables the Secretary of State to exercise 
control over the actions of local planning authorities in a manner 
acceptable to the public at large.
’The quintessential skill of the senior civil servant involves 
being able to draft a letter or ministerial speech which means 
five different things to five different people”
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(Anon).
It would be difficult to find a statement more contrary to the role 
of an Inspector in writing a decision letter or report, so as to 
demonstrate the "openness, fairness and impartiality” mentioned in 
the Franks Report in 1957*
As we have seen, the Planning Inspectorate has been organised so as 
to demonstrate these precepts in operation, and the Inspectors 
deciding appeals or reporting to the Secretary of State working 
independently from home. Supervision of their output by office and 
field based managers is directed to ensuring that the work produced 
is of high quality, soundly based on the relevant policies and easy 
for the recipients to understand. Administrative staff in Bristol 
support these fundamental aims.
The Inspector holding an inquiry is an investigator as well as a 
judge on behalf of the Secretary of State, considering the evidence 
presented in the light of his or her training and experience, and 
whether there is sufficient evidence for a sound decision to be made 
in the wider public interest.
The Inspectors have historically seen themselves as being accountable 
in two directions:
to appellants, local planning authorities and interested third
parties in making open, fair and impartial decisions,
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and to Ministers in operating within the national and local 
policies.
The descriptions of the Inspectors' role earlier in this chapter will 
have made it clear that managerial accountability in the Planning 
Inspectorate has had a more limited meaning than in other parts of 
the civil service, where the "second tier" of managers are fully 
involved in managing their specialist areas. The professional 
managers in the Planning Inspectorate have therefore acted as liaison 
officers between the policy divisions formulating planning policies 
and the Inspectors who have implemented them through the outcome of 
appeals.
The political accountability of the Planning Inspectorate had 
originally been directly (via the Permanent Secretary) to the 
Secretary of State of the Department of the Environment, to preserve 
the Inspectors' independent status. That was changed in the mid 
1980s to access via a Deputy Secretary to the Permanent Secretary, 
and thence to the Secretary of State. Concern within the 
Inspectorate that this might taint the impartiality of the 
Inspectors' quasi-judicial role was mitigated by the Deputy Secretary 
concerned not being responsible to the Minister for government 
planning policies.
The then Chief Planning Inspector appeared in 1986 before a 
Parliamentary Select Committee to explain the way in which the appeal 
process was operating at that time (The Environment Committee (1986);
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Planning Appeals, Call-In and Major Public Inquiries, HC l8l (London: 
HMSO).
This independent status of Inspectors has contrasted with the role of 
the 370 administrative staff in the Planning Inspectorate, who have 
been organised in the normal civil service hierarchy of grades which 
were referred to in Chapter 2. They have adhered to established and 
interdependent patterns of civil service organisation and 
responsibility, and they see their main loyalty as being to the 
Minister they serve - the Secretary of State for the Environment.
The accruals accounting system
The funds for the Planning Inspectorate before Agency status came via 
the Department of the Environment vote from the House of Commons, 
with funds voted on an annual basis, and not able to be used in the 
succeeding year. Amounts tended to be based on those allocated in 
the previous year, rather than being related to the volatile 
workloads.
Summary
In many ways, the organisation of the Planning Inspectorate 
demonstrated, before Agency status, some of the practices and 
patterns of responsibility which were to be favoured by the Next 
Steps Initiative, the Citizens' Charter and market testing.
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In particular, the role of the Inspectors had evolved from the normal 
and hierarchical civil service pattern to one of identified and 
individual responsibility for their actions, with the system 
accepting that the exercise of professional discretion was an 
essential part of the system. In the course of these developments, 
new procedures had been successfully been tried, initially on an 
informal basis with the agreement of the parties, before confirming 
their use by statutory powers.
The outcome of their work had become available for public scrutiny, 
and the reasons for their decisions made available to those who use 
the appeal system, and interested third parties, in accordance with 
the parameters of openness, fairness and impartiality laid down by 
the Franks’ Committee; the emphasis on openness contrasted with the 
procedures within the parent Department, which continued on the 
normal civil service pattern.
The nature of the Inspectors' role had also led to a separation 
between the policy and executive functions within the Department of 
the Environment in respect of the work done by Inspectors, and to the 
introduction of target time limits, procedural rules and a choice of 
methods to suit the needs of the customers and the variable character 
of the workload.
Because of the independence necessary for the Inspectors carrying out 
field duties, the professional managers in the Inspectorate had 
limited line management duties, acting as the source of policy 
information, training and career development. Inspectors saw
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themselves as being accountable in two directions: to the Secretary 
of State and to the parties interested in the outcome of their work. 
By contrast, the administrative staff in the organisation had 
continued to operate much as their equivalents in other parts of the 
Department.
Some progress had been made with performance indicators, despite the 
absence of an effective IT systems, and the use of "customer" surveys 
to examine areas where change might be needed. The actions of the 
organisation had been supervised from outside the civil service and 
the Department by the Council on Tribunals, as well as by the 
Ombudsman. Thus the intentions of the Citizens' Charter had, to some 
extent, been anticipated.
The importance of the processes in political terms had been confirmed 
by the series of internal and other studies and reviews carried over 
the years in order to speed the process and, in some cases, ensured 
that the organisation conformed to patterns in the Department and 
elsewhere in the civil service in terms of staffing and financial 
restrictions. These reviews were rarely concerned to involve the 
public or the interests of the "customers" of the Inspectorate.
The difficulties of providing adequate staff resources and trying to 
run an organisation with significant fluctuations in its workload 
within these restrictions and the civil service accounting system are 
clear. These had, in part, led to the use of contract staff several 
years before the introduction of market testing elsewhere in the 
civil service.
108
Having completed this overview of the organisation before the Next 
Steps Initiative was introduced, we shall look in the next Chapter at 
the process of moving on to Agency status.
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CHAPTER 5 - THE PLANNING INSPECTORATE AND THE MOVE TO AGENCY STATUS
We saw in the last Chapter that the Planning Inspectors in their 
modern role of deciding appeals and holding other types of public 
inquiry were in some ways anticipating the Next Steps Initiative, in 
having a different approach to civil service operations.
In this Chapter, we move on to examine the processes needed for the 
transition to Agency status, and those matters which were thought to 
justify the most attention.
As we saw in Chapter 1, the Next Steps Initiative has been introduced 
in the civil service as a whole. The Project Team in the Cabinet 
Office having been established, each Department was asked to consider 
which parts of its executive activities could be candidates for the 
new form of organisation.
It is reasonable to assume that the various Departments looked first 
to those parts of their operations which already had some degree of 
autonomy in their operations, since such organisations would need 
less detailed attention in order to become an Agency under the new 
arrangements. In the Department of the Environment, the Building 
Research Establishment (BRE) and the Royal Palaces were early 
candidates for the new programme.
Ill
The BRE was already a semi-separate part of the Department, providing 
guidance and carrying out research on the design and performance of 
buildings, their materials and on the prevention and control of fire. 
BRE already did some work for the private sector, and was involved in 
international programmes. It was selected as a candidate for Agency, 
reaching that status in April 1990.
In the case of the Royal Palaces, this had been the centre of a
complex web of interests. Several government Departments and other
organisations in addition to the Department of the Environment were 
involved in the running of the Palaces, and they agreed that the 
"Historic Royal Palaces” should be launched as an Agency in October 
1989 (see Chapter 9)*
On the face of it, the Planning Inspectorate was also a prime 
candidate for Agency status. As we saw in the previous Chapter, the
Inspectors exercised independent judgement in much of the work
carried out by the organisation, and it therefore seemed to be an 
obvious candidate for the Next Steps Initiative process.
The reasons for and against Agency status
However, it appears from the approach of some civil servants (such as
the Staff Inspection referred to in the last Chapter) that the 
Planning Inspectorate’s methods of working were seen as causing some 
concern to those unfamiliar with them, and considered as conflicting 
with the traditional approach used in the civil service and the rest
of the Department of the Environment.
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It had become accepted over the years by those in the planning policy 
division that some ’’separation of powers” from the civil servants 
dealing with policy making was necessary to retain public confidence 
in the independence of the Inspectors. However, on administrative 
matters, the Planning Inspectorate had retained the patterns used by 
other parts of the Department (Chapter 4).
As in other parts of the civil service (Trosa Report, 199*0. some 
senior managers in the Department of the Environment in the late 
1980s were not seen by the Project Team as being very comfortable 
with the introduction of the Next Steps Initiative.
Stephen Crow had become the Chief Planning Inspector in September 
1988 under the system for internal civil service appointments which 
had been used since the Inspectorate had become part of the 
Department. His appointment almost coincided with the establishment 
of the first Agency under the Next Steps Initiative.
The new Chief Planning Inspector did consider that Agency status 
would bring advantages to the Inspectorate which were not likely to 
be available if the organisation remained more closely associated 
with the central core of the Department. He saw these advantages as 
including additional emphasis on the independence of the Inspectors 
as seen by the Planning Inspectorate's "customers” in the 
professional, commercial and local government spheres outside the 
civil service.
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The various reviews of the Planning Inspectorate’s operations in the 
1980s which were summarised in the previous Chapter had brought some 
practical benefits but, in some instances, had confirmed the problems 
of deciding at a distance on the sensible priorities for an 
organisation with a variable and demand led workload and considerable 
and constant exposure to the public
It would be fair to say that there were differing views within the 
Inspectorate’s administrative and professional management over the 
Chief Planning Inspector’s enthusiasm for moving to Agency status 
(and the subsequent costs). Other managers were aware, at least in 
principle, of the amount of preparatory work that would be needed to 
reach Agency status, including deciding how the supply of Inspectors 
to deal with cases in Wales was to be handled. It was not so clear 
to them that the advantages gained by a change in the pattern of the 
relationship with the Department would be very radical or beneficial 
in practice.
The Inspectorate was already accommodated in a building shared with 
other regional functions of the Department; a building over which it 
had only very limited control. The Planning Inspectorate had (and 
has) a very limited income from outside organisations, so that most 
of the funding for the new Agency would continue to come from the 
Department. It relied on central staff in London for personnel 
support, financial accounts and advice. Agency status would require, 
sooner or later, that all these matters should be dealt with 
”in-house”. Functions such as legal services, library support, 
stationery supplies and other centrally supplied services would have
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to be reviewed. All in all, change to a new order in these 
circumstances seemed to offer little improvement, and many 
difficulties.
However, there were pressures for each Department to bring forward 
candidates for the Next Steps Initiative. The Department agreed with 
the Chief Planning Inspector that the organisation should be a 
candidate for Agency status, and this was announced in December 1988.
The Chief Inspector's Annual Report for the year 1988/89 stated (page 
1) -
"In the event of the Inspectorate becoming an Agency, the role 
of the individual Inspector would be fundamentally unchanged, 
and the same high standard of decision making would still be 
demanded. But Agency status would give managers more 
responsibility and greater freedom to manage the resources of 
the Inspectorate efficiently. Although a good deal of 
groundwork has already been done towards the establishment of 
the Agency, it is unlikely to come into operation before the 
end of 1990."
Practical arrangements
It is always easier not to be the first in any enterprise, and by the 
time the Planning Inspectorate came forward to enter the Next Steps 
Initiative process, other Agencies had already been dealt with and 
launched on their new role. The account of the Planning
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Inspectorate's progress therefore reads less as a pioneering change 
than as an organisation able to gain benefits from the efforts of 
those ahead of it in the process.
Thus, to take the planning for reaching the new status of the 
organisation forward, a civil servant transferred from a similar role 
in the Vehicle Inspectorate, which had already become an Agency, to 
act as the Planning Inspectorate's liaison officer with the 
Department, the Next Steps Team and the Treasury. An Agency steering 
group was set up, with senior managers in the Planning Inspectorate 
and the Department represented.
The Planning Inspectorate's managers dealing with the Agency process 
took care to consult regularly and fully with the Project Team in the 
OMCS (Office of the Minister of the Civil Service) steering the Next 
Steps Initiative, and with the Department of the Environment.
As we saw in Chapter 1, the framework document is the written 
"contract" between the new Agency and the relevant parent Department. 
The process of drafting the framework documents prepared for other 
Agencies had established patterns being used for all similar 
documents. This undoubtedly assisted the staff in negotiating the 
content of the framework document for the Inspectorate.
This went through nearly 20 drafts; the structure for the document 
followed the layout used for other Agencies. Thus, the substance of 
the discussions between the Department of the Environment, the 
Treasury and the Planning Inspectorate concentrated on the precise
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Figure 5*1 “ The Planning Inspectorate Framework Document
Headings
Status
Functions, duties and objectives
Organisation and management
Financial planning and control
Personnel management
Framework document - review and publication
Annexes
A. Main duties performed on behalf of the Secretary of State
B. Memorandum on the instruction and appointment of Inspectors
C. Administrative functions carried out on behalf of the Secretary of State
D. Main financial and contractual delegations to the Chief Planning Inspector
E. Main performance measures
F. Services provided to the Agency by DOE/Welsh Office
G. Services provided to the Agency by the Lord Chancellor’s Department
Annex E - Main performance measures
Timeliness The time taken to decide planning and enforcement appeals
Financial Unit costs and other measures which highlight the
financial performance of the Agency
Efficiency Appropriate measures to demonstrate overall efficiency
savings of at least 2% a year
Quality The number of cases lost in the High Court and the number
of justified complaints received. Other external measures 
will be developed as appropriate
Volume The volume of decisions issued on planning and enforcement
appeals
Information
and guidance The adequacy, clarity and availability of information and
guidance for all who come into contact with the appeals 
system
form of the wording to be used, rather them on matters of principle.
Indeed, the process seems to have been more remarkable for the
problems which were not encountered than for those that were. Most 
notable was the heavy reliance on committees for discussion, familiar 
to and normal for those who work in the civil service.
The headings and annexes used in the final framework document are 
shown in Figure 5*1* the full document ran to 22 pages. Annex B - 
the memorandum on the instruction and appointment of Inspectors - 
said that each Inspector in exercising the duty of making a 
recommendation (to the Secretary of State) or determining an appeal 
is technically a tribunal, each must exercise an independent 
judgement, and they must not be subject to any improper influence.
In this, the memorandum echoed the view, set out in the Justice/All 
Souls Report (1988) on Administrative Justice (Chapter *1), that the 
transfer of decisions to Inspectors had changed the nature of their 
role, and converted the inquiry into a tribunal hearing.
In general, the Planning Inspectorate found that agreement with the
Next Steps team and the Treasury was more a matter of working
steadily through all these matters which had to be resolved, rather 
than encountering any serious conflicts. In both cases, the staff 
concerned were dealing with the creation of other Agencies at the 
same time, and the Project Team had already completed negotiations on 
3*1 other Agencies already launched. The Planning Inspectorate was 
therefore far from being a novelty to the Next Steps Initiative’s 
team or to the Treasury.
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The senior staff in the Department of the Environment were, initially 
at least, much more pessimistic about the negotiations than the 
managers in the Planning Inspectorate. They suggested to the 
Planning Inspectorate that problems might be encountered with the 
Treasury over detailed arrangements and negotiations on financial and 
other matters for the proposed organisation, as this seemed to be the 
experience of the Departmental staff.
However, although much time was spent on discussion about the best 
pattern for management organisation and the other procedural changes 
needed, good progress was made (Minutes of the Agency Steering Group, 
1989 to 1992). The Planning Inspectorate found in practice that the 
Treasury staff were co-operative as long as sufficient information 
was available to them.
Performance indicators
We saw in Chapter 1 that the creation of the new Agencies was 
intended to be the beginning of a process of continuous development. 
One means of assessing this is the publication and monitoring of 
performance indicators. The areas to which these were to apply were, 
as we have seen, initially set out in the framework documents.
Again, the Planning Inspectorate was a forerunner in this process 
(Chapter 4) in that target handling times had been included in the 
Rayner Reviews in the middle 1980s (Wakeford/Heywood 19&5 and 
Ash/Heywood 1986).
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The matters to be addressed in the main performance measures for the 
Planning Inspectorate Agency were set out in general terms in Annex E 
to the Framework Document (see Figure 5*1)* These performance 
indicators were later developed into the more specific targets in the 
Business Plan, and the requirements reviewed by the Treasury and the 
Department on an annual basis (see Chapter 7 and Figure 7*1)*
Charging for planning appeals
Another issue arose during the process leading up to the creation of 
the new Agency - the possibility of charging users of the planning 
system for making appeals to the Secretary of State. The idea was 
based, at least in part, on the Report of the Committee of the 
Justice/All Souls Review of Administrative Law in the United Kingdom 
(1988).
It may be that the fact that this possibility was being considered 
would not have been known outside the civil service if it had been 
dealt with several years earlier. However, interest had developed 
over the years in the Planning Inspectorate's operations by various 
groups outside government (Chapter 4), and the practice had evolved 
of consulting the potential customers of the organisation about 
significant changes. In this, the practice anticipated the Prior 
Options Reviews (Chapters 1, 8 and 9)*
Thus the government considered including powers in planning 
legislation (then in draft) to allow the Planning Inspectorate to 
charge appellants for processing and determining planning appeals.
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This intention was set out in a Department of the Environment 
consultation paper "Efficient Planning" published in July 1989*
Raising money for existing government services is always going to be 
a contentious issue, and this had been the case when local planning 
authorities had been directed to charge for processing planning 
applications some years earlier.
Charging for the most common types of appeal could be seen as a 
logical extension of what local planning authorities had been 
required to do for some time. It was considered that charging could 
deter frivolous and sometimes repetitive appeals. It would also 
transfer the cost of the procedures to those "customers” who might 
hope to benefit from them by obtaining a planning permission with 
value either to the individual or in the "marketplace", or both.
However, the Council on Tribunals (which is consulted on procedural 
changes in the Planning Inspectorate) felt that charging would 
effectively exclude the right to appeal from those aggrieved 
applicants with a sound case but limited financial means. A range of 
associated appeals, including listed building and Conservation Area 
consents, and enforcement appeals (where granting planning permission 
is an option), were other areas of the Planning Inspectorate's work 
where similar issues would have arisen.
Thus the "Franks principles" of openness, fairness and impartiality 
established in 1958 (Chapter 2) were recognised as being a 
significant and perhaps overriding consideration in the way in which
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income might be gained for the prospective Agency over 40 years 
later.
Charging fees for planning (and other) appeals would have provided an 
income for a significant part of the workload of the new Agency.
From the Planning Inspectorate’s point of view, charging would have 
provided a more independent income, even if the level of charges 
would have had to be agreed with the Department of the Environment.
It would also have probably led to regular reviews of whether 
customers were getting value for their money. However, apart from 
the principles involved, one of the aspects which fell to be 
considered was the way in which charging would operate.
Charges which reflected the scale of the development involved would 
probably have been only a marginal extra cost for major commercial 
organisations already expending considerable sums on the planning 
process in order to progress their development programme. Realistic 
charging for larger cases would have kept down the costs for 
appellants seeking to build domestic extensions and limited housing 
developments.
However, too much dependence on proposals for major developments as a 
source of income for the Planning Inspectorate would provide too 
uncertain a basis for financing the new Agency, particularly in view 
of the fluctuations in the strength of the economy and their likely 
effect on the number of planning appeals. The majority of the appeal 
caseload is always made up of smaller appeals resulting from activity
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in the housing market (Planning Inspectorate, 1994), and they are not 
proportionately cheaper to process than larger cases.
These practical considerations seem to be very little different from 
those which would have been taken into account by a commercial 
company, and perhaps show that the intentions of the Next Steps 
Initiative in leading to a more "private sector" approach were 
working.
Also, the implication might also be that costs in inquiries and 
hearings, at present borne by each side unless they have behaved 
unreasonably, might be awarded "following the event" as in court 
proceedings. The possibility of having to pay considerable costs 
incurred by the other parties when appeals were lost might well deter 
local planning authorities from refusing planning permission, or 
appellants from going to appeal, neither of which would be viewed as 
being in the public interest.
The decision was taken in the autumn of 1990 not to introduce charges 
for appeals, just before Nicholas Ridley was replaced by Michael 
Heseltine as Secretary of State for the Environment. The main reason 
seems to have been the reluctance of the government to introduce fees 
that would impact on the majority of appeal proposals, which are made 
by householders and small businesses.
Thus a mixture of ethical and practical considerations delayed the 
preparations for Agency status, and the late timing of this decision 
postponed the launch date to 1992.
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The plans for the new Agency proceeded on the basis that its 
"external" income would only arise from local planning authorities 
and the Department of Transport when they needed inquiries into 
orders or objections to Local Plans, or when other authorities made 
proposals needing an inquiry. These fees are not paid directly to 
the Planning Inspectorate, but go to the Department of the 
Environment - one aspect in which the authority of the Chief 
Executive Officer is limited (Chapter 7)*
Proposed structure of the organisation
In Chapter 2, the traditional and hierarchical pattern of the civil 
service was mentioned, and in the last Chapter we saw that the 
management of Inspectors necessarily deviated from this because of 
the independent roles of the professional staff in the Planning 
Inspectorate. This contrasted with the pattern of the administrative 
staff, who were managed in the manner familiar to civil servants.
Within the Planning Inspectorate, a major pre-occupation during the 
period leading up to Agency status was the future structure to be 
adopted for the professional and administrative staff in the 
organisation. The Lord Chancellor’s Panel of independent Inspectors, 
Inspectors doing work in Wales, and the Inspectors dealing with 
enforcement appeals were already, or were planned to be, in "through 
groups" of consisting of both administrators and Inspectors managed 
by an Assistant Chief Planning Inspector. This pattern was suggested
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by the Chief Planning Inspector for other groups of Inspectors doing 
more general casework.
However, the advantages of having all the staff dealing with a 
particular specialist area of work in the Planning Inspectorate, and 
thereby allocating those financial costs separately to the Agency's 
accounts, were not so clear cut for general professional groups in 
the Inspectorate, since Inspectors can be deployed on many different 
types of cases. There were reservations amongst the administrators 
about the inflexibility which could result by not easily being able 
to switch staff between different types of casework according to the 
demands at a particular time.
Regional groupings for Inspectors and associated administrators were 
considered, assessed and rejected on the grounds of increased costs. 
The ultimate decision was to continue, as before, with the 
administrative branch dealing with the procedural aspects of the 
general appeal casework, and the dispatch of decisions to appellants; 
to retain a separate chart room with administrators allocating work 
to Inspectors under professional supervision; and to maintain a 
central quality control unit rather than revert to groups of 
administrators supporting individual group heads (although the latter 
pattern has since been reversed).
All this discussion consumed a considerable amount of management time 
in the Planning Inspectorate over a period of 2 or 3 years. The 
costs of the lengthy discussion period have not been quantified, but 
were clearly considerable. Those involved at the time are still
124
doubtful that the benefits gained from Agency status so far are very 
obvious as far as the Inspectorate staff are concerned.
However, these views are held in the context that service-wide 
constraints on pay, travel and subsistence, financial freedoms and so 
on were being applied across the civil service by the Treasury at the 
same time as the Agencies were being introduced, and show the 
difficulties of separating out the effect of the Next Steps 
Initiative from other government initiatives such as the Citizens’ 
Charter and market testing.
The Inspectorate in Wales
Historically, the appeal cases in Wales had been dealt with by a 
separate group of Inspectors managed from within the main 
Inspectorate, with administrative support based in Cardiff, thus 
giving some autonomy to the civil service in the Principality. This 
unusual pattern had worked well enough, although with primitive 
financial arrangements. A consequence of Agency status had to be a 
more clear cut situation.
The quantity of mainstream appeals in Wales is approximately 5# of 
that in England. Management and Ministers had to resolve the 
position of the Inspectors and supporting staff working in Wales in 
the new Agency. With two Secretaries of State involved, for the 
Environment and for Wales, and no precedent for an Agency working in 
that way, there was much discussion about the best way to proceed.
One option considered was for a separate Inspectorate for Wales, with
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a Chief Inspector taking major inquiries and managing the 
organisation, as in Scotland.
Ministers finally agreed in late 1991 that the Secretary of State for 
the Environment should take the lead in dealing with appeals, 
providing services to Wales, with the supporting staff retained in 
Cardiff under an Assistant Chief Inspector who would be based there 
part of the time.
The late decision for the Planning Inspectorate to have a joint 
responsibility to the Secretary of State for Wales and the Secretary 
of State for the Environment could have been a potential source of 
considerable difficulty, one complication being that the Inspectors 
working in Wales are employed by the Department of the Environment 
and their administrative staff by the Welsh Office.
In practice, due to the personalities involved, the limited time 
available after the decision that the Agency should be under both the 
Secretary of State for the Environment and the Welsh Office Minister 
was well used. Since the Agency was set up, the Department of the 
Environment has taken the lead in policy matters, and the Planning 
Inspectorate in practical considerations, consulting the Welsh Office 
to discuss their ideas and obtain their agreement when necessary.
126
Agency status
The necessary changes were made at short notice to the latest version 
of the framework document to reflect the agreed pattern, with the 
agreed date for Agency fast approaching.
In the autumn of 1991. the post of Chief Executive Officer was 
advertised and a "head hunting" exercise initiated. After a series 
of interviews, the incumbent Chief Planning Inspector, Stephen Crow, 
was appointed to the joint position of Chief Executive and Chief 
Planning Inspector for the new Agency until his retirement in 
September 199^ * The Planning Inspectorate finally reached Agency 
status in April 1992, marked by a brief formal launch party in 
Brunei's Engine Shed at Temple Meads in Bristol.
The framework document for the Agency refers (paragraph 3*5) to the 
preparation of the Corporate Plan, the Business Plan and the Annual 
Report and Accounts. The Corporate Plan sets out the Agency's 
responsibilities and strategic aims for the next 3 years with 
particularly emphasis on the forthcoming Public Expenditure Survey 
(PES) period. It complements the Business Plan, which focuses 
specifically on the tasks and targets for the financial year ahead, 
including the performance indicators. The Annual Report and Accounts 
sets out the Inspectorate's performance in the previous financial 
year, and is the principal vehicle for reporting on the performance 
of the Agency against the targets for that year. Together, the three 
documents are intended to provide a comprehensive statement of the 
Inspectorate's plans and performance in handling all the types of
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business for which it has responsibility under the framework 
document.
Following on the creation of the Agency, a new Management Board was 
formed in the Inspectorate with 5 members, assisted by a business 
adviser. The main concerns of the Board have been preparation of the 
annual Corporate and Business Plans; manpower planning; the 
fluctuating workload; the information technology project; customer 
surveys; pay and grading, market testing and other service-wide 
Treasury requirements; performance indicators, quality and other 
targets; and auditing and monitoring.
The relationship with the Department of the Environment
With so many Departments involved in the Next Steps Initiative, their 
success in relationships with their new Agencies is not likely to be 
identical. The nature of the relationship between the 2 
organisations must have a significant effect on how well the Agency 
prospers, and how well it can improve its performance without 
interference.
In this context, how the Department supervises the Agency, how 
positive an approach it takes to practical arrangements, and how 
effectively the parent Department is able to "stand back" from 
overseeing details within the new organisation, are all relevant.
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In 1992, the Planning Inspectorate became one of the 6 Agencies for 
which the Secretary of State for the Department of the Environment is 
now responsible:
BRE (The Building Research Establishment)
Ordnance Survey (which is also a government Department)
Planning Inspectorate (also reporting to the Secretary of State 
for Wales)
Queen Elizabeth Conference Centre 
Security Facilities Executive 
Buying Agency
For all its Agencies, the Department of the Environment appraises 
forward plans, and negotiates the annual service agreement; gives 
independent advice to the Secretaries of State on targets and 
resources; monitors performance and workload against targets; is 
consulted on the annual report and accounts; consults the Agency as 
one of the organisations which can inform policy and system inputs; 
and advises on changes to the framework document.
Once the Agency was established, the Planning Inspectorate found that 
it was able to take more of the initiative than had been anticipated 
in the matters to be included in the Corporate Plan and Business
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Plan, with both the planning and finance divisions of the Department 
of the Environment taking a hands-off approach.
Whereas the Department of Transport, for instance, has a Board 
overseeing the activities of the Vehicle Inspectorate (National Audit 
Office, 1992), the Department of the Environment uses a Deputy 
Secretary as a "Sponsor" for the Planning Inspectorate, and this 
arrangement seems to be more effective and less cumbersome (but see 
the recommendations of the Trosa Report in Chapter 8).
The delegation of responsibilities
Some responsibilities for Inspectors' personnel matters had already 
been handed over in the autumn of 1991* In the year beginning in 
April 1992, the Department of the Environment delegated more 
responsibilities to their Agencies, perhaps resulting from the 
service wide push towards market testing being supported by William 
Waldegrave, the Minister then assigned to the control and continuing 
promotion of the Next Steps process and the Citizens' Charter.
The arrangements for managing Department of the Environment and 
Department of Transport staff together in the Bristol area also came 
to an end as the result of a decision by the Department of Transport 
that they no longer wanted to be part of a joint arrangement.
So the Planning Inspectorate took over the control of personnel 
matters for most administrative grades in April 1993* This required 
the transfer of staff to this function, and was felt by some of the
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administrators concerned to reduce their opportunities for job 
progression elsewhere. Responsibility for pay and grading is due to 
be transferred in April 1996.
Information technology
As we saw in Chapter 4, the very limited use of IT before Agency 
status prevented detailed assessment of how the organisation was 
performing in terms of the speed with which cases were being dealt
with, and the costs of doing so.
In 1991. the Department of the Environment agreed that detailed 
analysis work could be started on IT systems to store and maintain 
information about the Planning Inspectorate and other aspects of the 
organisation. These included budget centres; storing and maintaining 
information about the Planning Inspectorate's staff; extensive 
support for case registration, processing and information; finance 
related aspects of casework and information about cases, to replace 
much of the interim systems; and replacing the interim financial
system with the use of data from the case system.
Further projects were considered for business planning support - to 
provide assistance for strategic business analysis; Inspector IT 
communications with the headquarters at Tollgate House; and a 
replacement for the planning case database.
After initial difficulties, an outside consultant was brought in to 
manage the project in the autumn of 1992, with the intention of
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getting the basic data-passing functions for the processing of case 
files ready by the spring of 199  ^♦ with a similar time-scale for 
address and information databases for Inspectors, local planning 
authorities and other sources to be linked in due course with the 
data information.
To date, only part of these functions have been transferred to an up- 
to-date IT system. This situation contrasts strongly with the 
extensive use of IT by other Agencies, including others dealing with 
intellectual property (Chapter 9)• It is particularly disappointing 
in view of the extensive use of IT in local authorities for similar 
purposes, as we shall see in Chapter 7«
We now turn, first, to the accountability in the Agency in Chapter 6, 
and then (in Chapter 7) to the ways in which the operations of the 
Agency can be measured and controlled, including the accounting 
system, performance indicators and relationships with the Department 
of the Environment.
Summary
The Inspectorate was able to benefit from not being one of the first 
Agencies to be established, so that the discussions with the 
Department of the Environment, the Treasury and OMCS on the framework 
document and other matters related to details rather than to 
principles. The assessment of whether gaining Agency status has been 
an advantage cannot be conclusive because innovations such as market
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testing and the Citizens’ Charter which have some similar effects 
have been introduced during the same period.
The possibility of charging for appeals was discarded before the 
Inspectorate became an Agency in April 1992 because of the political 
implications for householder and small appeals, and the 
unpredictability which that would bring to the Agency's income.
The particular nature of the Inspectors' role is referred to in the 
framework document, as well as the need to preserve their 
independence from political influence and the traditional pattern of 
civil service organisation. However, consulting the public on the 
possibility of charging for appeals accords with the principles since 
introduced by the Citizens' Charter. Surveys have confirmed the 
public's confidence in Inspectors and their appreciation of the 
openness of the planning appeal process.
In the relationship with the Department of the Environment after 
April 1992, the Planning Inspectorate found that it needed to take 
more of the initiative than had been anticipated on the Business Plan 
and Corporate Plan.
The precedent of the targets introduced by the Inspectorate following 
the Rayner Scrutinies has continued through the reference to 
performance measures in the framework document and then to 
performance indicators. The autonomy of the Chief Executive Officer 
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CHAPTER 6 - THE PLANNING INSPECTORATE: ACCOUNTABILITY
In this Chapter, accountability in the Planning Inspectorate Agency 
is considered in the context of the questions raised in Chapter 2. 
These recognise that many changes, such as market testing and 
Citizens’ Charter, are now taking place in the civil service as a 
whole. Some innovations would probably have taken place in any case 
without the introduction of the Next Steps Initiative. In the 
Inspectorate, the additional factors which did not apply to most 
potential Agencies are the ’openness, fairness and impartiality’ 
required by the Franks' Report (Chapter 4), which have meant that for 
many years the organisation has already displayed more visible 
processes and individual accountability than most other parts of the 
civil service.
Since Agency status, the Chief Planning Inspector and Chief Executive 
Officer has been formally accountable for the running of the Agency 
through the Permanent Secretary of the sponsoring Department to the 
Secretary of State for the Environment, and thereby to Parliament. 
Within the Inspectorate, the professional and administrative staff 
are responsible to the Chief Planning Inspector for the day to day 
workings of the new organisation.
Since the previous arrangements for accountability within the 
Department had been made in order to preserve the independence of the
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Inspectors’ quasi-judicial role (Chapter 4), it is not surprising 
that Agency status did not alter that.
Thus rather than changes being made to the formal responsibilities 
assigned to the Planning Inspectorate, the structure and arrangements 
introduced for other Agencies have moved towards those already in 
place for the Inspectorate. In that sense, the pattern for the 
Planning Inspectorate has anticipated the Next Steps Initiative.
Parliamentary accountability
What did change for the Inspectorate (as for other new Agencies) 
after April 1992 was that the Chief Planning Inspector became 
directly responsible for dealing with the majority of outside 
queries, and questions to the Select Committees of the House of 
Commons. The central Department's staff and (via the Permanent 
Secretary) the Minister become involved only when issues with 
particular political implications arise.
Reactions to change by Members of Parliament are relevant here. One 
recently raised a question in the House of Commons querying why he 
had had a answer to his inquiry only from the Deputy Chief Inspector, 
rather than from the Permanent Secretary, or the Minister, implying 
that his concern was not being considered at a high enough level.
The reply tactfully reminded him of the procedure laid down since the 
Next Steps Initiative Agencies were introduced.
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In fact, the only real change was that the person who would have 
drafted the reply in the past was now being identified as the author 
of an answer to an non-political problem, rather than the reply being 
presented as emanating from the central Department of the 
Environment. This approach is being followed in all the Agencies, as 
we shall see in Chapter 8.
The Chief Planning Inspector still meets with Ministers from time to 
time, and with the Permanent Secretary as Accounting officer for the 
whole Department of the Environment, as his predecessors did before 
the Agency was created. In that sense, there has been no change.
Professional accountability
"The right of appeal against a planning determination by a 
local planning authority involves at one and the same time both 
post hoc and ex ante accountability. The local planning 
authority has to justify its decision after the event, while 
central government is exposed to detailed evidence and advice 
as to what decision it ought eventually to make."
(Purdue, page 3. 1991)
The administrators in the Agency continue to see their main loyalty 
as being to the Minister they serve - the Secretary of State for the 
Environment. The Inspector holding an inquiry continues to be an 
investigator as well as a judge on behalf of the Secretary of State, 
as we saw in Chapter k (Planning Inspectorate, 199*0. accountable in
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two directions: to appellants, local planning authorities and 
interested third parties in making open, fair and impartial 
decisions, and to Ministers in operating within the national and 
local policies.
The Inspectors* approach seems to accord more with the customer- 
friendly style sought by the Citizens* Charter, as well as the 
approach now being adopted by many other Agencies. In this sense, 
again, the Inspectorate in its practices may have been a forerunner 
for the Next Steps Initiative. The Inspectorate has not, so far, 
made any use of the many decision letters issued each year on 
appeals; private companies are marketing these to interested 
professionals, However, in the autumn of 1995 the first edition of a 
new quarterly "Planning Inspectorate Journal" is to be published.
The advertisement for the Journal stated that the aim is to:
"inform the public about our internal organisation and the 
appeal process. This will comply with the principles of open 
government, encourage more efficient and effective 
participation in the appeal process and build on the 
Inspectorate's reputation for professionalism, integrity and 
efficiency."
The importance attached by an impartial outside observer to an open 
approach to the work carried out by Inspectors can be demonstrated by 
a very recent example. The Parliamentary Ombudsman produced a report 
in 1995 on those complaints which alleged that an application under 
The Code of Practice on Access to Government Information had been
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unsuccessful. The Code obliges government Departments to let the 
public to have access to information (rather than to the documents in 
which that information is contained).
An Inspector held an inquiry into a road scheme in 1988, but the 
scheme was subsequently withdrawn and a new scheme was proposed, so 
central civil servants decided that the Inspector's report should not 
be published. Objectors to the second scheme sought publication of 
the report into the first scheme. This publication was refused by 
the central Department of the Environment. However, the Ombudsman 
held that the report should have been made available, since the terms 
of the Code did not exempt the Department from disclosing it (House 
of Commons, 199^ )•
Managerial accountability
We saw in Chapter 4 that the Planning Inspectorate prior to becoming 
an Agency had been subject to many reviews by the parent Department 
of the Environment.
Agency status would seem to imply that the responsibility for 
initiating reviews after April 1992 should be with the Chief Planning 
Inspector rather than the Department, with the consequence that he 
would be held accountability for the outcome and implementation.
Despite this, in 1992 there was another investigation of the Planning 
Inspectorate' management by the Department, this time by Ian Nicol of 
the central staff (Planning Inspectorate, 1992). He reviewed the
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structure of the senior management below Chief Executive Officer 
level, and this review resulted in one of the Deputy Chief Planning 
Inspector posts being removed, and a reduction in the number of 
management groups of Inspectors.
This intervention seems to have been contrary to the spirit of the 
Next Steps Initiative. More in keeping with the new intentions of 
government would have been giving the Chief Executive Officer of the 
Planning Inspectorate the opportunity to arrange for an independent 
review, or one carried out by the Agency’s own staff.
We saw in Chapter k that many innovations in procedure had first been 
introduced by the Inspectorate on a non-statutory basis, by the 
parties to an appeal agreeing to waive their legal rights in the 
interest of having an earlier decision and/or a customer-friendly 
procedure. It might be reasonable to anticipate that since the 
Agency was created, the Chief Planning Inspector would be "master in 
his own house" in being accountable for how the Agency is run within 
the overall budget allocated to him. However, the Treasury still 
sees dangers in allowing even the pattern of management to vary from 
other parts of the Department.
In part, this can be seen as reasonable where senior administrative 
staff are concerned since, as we saw in Chapter 5» they are still 
regarded as a central resource despite the fact that movement is 
minimal at that level from the Agency so far. Nevertheless, the 
Chief Planning Inspector has to echo the central Department in re­
assessing the number of both professional and administrative staff in
senior management, although the Inspectorate's workload is "demand- 
led", and rising rather than falling. In this, the Department is 
only carrying out the government's desire to reduce the size of the 
civil service.
Because of the necessarily independent role of Inspectors which was 
mentioned in Chapter 4, the management in the Planning Inspectorate 
continue to have less than the full range of accountability for their 
staff normal for line managers elsewhere in the civil service.
The present role of the Assistant Chief Planning Inspectors heading 
groups is not therefore to endorse or correct what Inspectors do, but 
to liaise with the central Department on policy matters in specified 
areas; be responsible for quality control and responses to 
complaints; and give professional advice to, and oversee the career 
development of, the Inspectors in their group. However, with the 
number of justified complaints increasing, it may not be a good time 
to reduce the number of staff involved in monitoring quality and 
seeking to raise and reinforce professional standards.
The Assistant Chief Planning Inspectors also contribute to the 
management of the Agency through regular meetings with the Deputy 
Chief Planning Inspector who sits on the Management Board, and of 
which one of them is a member. The current management review may 
alter this situation, but is more likely to reduce rather than 
increase the number of Inspectors in the field for whom the managers 
are responsible.
l4l
There is little emphasis on individual as opposed to collective 
responsibility for managers, as intended by the Next Steps 
Initiative. The managers in the Inspectorate continue to act a s a 
group rather than taking decisions individually on allocated duties 
which would be devolved in the private sector.
Another approach to focusing on the Agency’s aims and objectives is 
being investigated at present. In 1995. the Inspectorate’s 
management has been developing a ’Vision Statement” to focus the 
attention of management and the staff on the way forward for the 
organisation. It includes an interesting echo of a suggestion put 
forward by the Inspectors at the time of the Staff Inspection in 
1984/5 “ that the Planning Inspectorate should consider itself as the 
first recourse for those seeking to resolve environmental disputes 
(Chapter 4). However, many new independent forms of dispute 
resolution and monitoring have been created in the last few years 
(Planning, March 1993). so it must be more difficult to achieve this 
aim than when it was first suggested. In addition, the co-operation 
and agreement of the Treasury and the Department of the Environment 
would be needed.
Accountability to the customer and the Citizens' Charter
The Planning Inspectorate's administrative staff now identify 
themselves on the telephone and in letters by name, to give the more 
customer-friendly image as sought by the Citizens' Charter. This 
innovation cannot be said to have directly followed from the Next 
Steps Initiative.
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FIGURE 6.1 - CHARACTERISTICS SOUGHT IN INSPECTORS
The work of the Planning Inspectorate before Agency status was 
described as offering potential Inspectors:
"an attractive combination of interest, challenge and 
responsibility.
It demands - total commitment,
self-confidence, 
high intellectual standards, 
self-motivation 
and integrity."
(Planning Inspectorate recruitment advertisements in the 1980s)
The current advertisements for contract planning Inspectors in 
1995 say:










We are looking for persons who will uphold the Planning 
Inspectorate's very high standards of professionalism, 
integrity and impartiality".
(Planning Inspectorate recruitment advertisement, March 1995)-
The Chief Planning Inspector decided in May 1994 that all the 
Planning Inspectorate's staff should wear name badges in the office - 
something welcomed by Inspectors who meet so seldom that they do not 
know all their own professional colleagues, let alone the names of 
the administrators who they may meet in Tollgate House - and that 
Inspectors should display name badges at inquiries and hearings. 
Again, this innovation derives more from the Citizens' Charter than 
from the Next Steps Initiative.
A very obvious way of demonstrating accountability to the Agency's 
customers is to maintain, and if possible improve, the quality of the 
"product" - the Inspectors' decisions - offered to appellants, local 
planning authorities and the general public. We saw in the previous 
Chapters that one consistent theme in the external surveys done by or 
for the Department of the Environment and the Planning Inspectorate 
has been the confidence placed by the public, appellants and local 
planning authorities in the integrity and standing of the Inspectors, 
even when the "customers" of the service provided are dissatisfied 
with the outcome of their appeal.
The integrity and ability sought in new Inspectors are intended to 
enable the Inspectorate to recruit staff capable of producing this 
standard. The current advertisements for contract planning 
Inspectors echo those used in the 1980s to which reference was made 
in Chapter 4. Although there is a slight difference in wording, the 
emphasis in both (Figure 6.1) is the range of qualities needed.
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The terms of the latest advertisement confirm that, in the context of 
professional accountability, the Inspector’s role has not been 
changed by Agency status. Indeed, bearing in mind the reasons for 
the independence of Inspectors, this would not have been a change 
welcomed by the customers of the Planning Inspectorate.
Another way of monitoring whether this aspect of accountability is 
being achieved is the links between the Planning Inspectorate and the 
relevant professional organisations. There has been regular 
feed-back from them on how well the Inspectorate has been serving at 
least its more sophisticated customers. These links have become more 
pro-active since the Agency was created, in both directions, as both 
sides have sought to improve best practice, and speed the handing of 
appeals.
In order to meet a target under the Next Steps Initiative set by 
Ministers (see Chapter 7 and Figure 7*1)* studies by W S Atkins in 
1993 investigated the experiences of appellants using the 
Inspectorate’s procedures for written representations’ and hearings’ 
appeals. The satisfaction of the ’customers’ with the reasons for 
the decisions varied from 80# of those successful, to 9% of those 
unsuccessful in their appeal - a perhaps not surprising result. 
Overall satisfaction was 86# and ^1% for the same categories (Atkins, 
1993; and Planning, January 199*0*
In 199*095t 80# of all appeals were determined by written 
representations, 2% by hearings and 8# by inquiries. Satisfaction 
overall was greater for the appeals dealt with at hearings; the
m
survey showed that this procedure had been chosen by appellants 
because of the opportunities for debate, because it was seen to be 
fairer and more thorough, and gave an opportunity to witness what 
happened. This confirmed the findings of the Oxford Polytechnic 
Study before the Agency was created (Chapter 4), that people prefer 
to meet the Inspector and "be heard", so that they feel that they 
have had a positive input into the process.
Those appellants who had opted for the written representations’ 
procedure had chosen it for other reasons: because of the low costs 
(to them) and its simplicity, because of their Agent's advice, and 
because it was seen to be quicker. However, with both types of 
procedure a significant percentage of appellants were dissatisfied 
with the length of time taken to issue the decision letter, which 
averaged 34 days for written representations' appeals (compared to 
the "target" of 14 days mentioned in the Town and Country Planning 
(Appeals) (Written Representations Procedure) Rules 1987).
The times for issuing decision letters are now increasing in 1995. 
because of the pressures on resources already mentioned in giving 
priority to work on development plans in accordance with the wishes 
of Ministers. The current targets in the Business Plan are therefore 
at risk (Chapter 7) as, even with retired Inspectors returning to 
help as they have before (Chapter 4), short term solutions are not 
available.
In response to a more recent target for the Agency, a further survey 
by W S Atkins of customers involved in planning inquiries (Figure
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7.1) was completed in February 1995. Overall, the general level of 
satisfaction on administrative procedures was good, with the 
Inspectors thought to be well briefed, fair, and with a good 
understanding of the issues in the appeals. The scores for the 
ability of Inspectors to put the participants at their ease and to 
make efficient use of time were satisfactory, but rather lower than 
the other scores (Atkins, 1995). This is an aspect more concerned 
with quality, and which the organisation will wish to address.
These surveys offer a way of giving those interested in the appeal 
and inquiry system outside the organisation more access to 
information about the Inspectorate, and thus accord with the new 
emphasis on open government. Since such surveys were done before 
Agency status was achieved, it would not be correct to credit them 
entirely to the advent of the Next Steps Initiative.
However, the surveys have confirmed what the customers want in any 
appeal procedure - for appellants, a quick service, the chance to be 
heard, no need to produce more paperwork, and an early decision. For 
local planning authorities, the priorities would seem to be less 
’hassle", a reduction in the tasks to be performed consistent with 
getting a fair result, and minimum costs for them.
Summary
Agency status did not alter their accountability as far as the 
Inspectors were concerned, so that professional managerial 
accountability remains limited. The Next Steps Initiative has made
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more apparent the responsibility of the Chief Planning Inspector for 
answering outside queries, and questions from the House of Commons.
It has also confirmed the involvement of interest groups in observing 
and commenting on the activities of the Inspectorate, although this 
is only a continuation and enhancement of the previous situation.
More emphasis has been placed since April 1992 on customer relations 
and surveys, as well as links with relevant professional 
organisations.
The political consequences of any variations in performance by the 
organisation underlie the continuing involvement of Ministers in the 
priorities given to the workload, as we shall see in Chapter 7* The 
Chief Planning Inspector therefore has not gained autonomy in this 
respect despite the Next Steps Initiative.
Senior administrative staff are still seen as a central Departmental 
resource. Service-wide restrictions and Treasury controls inhibit 
innovation and flexibilities within the Agency. Pressures on 
resources affect the performance on performance indicators; customers 
have confirmed that they want quality of output. A Vision Statement 
is being prepared by management which favours the Planning 
Inspectorate being the first recourse for those seeking to resolve 
environmental disputes, although many other independent forms of 
dispute resolution have been created during the past few years.
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CHAPTER 7 - THE PLANNING INSPECTORATE: CONTROL
In this Chapter, the way in which the Inspectorate's activities can 
be measured and controlled will be examined in the context of the 
questions set out in Chapter 2. One aspect of this is the changes 
which could have affected the costs of running the organisation; and 
another is those which have an influence on other ways of overseeing 
and controlling the operations of the new Agency. In doing so, as 
before we need to have regard to market testing and the Citizens' 
Charter, which have been introduced throughout the civil service.
One change introduced by the Next Steps Initiative is that the 
Planning Inspectorate now carries out functions itself, such as 
personnel and accounting previously done centrally by the Department 
of the Environment. This increased staff numbers within the 
Inspectorate as the Agency was set up, so that some of the 
Departmental overhead costs have been transferred into the 
Inspectorate.
This is illustrated in Chapter 4, where Figure 4.2 compared the 
numbers of professional and administrative staff between 1981 and 
1992. After 1992, it is difficult to isolate the changes due to the 
Next Steps Initiative alone, since fluctuations in the numbers of 
appeals, a significant increase in development plan inquiries, and 
the transfer of staff from other parts of the Department of the 
Environment, have affected the statistics.
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Administrators see this to some extent as a wasteful duplication 
compared to the previous system. Of the 370 administrative staff 
employed in the Inspectorate in 1993/9^ (a rise from about 200 in 
both 1981 and 1986), about 50 were transferred with the 
administration of enforcement appeals from other parts of the 
Department of the Environment. The functions which have been created 
(accounting), strengthened (personnel and training) or handled 
differently (quality control, monitoring) since the Agency came into 
being into 1992 account for most of the remaining increase between 
1986 and 1993.
In order to be able to prepare separate accounts to meet the NAO's 
requirements, the accounting function had to be created more or less 
from scratch. The personnel function had previously been almost 
entirely a channel for access to the Department’s personnel staff in 
London. Again, much more training is now done locally, and the Next 
Steps Initiative’s focus on performance indicators requires more 
attention to monitoring and quality indicators. Thus some of the 
additional staff are needed to take on new functions from the central 
Department of the Environment, and part in able to support the need 
to show accountability for the Planning Inspectorate's operations to 
its customers and to government, as explained in Chapter 6.
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Finance
"Few public servants can give the public - small man or big 
developer alike - better value for money than the Ministry's 
professional Inspectorates."
(Wraith and Lamb, 1971)*
That statement was made long before the creation of the Planning 
Inspectorate Agency. The opinion was offered taking into account the 
ability of Inspectors to work alone, without administrative support 
"in the field", and it was given long before the emphasis on the more 
specific meanings common in government now for efficiency, 
effectiveness and value for money, which have become a constant theme 
in the Next Steps Initiative.
Agency status has brought more detailed financial accounting methods 
to the Planning Inspectorate, but basically the organisation 
continues to adopt an approach to financial accountability which 
mirrors that used before 1992, but with more detailed accounts in the 
Annual Report.
The more detailed procedures were required by the need to meet the 
standards set out by the NAO, in order that the Planning Inspectorate 
achieved the requirements set for all Agencies’ financial affairs 
after the first year or so of operation. Some new duties taken on 
the field of pollution and environmental management are reimbursed by 
the appropriate Department, but essentially the funding of the Agency
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continues to come from the Treasury via the Department of the 
Environment. Expenditure in the Agency continues to be controlled by 
fixed annual financial allocations voted for by Parliament, although 
the workload is demand-led. Thus the new status has made no 
difference to this situation overall to date.
The outgoings for the year 1993/9*+ were about £23 million net after 
receipts for local plans and other specialist work, and from the 
Welsh Office for work done in Wales. One change has been that the 
Department of the Environment itself is now producing more detailed 
financial accounts, and the cost of the Planning Inspectorate is now 
shown separately on the Departmental Vote as a gross amount - under 
£28 million.
This total has not changed much over the past few years, although the 
costs directly incurred by the Planning Inspectorate have risen.
This is because, in the past, the Department of the Environment added 
had added about 30# for their overhead and management costs to the 
Inspectorate’s figures, to produce the sum of just under £28 million 
set out in the annual estimates.
The Planning Inspectorate is now responsible, through the Chief 
Planning Inspector as accounting officer, for showing that value for 
money has been obtained. Whereas previously charges for specific 
central services such as computing or personnel management were 
included in the Department’s overall charges, now the Planning 
Inspectorate is told what is attributable to a particular function, 
giving a clearer accountability.
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Currently, the addition for the Department’s overheads is about 2% so 
that, although the Inspectorate's own expenditure has risen, the 
overall cost to the Exchequer is still a little over £27 million. 
Clearly, this situation also has implications for the finances of the 
central core of the Department, since the overhead and management 
costs passed on to the Planning Inspectorate in the past must now be 
reduced by some means, or absorbed by other central functions which 
in turn would increase their costs. Those decisions would have to be 
made in the context that the NAO is increasingly concerned with value 
for money in central Departments.
The accounting system
Without any real income of its own, the Planning Inspectorate 
continues to operate under a gross running costs regime, with all 
costs paid by the DOE from public funds, and any receipts from local 
planning authorities and other bodies paid directly to the central 
Department (Planning Inspectorate Business Plan 1993/9*0*
As the organisation reached Agency status, improved management 
practices were put in place with (as we have seen) additional staff, 
in order that the Inspectorate could produce specific financial 
accounts. More detailed financial controls and procedures were 
instituted on a paper-based system in 1992 and 1993* and the National 
Audit Office has audited the accounts for the first time for the 
financial year 199*095 •
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Like other Next Steps Initiative Agencies, the Planning Inspectorate, 
has to produce its reports and accounts and have them audited, 
publish them, and send them through to Parliament by the summer 
Parliamentary recess. This "April to July” timescale is tight, and 
means a significant bunching of work for all Agencies and, of course, 
for the National Audit Office.
We saw in Chapter 2 that the accruals accounting system does not 
encourage an organisation to find new sources of income, or to 
economise in the use of funds already allocated, since any savings 
made are likely to be reflected in a lower provision of resources in 
the following year. This applies to all Agencies using this system, 
including the Planning Inspectorate.
The accruals system, and the use of a gross running costs regime, do 
not fit well with the Inspectorate’s fluctuating workload, and the 
long lead time needed to train Inspectors to meet the upturn in 
casework (Chapter 4). The Agency has agreed with the Department of 
the Environment that the cost of the inquiries into objections to 
draft local plans (repaid by the local planning authorities 
concerned) should be operated on a marginal extra receipts basis, so 
that more income for the Agency can be available from the Department 
when the work load increased, without the necessity for a special 
application to the Treasury (the Welsh Office casework is funded in 
an arrangement through the Department of the Environment on a similar 
basis).
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After a reduction between 1989 and 1993, the number of planning 
appeals has stabilised, and there is now an increase in other types 
of environmental appeals. Thus the increase in the number of local 
plan inquiries in recent years has not been compensated for since 
1993 by a continuing fall in the number of appeals against the 
refusal of planning permission, which have a strong correlation with 
the number of planning applications (there were 597.000 planning 
applications made to local planning authorities in 1989/90, 483,000 
in 1991/91 and 447,000 in 1993/94 (Central Statistical Office, 1995) 
and an average of about 28% of refusals of planning permission are 
challenged by appealing to the Secretary of State).
The workload of the Agency is therefore demand-led. However, the PES 
system for allocating money to the Inspectorate is rightly addressed 
to imposing cash limits. As part of the Department pf the 
Environment, the Planning Inspectorate is affected by any problems 
which arise centrally in the Department, and in the civil service as 
a whole.
Final budgets for the Agency are not confirmed until after the 
beginning of the financial year, delaying the production of managers’ 
individual allocations. With a volatile workload, this inhibits 
innovation and deters management from investigating measures which 
could provide a more varied, rapid and effective service to meet 
customer needs.
The Inspectorate is one of the largest employers of "homeworkers” in 
the civil service, and this reduces office rent and running costs, as
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well as achieving considerably higher productivity than would be the 
case if all Inspectors were office based. This is confirmed by the 
computer firm ICL, whose software development staff have said that a 
25 hour week at home produces as much output as a full week in an 
office. The National Computing Centre in Manchester has recorded 
that "teleworkers” can be as much as 40% more productive than 
office-based colleagues (Wickham, 1993)*
With a small central staff, every week some Inspectors travel to 
Bristol from their homes all over the country to assist with the 
professional management. The cost of travel and of travelling time 
is the "down side" of having staff based at home.
As stated earlier, in considering the costs of the planning appeal
system, it should be remembered that Inspectors in the field act 
alone, without supporting staff of any kind. The arrangements for 
premises for inquiries are usually organised by the local planning 
authority at no charge to the appellant or to the Planning 
Inspectorate. Thus the cost of the inquiry to the Inspectorate is 
only the salary of the Inspector, plus administrative overheads of 
perhaps about £400 for each sitting day.
This situation can be contrasted with the £7,600 daily cost to the
taxpayer of an action in the High Court for the judge, ushers and
stenographers (The Economist, 1995)* The Lord Chancellor is now 
proposing that civil litigants should pay for taking cases to the 
courts, with fees of £200 for the county court and £500 for the high 
court being suggested (Millward, 1995)* That could be taken as a
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precedent for charging fees for planning appeals which, as we saw in 
Chapter 5. was considered but rejected during the period leading up 
to Agency status. The introduction of fees would undoubtedly 
increase the pressure for the Inspectorate to demonstrate every year 
that it is providing value for money - which would be a very 
effective aspect of control.
As in other Agencies, the Planning Inspectorate is delegating budgets 
"down the line”. This approach is now also being pursued in parts of 
the civil service, so it is no longer an aspect confined to the Next 
Steps Initiative. In the Inspectorate, from the beginning of the 
199^/95 financial year, group heads will have budgets for the their 
"command”. However, the nature of the Inspectors’ role means that
the Assistant Chief Planning Inspectors, heading groups usually of
about 60 professionals and a small group of administrative staff 
(representing an annual total staff cost close to £3 million), have 
very little control over the allocation of work to most of the
professional people in their group.
The proposed scope of the group heads’ budgets was therefore reduced, 
after discussion, to those aspects which they can influence, since 
otherwise they would be held responsible for money being expended 
without having any influence over the outcome:
A. bonus awards (although these are now proposed
to be discontinued under the 
proposed new pay and grading 
regime from April 1996)
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B. overtime (for administrative staff, as 
Inspectors are not paid overtime)




This limited responsibility confirms the particular nature of the 
Inspectorate’s organisation and the Inspectors’ duties, and the 
limited influence which some of the Agency’s managers have on the 
deployment of their staff. Whilst the managers advise on career 
development, quality standards, and the general nature of the 
casework which Inspectors do, they do not exercise the ultimate 
control over each case, or most aspects of what their professional 
staff are responsible for.
Relationships with the Department of the Environment
Any relationship will be coloured by its importance to the parties 
concerned. In government, this will be influenced by the political 
implications of the success or failure of the current operations of 
the organisation.
The Inspectors, in deciding and advising Ministers on planning and 
other types of appeals, and in holding inquiries into objections to 
draft development plans, have an influence on whether changes are
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made to the ’built environment” and the uses to which land and 
buildings are put. In turn, this affects the construction industry, 
which accounts for one third of the manufacturing base in this 
country, one tenth of GDP, and 30% of fixed investment.
The importance of the construction industry was shown in 1993. when 
the Department of the Environment launched its construction 
sponsorship directorate to promote this aspect of national activity, 
which depends on planning permission being granted by local planning 
authorities. In the case of some proposals, and particularly the 
more major but controversial projects, the promoters of development 
are likely to have to obtain planning permission on appeal. Very 
considerable sums of money are involved in the outcome of appeals, 
running into millions of pounds for each of the more major cases.
The effect of the Inspectors' decisions and reports also impinge on 
other aspects of the Department’s responsibilities for the 
environment, including the control of potentially polluting 
processes, overseeing the compulsory purchase of land by local 
authorities, and urgent measures needed in cases of drought and water 
shortages. It is therefore understandable that Ministers and senior 
Departmental administrators continue to be interested in how the 
appeal system is coping, and whether the Planning Inspectorate is 
demonstrating a practical approach in satisfying its customers.
However, one recent example illustrates the difficulties which the 
Department of the Environment can have in standing back from the new 
Agency's activities. This was in the summer of 1993. when Ministers
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decided that some inquiries should be scheduled to start on Mondays, 
the day normally used by Inspectors to contact or visit the office, 
catch up with paperwork and administration, read case files ready for 
the next week, and travel ready for inquiries and other work 
scheduled for Tuesdays.
One group of the Agency’s "customers”, the Planning Bar Association, 
protested at this proposal, as barristers use Mondays for case 
conferences with clients and witnesses before travelling to stay away 
from their chambers for that week’s inquiries (Planning, June 1993)* 
They did not think that the proposal would be beneficial to resolving 
appeals effectively. However, Ministers insisted that the 
Inspectorate should allocate inquiries on Mondays.
Inspectors and planning barristers might be concerned about the 
practical consequences but, for the purposes of this study, the 
interesting point is that the Ministers decided to specify the exact 
action to be taken. The relevance in the context of the Next Steps 
Initiative is the fettering of the Chief Executive Officer’s duty to 
manage, especially as the proposal was made at a time when workload 
pressures had been reducing.
We saw in a previous Chapter how simple guidelines for performance 
indicators had been set out in the framework document. If the 
principles underlying the setting of such indicators had been adhered 
to, the appropriate pattern would have been for the desired outcome 
(for example, a minimum number of inquiries to be held in a week or
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other specified period) to be set out by Ministers, and for the Chief 
Planning Inspector to decide how that should be achieved.
Another area where the Department continues its previous practices is 
when Ministers are briefed on policies in which the Planning 
Inspectorate has the expertise and/or is dealing with a particular 
subject on a day to day basis. There is, of course, the need to 
distance the Inspectors who are deciding and/or reporting on appeals 
from political contacts; that is why other Inspectors are employed as 
senior managers in the office in Bristol, whose duties as we saw 
earlier include liaison with the policy divisions of the Department. 
However, central civil servants continue to take the lead on these 
matters, with the Planning Inspectorate management regarded only as a 
consultee at a distance.
Ministers continue to come under pressures from parts of the 
development industry to give priority to particular aspects of the 
Planning Inspectorate’s workload, Reference was made previously to 
the duties of Inspectors to hold inquiries into objections to local 
development plans; these inquiries alone are now occupying an 
increasing amount of Inspectors’ time (over 20% in 1993/9^ “ Chief 
Inspector's Annual Report and rising) as the result of legislation 
requiring local planning authorities to prepare a new plan for the 
whole of their area.
Increasing public participation has extended the duration of these 
inquiries, as have the use of the word processor and the photocopier. 
Attention to the ways of analysing objections and using databases can
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assist authorities in minimising costs and increasing effectiveness, 
and the Planning Inspectorate visits authorities to give advice on 
this. Ministers have decided that, as a matter of policy, priority 
should be given to development plan work, with enforcement appeals 
being next in priority, and planning appeals coming third.
In 1995. this has resulted in a backlog of written representations' 
appeals building up in the system, and delays in fixing dates for 
inquiries and hearings. To make further staff resources available to 
accommodate this, new Inspectors must be recruited and given 
comprehensive training. The organisation must then give them a range 
of work over a minimum period to develop their expertise to the 
required standard. Thus there can be a considerable delay before the 
Inspectorate is ready to accommodate any increases in workload, as 
mentioned in Chapter 4.
The political consequences of restricting resources - in real terms 
the financial settlement is being reducdd by 10# in 1994/95 compared 
to the previous year - when the workload rises is increasing delays 
in determining appeals and holding inquiries into objections to local 
plans. These are likely to be a matter of interest in the House of 
Commons if any significant backlog continues.
Ministers have therefore been prepared to authorise the extra cost 
for the recruitment of contract staff in 1995 to cope with an 
increase in workload; these staff will, as usual, be deployed on 
simple cases whilst they develop their experience. In the meantime,
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the Planning Inspectorate has sought assistance from recently retired 
staff to assist on a period basis.
These limitations of having control from the Department in relation 
to a fluctuating workload are a real problem for the organisation. 
Forecasting for the Inspectorate is an uncertain art (Planning 
Inspectorate Corporate Plan 1994/95 to 1996/97)* This is exemplified 
by a study carried out in 1993 for the Planning Inspectorate by Arup 
Associates. Based on a figure of just over 8,000 enforcement appeals 
submitted in 1992/93. hut which appeared to be a peak, the 
consultants forecast up to 7.000 cases in 1996/97* However, the 
number of decided enforcement appeals for 1993/94 turned out to be 
about half that figure - 3.500. However, this is only one aspect of 
the Inspectorate's work, and other types of case increased and meant 
that there was an overall increase in Inspectors' time needed in
1993/4.
The payment of salaried and fee-paid/contract staff from two 
different civil service accounts affects the Inspectorate's ability 
to manage effective staffing policies in the financial situation of 
the mid 1990s, and Agency status has made no difference to that. The 
rigid link to civil service pay scales affects the choice of people 
from the private sector who are attracted to apply.
Performance indicators
Performance indicators are now one of the most effective ways in 
which an Agency's progress can be measured and controlled - if
163
FIGURE 7.1 - TARGEIS FOR THE PLANNING INSPECTORATE
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appropriate indicators are chosen. For the Inspectorate, the scope 
of the performance indicators were first set out in general terms in 
the framework document, which was agreed by the Department of the 
Environment and the Treasury in early 1992 (Chapter 5)•
Each year since then, the Inspectorate’s performance has been 
assessed against these targets, which are shown in Figure 7,1. In 
turn, the current year’s targets are discussed each year with the 
Department and the Treasury. This leads to changes for the following 
year, by (between 1992 and 1995)*
reducing the unit costs for the majority of appeals;
increasing the percentage efficiency improvement;
controlling the time taken to recover fees from local planning 
authorities; and
completing a series of customer surveys in the period 
concerned.
The table in Figure 7*1 summarises the progression over recent years. 
However, standards can be set after the beginning of the financial 
year. So far, the effect of the efficiency saving percentage 
requirement is difficult to disentangle from the overall control of 
the costs of the Agency, and the Department’s overall control of 
decisions on recruitment of new Inspectors. Although staff costs are 
about 60% of the overall expenditure on the Agency, the political
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pressures if delays begin to build up in deciding appeals because 
there are too few Inspectors seem likely to override any reluctance 
to finance the necessary staff.
However, the emphasis at present is on the recruitment of contract 
and fee-paid professional staff, who cost less and are not a 
permanent commitment for the Agency. It is more difficult to know 
whether the quality available by this means matches that which would 
be sought in full-time staff, since the Inspectorate has done very 
little recruitment of that type in recent years, and pay rates 
offered in competition with the private sector and the more senior 
jobs in local government would be important.
The volume workload has necessarily been little more than a general 
indication since, as we saw in Chapter 4, the number of appeals is 
related to the number of applications made to local authorities, and 
that fell considerable between 1989 and 1994. Since appeals are 
lodged up to 6 months after planning permission is refused, and the 
number of refusals as a percentage of applications is fairly 
consistent, the Inspectorate has only a few months' warning if the 
caseload is going to rise. Figure 4.1 in a previous chapter showed 
that these fluctuations can be close to 5t000 cases in 12 months.
In 1995. a shortage of Inspectors and the priority being given at 
Ministers' request to inquiries into objections into development 
plans (Chapter 4), is likely to mean that, although the number of 
appeals being made has not fallen, the number determined will be 
lower than in the previous year.
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This is partly because the number of development plan inquiries is 
greater, and also (as already mentioned in this Chapter) because of 
the time it takes to train Inspectors to take more complex inquiries, 
linked to the restrictions placed on staff recruitment in recent 
years. A further complication, as we saw earlier, is that the 
Agency’s budget is not certain until several months after the 
beginning of the financial year, which increases the uncertainty 
about the resources that can be deployed.
Thus, the targets for dealing with appeals assume the anticipated 
number of applications being refused from which appeals are made, 
minimal queuing of cases, the co-operation of the parties, the 
availability of sufficient Inspector and financial resources, and the 
Planning Inspectorate enforcing the present regulations and 
timescales.
The quality target is very crude, since recourse to the High Court 
depends more on the financial resources of the appellant than on the 
justification of the grounds for challenge; later, we shall see that 
there are proposals for a different way of making this assessment.
The percentage efficiency improvement is a Departmental or civil 
service-wide target, rather than an Next Steps Initiative or Agency- 
specific, and the information in performance indicators more a matter 
of record.
Ideally, performance indicators should show practical ways of 
assessing the allocation of resources, and the ’what if" effect of 
alternative courses of action. For instance, an Inspector working on
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straightforward written representations* appeals, and taking normal 
leave and training time, will complete about 160 cases a year. Every 
Inspector who is occupied on management or training duties instead of 
determining appeals reduces the Agency*s capacity by that number of 
cases. The management changes in the 1980s (Chapter 4) which altered 
the number of Assistant Chief Planning Inspectors in the Bristol 
office from 10 to 8, only to bring in 8 Principal Planning Inspectors 
to assist instead, in practice reduced the casework capacity by 
( - 2 + 8 =  + 6 x  160 =) nearly 1000 cases a year. The current re­
assessment of the management pattern could result in a similar 
outcome.
Information technology
In a ’’business" where many cases have procedural similarities, and 
where statistics on location and the outcome of appeals would be of 
use to management, the limited progress made on information 
technology (IT) in the Inspectorate to date which was mentioned in 
Chapters k and 5 is disappointing. Computerisation is only now being 
slowly introduced into an organisation dealing with many hundreds of 
thousands of documents a year.
This delay also affects the relevance and interpretation of the 
results achieved each year against the performance indicators set as 
detailed targets in the Planning Inspectorate.
Local planning authorities carry out very similar processes to the 
Planning Inspectorate when determining planning applications, and
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most of them have had information technology systems for this purpose 
for 10 to 20 years. It has been little comfort to the Inspectorate 
that the difficulties which have been encountered in implementing IT 
mirror those found elsewhere in government in this country and the 
USA (Muid, 199^ ).
The absence of extensive computer based systems, and the 
unsophisticated financial methods available before the Planning 
Inspectorate was selected for Agency status, have meant a slow start 
in identifying where and why money was being expended. This has 
limited the data available to assess performance and show what costs 
what, and where effective changes could be made.
Particular capital expenditure schemes in the Agency are often linked 
to the parent Department - for instance, the software for the IT 
project in the Inspectorate was a Department of the Environment 
choice, as the systems are to have some links with those in the 
Department. The introduction of networks and word processing in the 
main Department of the Environment brought the impetus for the 
Planning Inspectorate to be allowed to address the task, rather than 
the advent of Agency status when it finally came.
The Treasury originally gave approval in April 1990 for a range of IT 
activities, involving the investment of about £7 million, plus 
operational costs of about £7 million over an expected life of 10 
years for the systems. At that time, some £27 million of benefits 
were expected over a similar period, including administration and 
management of cases, matching them to Inspectors, the Planning
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Inspectorate's finances, improving management information and 
communications between the office and the field.
The overall situation on the implementation of IT in the Agency is 
about to be reviewed, and the outcome could have a significant 
influence on the progress on performance indicators in the future, 
as well as any changes introduced by the Prior Options Review.
The Prior Options Review
When the Next Steps Initiative was set up, the review after 3 years 
was expected to bring the framework document up to date, rather than 
change the ground rules by which an Agency operated. However, in 
1993 the government announced that more fundamental aspects of how 
the operations of an Agency were implemented would be addressed in 
the assessment, by looking again at the "Prior Options" (Chapter 1) 
which were examined when an Agency was established.
In the Inspectorate’s case, the revision of the framework document 
will reflect the agreed objectives and managerial arrangements, and 
any new responsibilities and flexibilities. The review is being 
carried out by the Department of the Environment as the sponsoring 
Department in consultation with the Planning Inspectorate, the Office 
of Public Service and Science, and the Treasury. Comments have been 
invited from many professional bodies and environmental interest 
groups.
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This more radical assessment implies the possibility of more 
significant change, although this may mirror the way a private sector 
organisation will re-assess the operations of its constituent parts 
from time to time. The final choices lie with senior managers in 
other parts of the civil service, rather than with the Chief Planning 
Inspector.
The comments received from outside bodies on the ’Prior Options” 
consultation have been overwhelmingly supportive of the present 
independent status of the Inspectors, and the separation of the 
Inspectorate from the central Department which the commentators 
observe. It is not yet clear whether market testing of some other 
functions may be necessary, with the potential disruption and loss of 
confidence for the staff concerned that that could entail.
The study appear likely to conclude that the planning appeals system 
does serve a useful and necessary purpose, and that no form of 
’’privatisation" would be appropriate, in view of the role that the 
Inspectors play in the quasi-judicial system. There seems, 
therefore, little likelihood of any competition with the private 
sector as far as the professional activities of the Inspectorate are 
concerned.
Also revived as part of the Prior Options process has been the 
suggestion of a regional structure for the Inspectorate; in the past, 
this has appeared to be more expensive than the present national 
system, without any compensating advantages.
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In the current Review, the possibility is also being explored of a 
’net funding” regime for compulsory purchase and development plans 
work where fees are paid by local planning authorities. That would 
allow variations in demand to be dealt with by the Inspectorate, 
without an application having to be made every time to the Department 
of the Environment for additional funds.
Some consideration in the Review is also being given to the
implications of charging for appeals although the political problems 
highlighted by the previous suggestion of this (Chapter 5) seem to 
rule it out, at least before a change of government. Without that, 
the majority of the Planning Inspectorate's workload will continue to 
be funded directly via the Department of the Environment. The
planned changes to the funding of the civil courts, referred to
earlier, may indicate that change will come eventually in this 
respect.
In Chapter 1, we saw that the new Agencies were created as units 
within existing Departments, and so without the need for legislation. 
As far as the Inspectorate is concerned, that situation could be 
changed by the outcome of a challenge in the European Court which has 
been made at the same time as the Prior Options are being reviewed. 
This relates to whether it is "fair” for a planning appeal to be 
decided by an Inspector ’’employed” by the Department as the 
organisation is responsible to a politician - the Secretary of State 
of the Environment.
171
This case will, amongst other aspects, be a test of whether the Court 
accepts that a quasi-judicial role can be carried out in an 
organisation not run by lawyers nor concerned only with legal 
decisions. If the challenge were to succeed, the outcome of the 
Prior Options Review as part of the Next Steps Initiative could be 
overtaken by events outside the Department's and the Treasury’s 
control, as the Inspectorate would probably have to be given an 
independent status outside the central civil service. That has few 
precedents at present.
Market testing
Market testing is not confined to and within the Next Steps 
Initiative (Chapter 2). However, its underlying impetus seems to 
have come, at least to some extent, from the report "Improving 
Management in Government" (Chapter 1) which preceded the introduction 
of the new Agencies.
The Public Competition and Purchasing Advice Division is responsible 
within the Department of the Environment for looking at the viability 
of contracting out Departmental functions, costing alternatives and 
drawing up specifications for bids from the private sector, which are 
assessed for quality and best value for money (Chapter 1). The 
division also oversees such activities in the Agencies within the 
Department, thus restraining the local autonomy of the Chief 
Executive Officer in the Planning Inspectorate.
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The Department’s evaluation of part of the organisation for market 
testing, according to an interview in the Department of the 
Environment staff newspaper ’’Environment World” (February, 1993)t 
should not take into account loyalty, morale or a sense of belonging:
’The testing process involves costing the service as currently 
provided; undertaking a user requirement and identifying and 
costing any resulting changes to the current service; and 
together with Legal, drawing up and issuing a specification and 
invitation to tender; evaluating the tenders and awarding 
either a contract if the function is to go outside, or a 
service level agreement if the function is to remain in house; 
and establishing and implementing monitoring review 
arrangements.”
(Citizens’ Charter Market Testing Bulletin 1993*)
Each year since market testing was introduced, Agencies in the 
Department including the Planning Inspectorate have been expected to 
propose some of their functions which could be contracted out, and 
this requirement is continuing. About 23% of the Planning 
Inspectorate’s professional workload in 1993/9^ was carried out by 
outside ’contractors”, and a further recruitment of 30 contract 
Inspectors have been authorised for 1995* In the Inspectorate, an 
in-house bid by typing services was successful in 199^/95*
Market testing of other work is planned, in accordance with a 
programme agreed with the Department. The Information Technology
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team are partly composed of outside contractors which, on successful 
completion of the current project, would be reduced to day to day 
assistance for maintaining the system (Planning Inspectorate 
Corporate Plan 199^/95 to 1996/97)* Thus the percentage of 
contracted-out work in the Planning Inspectorate may fall for that 
reason. However, that could be balanced by an increase in the number 
of contract Inspectors, which in turn partly depends on the level and 
type of casework received.
Changes in legislation applying to the whole civil service are 
reducing the barriers to contracting out functions such as 
administration carried out on behalf of the Secretary of State, which 
were previously barred from consideration.
In the Inspectorate, there is likely to be a lively debate about the 
conflict between increasing the percentage of the functions to be 
market tested, the new emphasis on freedom of information, and 
retaining the confidentiality that may be seen to be necessary in 
handling the Agency’s statutory responsibilities. However, this 
would be the case whether or not the Next Steps Initiative existed, 
since market testing applies to the whole of the civil service.
The advent of market testing, and changes in the organisation and 
responsibilities for pay and grading, due originally to the Next 
Steps Initiative and more recently extended to other civil servants, 
has unsettled administrative staff and Inspectors alike in the 
Planning Inspectorate.
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This is partly related to the reducing links with other civil service 
organisations in Bristol, and the lesser number of civil servants 
overall, which has meant that administrators in the Planning 
Inspectorate (particularly at management level) have been in their 
present posts for several years and have few prospects of gaining 
other experience. However, without vacancies elsewhere or the 
willingness to leave Bristol for London, this situation is unlikely 
to change.
Another factor is the limited choice of alternative jobs which may be 
available in the private sector. Most managers in the Planning 
Inspectorate with an administrative background had learnt on the job 
with the assistance of internal courses. Apart from those with 
degrees when they entered the service, few have had any opportunities 
to get that level of qualification during their time in service. In 
1995. less than 5 Planning Inspectorate administrators had 
qualifications for which professional subscriptions would be paid, 
and which would help them get posts outside the civil service.
This is in marked contrast to most inspectors, who have often 2 or 
more qualifications. Another contrast with the administrative staff 
is the age of Inspectors in post, which averages more than 50 years. 
Administrative staff, especially in the lower grades, are usually 
under 40 years of age.
At the higher management levels, the Inspectors need, in addition to 
administrative skills, professional knowledge and the ability to 
interact with a wide range of external organisations and groups.
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Almost all will have previously worked outside the civil service 
either in local government and/or in private professional practice 
(Chapter 4). Administrative managers at that level in the Planning 
Inspectorate have usually never worked outside the civil service, and 
have had a very limited exposure to organisations and individuals 
elsewhere. A successful outside bid as a result of market testing 
could therefore have a radical effect on some administrative careers.
The control of quality - The Advisory Panel on Standards
Devising performance indicators which measure quality has been 
acknowledged to need improvement in the Annual Review of the Next 
Steps Initiative Agencies (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster/ 
Office of Public Service and Science, 199*0* One way of overseeing 
the quality standards was introduced to the Inspectorate partly as a 
result of an idea put forward by the professional staff in the new 
Agency. They were concerned that these standards, which had become a 
hallmark of the organisation, should be preserved.
Thus the Institution of Professionals, Managers and Specialists 
Union, to which the majority of Inspectors belong, was a prime mover 
in the process leading to the decision in 1993 to set up an Advisory 
Panel on Standards. It is perhaps not surprising that professionally 
qualified civil servants should be particularly concerned that 
quality should be maintained in an Agency’s activities, and should 
not be jeopardised by the new emphasis on efficiency and 
effectiveness as a result of the Next Steps Initiative. It seems
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unlikely that the administrative staff in the Agency would have seen 
the need in quite the same way.
This is an independent body whose remit is to ’’monitor the quality of 
the Agency's work on the Secretaries of State's behalf” and to report 
to him. Chaired by Michael Fitzgerald QC, the Panel of 4 members all 
have considerable experience in town planning - one as a lawyer in 
local government, a second as a planner and the third as a Chartered 
Surveyor. The Panel can be regarded as one of the ’external” quality 
measures referred to in Annex E to the framework document (Figure 
5.1). The Panel prepared its first report in the summer of 1993; 
this was published in December 1993 (Department of the Environment, 
1993).
The Panel said that the quality target of "not more than 1% of 
successful high court challenges and other justified complaints” (see 
Figure 7*1 earlier, and Chapter 5) was a negative indicator, 
discouraging positive proposals and suggestions. The Panel said that 
excessive squeezing of the time and costs criteria may prejudice the 
quality of decisions so that, whilst it is right that the 
Inspectorate should seek to reduce costs, the means of funding should 
not adversely affect the quality of the Inspectorate's work.
The report emphasised that the Planning Inspectorate's independence 
from the Secretaries of State was crucial, and advised that there 
would be benefits if the division of responsibility between the 
Departments and the Agency was stated more clearly. The Panel stated
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Figure 'J .2 - The Advisory Panel on Standards
for the Planning Inspectorate
Matters to be investigated in the second year
the creation of more rounded quality 
targets
the selection of issues for further 
customer surveys
the relationship between the quality and 
other targets
the work of the quality assurance unit 
within the Planning Inspectorate
the effect of existing safeguards
recruitment
training for Inspectors and administrators
the effect of Inspectors’ working 
conditions on quality
the degree of independence enjoyed by the 
Agency
its intention, during its second year, to look at 9 areas of the 
Agency's operations (Figure 1.2).
It will be recalled that, in Chapter 5. the matters which performance 
indicators should address were set out in general terms in the 
framework document - timeliness (in deciding appeals); unit costs (to 
highlight the financial performance); efficiency savings (of at least 
2% a year); quality measures (related to high court challenges and 
justified complaints); the volume of decisions issued; and the 
adequacy, clarity and availability of information and guidance for 
the customers of the new Agency.
Bearing in mind that the Panel has been asked to "monitor the quality 
of the Agency’s work”, it is interesting that the members see the 
scope of their interests developing into a more pro-active approach, 
including the future activities of the Agency. Indeed, the Panel’s 
role could become akin to the functions performed by management 
consultants.
Following the Panel’s comments on the quality target in their first 
report, action had been taken. In the Inspectorate’s Annual Report 
to 31 March 199^ * the previous quality target:
"High Court challenges and/or other justified complaints 
allowed against Inspectors’ decisions should not exceed 
one per cent of intake"
had been revised to:
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"(a) the number of justified complaints about the way
Inspectors have carried out their duties, and the number 
of High Court challenges, should be less than one in 
every hundred decisions issued.
(b) the number of justified complaints about the way the
Inspectorate handled the procedural aspects of casework 
should be less than one in every hundred cases received."
In their second report (published in May 1995). the Advisory Panel 
concluded that, overall, the Inspectorate’s casework systems were 
soundly managed and that the high regard in which the Agency is 
generally held was fully justified. The Panel said that in the time 
available, they hade not been able to examine all the issues 
identified in their first report in the detail they would have 
wished, and had therefore concentrated on those aspects of the 
Inspectorate’s work which most affect quality in the decision 
process.
The second report said that the Panel agreed that the revised quality 
target was a more meaningful way of assessing performance, but that 
it remained essentially a negative measure. They considered that the 
target needed to address the quality of the Inspectors’ decisions, 
rather than whether someone had chosen to challenge them. The Panel 
said that for standards of quality they looked to the professionalism 
of the Inspectorate itself, and in the longer run wanted to see 
efforts for checking quality switched from checking decisions after 
issue to standards being enhanced throughout the appel process.
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The Panel drew a distinction between quality of process and quality 
of outcome; they said that the essence of the latter should be gauged 
from the standard of the reasoning employed in Inspectors' decision 
letters and recommendations to the Secretary of State.
The Panel members also said that they had been unable to find any 
documentation which explained the rationale for the other key 
performance targets, such as timeliness, volume of decisions and 
efficiency.
As we saw in Chapter 2, it can be too easy to tilt performance 
towards cutting costs rather than achieving and improving quality.
It is therefore interesting that the Panel also commented, in 
relation to the balance between quantity and quality, that the 
achievement of standards should not have to depend on resource 
implications.
The Panel is composed entirely of professionals, but their concern 
for quality stems directly from their terms of reference, which 
include "... whether the Agency's professional quality assurance, 
quality control and training systems are in place and functioning 
properly They have confirmed in their second report that they
propose to discuss with the Inspectorate and the Department what 
impact those targets had on quality performance.
By seeking to balance these considerations, the Panel is 
demonstrating that the mechanistic approach used in the 1985 draft 
staff inspection report (Chapter 4) is not appropriate for an Agency
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with a quasi-judicial function which seeks to satisfy its customers 
as to the quality of its output on a continuing basis.
To quote Appendix D to the Planning Inspectorate’s Annual Report and 
Accounts for 1993/94, recording the pattern which has been 
established over the years, and which was confirmed in both the 
Justice/All Souls report (Chapter 4) and the Inspectorate’s framework 
document (Chapter 5):
"Inspectors in planning inquiries act as a technical tribunal, 
entitled to make decisions based on the evidence before them, 
coupled with their own expert experience and qualifications.
In some cases, decisions may turn on the Inspector's value 
judgments in planning terms."
The Advisory Panel’s members also emphasised that there should be 
regular training for Inspectors. They said that contracting out 
parts of the workload should not become a replacement for a trained, 
salaried, professional Inspectorate which could attract talented and 
able recruits. The Panel noted that the 1993/4 Business Plan had 
regarded the outcome of previous recruitment campaigns as 
disappointing, and said that a centre of excellence could not easily 
be achieved by an increasing reliance on flexible and disparate staff 
resourcing.
The appointment of the Panel indicates that Ministers were persuaded 
that it would not be enough for senior central civil servants to
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confirm to them that quality standards were being satisfied, and that 
a regular overview was needed by independent outside professionals.
It will be interesting to see what the revised framework document (as 
an outcome of the Prior Options Review) has to say about quality 
standards and their interaction with other aspects, such as 
efficiency and value for money, which are sought by the Next Steps 
Initiative. If the Panel can encourage positive change whilst 
gaining and keeping the confidence of middle managers, the staff in 
the Planning Inspectorate, Ministers and central civil servants, 
considerable gains could be made in a short time.
Summary
There is a tendency to re-arrange, rather than change, administrative 
practices. Agency status has meant that accounting and personnel 
functions had to be created in the Inspectorate almost from scratch, 
and more detailed accounts have had to be prepared. The re­
allocation of overhead costs between the Department of the 
Environment and the Agency has implications for the centre.
The accruals system of accounting does not sit well with the 
fluctuating workload of appeals. Similarly, service-wide 
restrictions and late approval of finances after the beginning of the 
year cause problems for managerial forecasting and planning, and more 
formal procedures take up extra staff time. Although budgets are 
being delegated, the independent role of Inspectors means that their 
professional managers have very limited control over budgets.
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Targets tend to be numerical rather than directed towards promoting 
quality and other types of change. It is difficult to disentangle 
the effects of performance indicators from those of market testing 
and the Citizens’ Charter. The absence of effective IT systems 
affects the choice of performance indicators. Quality targets in the 
Inspectorate are regarded as crude by the Advisory Panel on 
Standards, and the Panel says that it has been unable to discern a 
rationale for the other key performance targets. The volume workload 
target is strongly influenced by the number of applications refused 
by local planning authorities each year.
The Planning Inspectorate was regarded as offering good value for 
money in 1971 (Chapter 4), and the practice of basing Inspectors at 
home reinforces that today. There is at present no incentive for the 
organisation to seek new sources of income; introducing fees for 
appeals would be likely to sharpen the focus on value for money.
The importance of the Planning Inspectorate’s processes in enabling 
and controlling development mean than there is continuing 
Departmental interest, and political controls which can inhibit 
obtaining resources at the best time to plan for future workloads. 
There can be political consequences if resources are restricted and 
tightly allocated to the extent that there are not sufficient 
experienced Inspectors available to deal with the current workload.
The Prior Options Review could mean major changes in the framework 
document, although the present pattern of the Planning Inspectorate 
Agency’s activities is generally supported by those consulted. The
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final form of the revised document will be decided by senior managers 
in the civil service outside the Inspectorate. One possibility being 
considered, again, is charging fees for deciding appeals. A 
challenge in the European Court, if successful, could mean the 
Inspectorate being removed from apparent political control.
The need to carry out market testing constrains the autonomy of the 
Chief Planning Inspector on an annual basis, but is a practice now 
being applied throughout the civil service. Market testing unsettles 
administrative staff in particular, who would appear to have less job 
options than the professional Inspectors if their work was to be 
contracted out.
The Advisory Panel on Standards has emphasised the need for 
professional independence, and a division of responsibility from the 
central core of the Department. The Panel says that contracting out 
should not be a substitute for a trained, salaried and hugh quality 
professional workforce. The existence of the Panel indicates that 
Ministers accept the need for a professional overview of quality in 
the organisation as well as supervision by central civil servants.
Comparisons with other Agencies
Overall, our examination of the Inspectorate and its programme to an 
beyond Agency status has not revealed any dramatic developments. 
Functions have been transferred as in other organisations affected by 
the Next Steps Initiative and Treasury decisions. However, few other 
changes have occurred that would not have come about in any case
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because of the variable workload and Departmental decisions 
independent of the Initiative.
Whilst the Inspectorate may have a unique function, and its 
professional staff an unusually independent role within the civil 
service, there are some features of other Agencies (which are 
examined in Chapter 9) which are comparable or relevant to the 
activities in the Planning Inspectorate. This is a useful basis for 
coming to conclusions, and comments on this are in Chapter 10.
We move on, first, to take a closer look at how the Next Steps 
Initiative was introduced, and the use of framework documents to 
define the role of Agencies in relation to Departments and Ministers. 
The effects of common requirements such as accountability, and 
financial and other controls, and scrutiny of the new Agencies are 
aspects which need to be considered throughout the Next Steps 
Initiative, whatever the function of the Agency or its staff may be.
Having examined these matters in Chapter 8 in general terms, we then 
consider the experiences of other Agencies, in many cases those which 
also have regulatory functions, to assess whether they provide 
examples of what the Inspectorate has or could have done since 1992 
(Chapter 9)* We shall particularly look at innovation and change, 
those Agencies with variable workloads, staffing issues, financial 
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CHAPTER 8 - OTHER AGENCIES
As mentioned at the end of the last Chapter, there are many common 
requirements made of Agencies in the Next Steps Initiative. Chapter 
1 set out briefly the manner in which the Next Steps Initiative was 
introduced within central Departments of the civil service. Now, we 
take a closer look at how the Next Steps Initiative was introduced, 
and the use of framework documents to define the role of Agencies in 
relation to Departments and Ministers.
We then look at the effects of the common requirements such as 
accountability, and financial and other controls, and scrutiny of the 
new Agencies are aspects which need to be considered throughout the 
Next Steps Initiative, whatever the function of the Agency or its 
staff may be. In doing so, we should bear in mind the aspects of the 
Planning Inspectorate mentioned in Chapters 4 to 7*
The system, in as far as that is an appropriate term for a procedure 
which has not been formally codified, has been extended rapidly in 
the 6 years since the first Next Steps Initiative Agency, the Vehicle 
Inspectorate, was launched in August 1988. One issue is whether the 
Next Steps Initiative has been able to extend accountability and 
responsibility to named permanent officials at lower levels in the 
hierarchy, as has happened in the Planning Inspectorate for many 
years.
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As we saw in Chapter 1, the Initiative was intended to change a 
horizontally structured civil service into an organisation where 
smaller central Departments oversee the activities of a large number 
of more autonomous organisations. With few of the changes being 
authorised by statute, we shall be looking also in the next Chapter 
to see whether the new Agencies are able to demonstrate meaningful 
and consistent change, and better service to their customers.
Whilst the framework documents used to set out the new situation 
could be said to indicate a change from management by command to 
management by contract, it is in the everyday relationships between 
Departments and Agencies that the real situation may be seen. A 
number of commentators commissioned by government have observed what 
has been happening, and their conclusions mentioned later in this 
Chapter may assist us in assessing what has occurred.
One matter to be considered is whether the Next Steps Initiative has 
proved to be the precursor of more major alterations in how the 
service is delivered and who by. In this context, the Prior Options 
Review used in all Agencies after about 3 years (Chapter 1) has a 
significant role to play.
The general situation
By the summer of 199^ . 62# of all civil servants were working in 102 
Agencies, plus the Executive Units of HM Customs and Excise and the 
Executive Offices of the Inland Revenue, which work on Next Steps’ 
lines. The total number of civil servants in these organisations was
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over 353.000 in April 1994 (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster: 
Office of Public Service and Science, 199*0* Some 64 more 
organisations are candidates for Agency status.
Overall, the staffing situation in the civil service at the beginning 
of 1994 was -
10# central staff in Departments;
9# in executive functions unlikely to be put into Agencies;
62# in 96 Agencies;
4# announced as firm Agency candidates;
12# announced as Agency candidates but the process of 
considering "prior options” alternatives not completed; and
3# still under consideration for Agency status.
In this Chapter, we look at matters which affect all Agencies, 
including framework documents, the developing relationships with 
their parent Departments, and various studies which have been done by 
civil servants or for the Office of Public Service and Science on 
behalf of the government, the general concept of accountability as it 
has evolved in the Agencies, financial issues, the use of performance 
indicators, and the innovations of market testing and the Citizens’ 
Charter.
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The 1994 Review of the Next Steps Agencies usefully summarised the 
common features of the organisations, as follows:
"Each Agency has a clearly defined task, or range of tasks, 
which are set out in its published framework document. Key 
performance targets - covering financial performance, 
efficiency and service to the customer - are set by Ministers 
annually and announced to Parliament. Each Agency has a Chief 
Executive, normally directly accountable to Ministers and with 
personal responsibility for the success of the Agency in 
meeting its targets. The majority of Chief Executives have 
been appointed through open competition and more than half of 
those appointed in this way have come from outside the Civil 
Service. Staff in "Next Steps Agencies" remain civil servants, 
accountable to Ministers and governed by the same strict rules 
of conduct as those working in Departmental headquarters."
(Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster: Office of Public Service 
and Science, 199*0*
Perhaps the most noticeable aspect of these characteristics is the 
emphasis on specific and measurable tasks. This will be familiar to 
the staff of the Planning Inspectorate who, as we saw in Chapter 4, 
are well used to having their output measured and examined.
There are regular meetings each year of all the Chief Executive 
Officers which give them opportunities to exchange experiences,
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listen to civil service and outside speakers, and discuss their 
procedures.
Individual Agencies’ experiences will be examined in more detail in 
Chapter 9t including how they have coped with changes in their 
workloads, together with examples of their use of performance 
indicators, and methods of upgrading services to their customers.
Framework documents
In Chapter 2, we saw that certainty has often been seen as a virtue 
within the established civil service, with adherence to established 
patterns being favoured above innovation and change. Since this 
country does not have the written constitution enacted by some other 
nations, the framework documents are a relatively rare example within 
the centre of government of a formalised and to some extent codified 
pattern of operations for part of the civil service. They should, as 
for the Inspectorate (Figure 5*1) reflect the character of the 
Agency's activities.
In as far as these documents are to be re-considered and possibly 
amended under the Prior Options Reviews for each Agency after 3 years 
(Chapter 1), they will also reflect the ability of the Departments 
and Agencies to adapt to changes which can reduce costs and benefit 
the customers and taxpayers. It is too early to come to overall 
conclusions about that aspect of the Next Steps Initiative, but the 
contents of the framework documents can assist in assessing the
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priorities of Ministers, at least when the Agencies concerned were 
first set up.
A summary of the main headings in the framework document for the 
Patent Office, part of the Department of Trade and Industry, is shown 
opposite (Figure 8.1). Some similarities between the main headings 
and those of the framework document for the Planning Inspectorate 
(Figure 5»1) are immediately apparent. This framework documents for 
all the new Agencies are intended to define roles, set out the terms 
of the contracts between the parties, and set the scene for service 
level agreements with Departments.
Similarities between the framework documents for the various Agencies 
also reflect the matters which the Office for the Minister for the 
Civil Service (OMCS) considers to be important, and which are seen in 
both Figures 5*1 and 8.1. These can be summarised as:
the Agency’s aims and objectives;
relations with Parliament, Ministers, and the parent 
Department, other Departments and other Agencies;
financial responsibilities;
how performance is to be measured;
and personnel issues such as pay flexibility, training and 
industrial relations.
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The first Project Manager for the Next Steps Initiative, Sir Peter 
Kemp, said that framework documents are partly mission statements and 
partly articles of association of a company; partly contracts and 
partly administrative documents (House of Commons, 1991)* Clearly, 
the documents are meant to have a key role in the implementation of 
the Next Steps Initiative, answering elementary questions about 
Agencies such as their size, structure and financing, policy field, 
type of work, and location.
The Agencies’ framework documents are, in practice, publicly 
available contracts by which they promise to meet service targets, 
and the Departments promise to devolve some of their powers. In the 
case of an Agency such as the Inspectorate whose staff already have a 
special and independent role, the document will confirm rather than 
create that situation.
The process of writing a framework document is the instrument for 
devising and negotiating the management arrangements for an Agency. 
However, the public as customers have no right to question the 
"contract” (framework document) when it is first agreed between the 
Department and the new organisation.
Similarly, third parties normally have no right to dispute the 
outcome of a planning appeal. A planning permission granted by 
Inspectors on appeal is also in a sense, a framework document, since 
it governs how development should "operate" on a particular piece of 
land.
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One intention of the Next Steps Initiative is that central government 
should adopt a "hands off” approach to operational matters, and allow 
Agencies to manage their own affairs. However, old habits die hard, 
and the level of central control thought appropriate by some civil 
servants was shown by the fact that the Home Affairs Select Committee 
was not allowed to see draft framework documents when the Chief 
Executive Officers appeared before them with Departmental officials 
only 2 months before the Forensic Science Service and the Passport 
Office Agencies were created (House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee, 1991)*
On 16 May 1991» Sir Angus Fraser, head of the Prime Minister's 
Efficiency Unit, issued a report entitled "Making the Most of Next 
Steps" (Prime Minister, 1991). in which he suggested that framework 
documents for Agencies could specify what they could not do, rather 
than what they could. However, part of the traditional civil service 
(the Civil Service College Study) saw difficulties in this innovative 
approach, and the parent Departments and the Treasury held similar 
views.
The government, in a document commenting on further improving civil 
service performance (The Prime Minister, The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 199*0 said 
that it did not envisage extending the formal establishment of 
Agencies into areas of the civil service primarily concerned with 
policy. However, Greer (1993) has suggested that one approach would 




Greer (1993) questioned the ability of the Next Steps Initiative 
process to distinguish effectively between the separate 
responsibilities of Departments and Agencies; what the Agency’s role 
was to be in policy issues; and how far Minister and Departments 
should become involved in day-to-day operations. She considered that 
the balance between the autonomy of the Agency, and Departmental and 
ministerial accountability would be difficult to achieve, and we 
noted this earlier when looking at an example in the Planning 
Inspectorate.
As we have seen, the Next Steps Initiative proposed and sought to 
introduce a 2 tier structure, with policy development and the 
organisation of strategic management in the central part of major 
Departments, and operational tasks in the new Agencies (Chapter 1).
We saw in Chapter 4 that this is a division which had already been 
largely achieved in the Inspectorate because of the regulatory and 
quasi-judicial nature of the role carried out by the Agency's 
professional staff. However, there are Agencies, such as the Prison 
Service, where the Chief Executive Officer is seen as being the 
Minister's principal adviser on policy (Greenway, 1995)*
With so many Agencies in various Departments, it would be surprising 
if all relationships had progressed in the same way, and the 
information in any case is limited. However, some examples have come 
to light which illuminate the process, and the extent to which
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Departments have felt able to allow their new associates to take 
forward their ideas. We look at these in more detail in Chapter 9*
A Treasury representative told the Treasury and Civil Service 
Sub-Committee that the Next Steps Initiative
"has been letting differences that were inherently there 
between Departments and Agencies in government come more to the 
fore"
(House of Commons, 1991 page 58).
Sir Frank Cooper, former Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of 
Defence, was reported in the Independent Newspaper on 17 March 1988 
as saying that
"the Agency concept would require major delegation of authority 
if it is to be effective rather than cosmetic".
Sir Robin Butler took a similar view, saying that one of the problems 
to watch out for is that Departments may not in practice delegate 
control as they should, by monitoring an Agency’s performance too 
rigorously, and constraining freedom of action at every turn (Butler,
1991).
This implies that central Departments should be aiming to confine 
their role to policy formulation and advice, as the relationship
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between the Department of the Environment and the Planning 
Inspectorate had evolved between the 1960s and the 1980s.
The implications of taking the Next Steps Initiative concept to what 
some see as its logical conclusion can be seen in the dramatic effect 
on the Department of Social Security, where only about 1200 out of 
over 76,000 staff now remain in the central policy core (Goldsworthy, 
1991)* By comparison, the effect on other Departments, such as 
Environment, has been limited.
In order to give the new Agencies more autonomy, powers have to be 
transferred to them which were previously exercised elsewhere. 
Generally, this transfer has been relatively informal within the 
broad "canvas" of the framework documents, unlike the delegation of 
powers passed from the Secretary of State to the Planning 
Inspectorate's Inspectors. Additional flexibilities put in place 
since the Next Steps Initiative began have been assisted by the Civil 
Service (Management Functions) Act 1992. The Civil Service 
Management Functions Act 1993 allowed delegations of further 
functions to Agencies.
Official documents may set out formal changes, but the day-to-day 
practices of Departments in endorsing or derogating from these 
changes need to be considered to see what is happening in fact.
If there are undefined areas of responsibility between Departments 
and Agencies in framework documents, these can be either a source of 
flexibility or a reason for disagreement, perhaps depending on the
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personalities involved rather than the matters actually at issue.
Sir Angus Fraser has said that, unless one is very careful, the 
people who have been delegating many functions to their Agencies will 
still retain a capacity for challenging, questioning and so on, 
interfering with the decisions which are being taken under those 
delegations (House of Commons, 1991). We saw in Chapter 5 that this 
had occurred in the Planning Inspectorate in relation to the timing 
of planning inquiries after Agency status had been given.
The challenge for the new Chief Executives is to display 
"restlessness" if the Next Steps Initiative is to stay relevant, but 
Sir Robin Butler qualified this by saying that "look-outs have to be 
put in place and arrangements made for warning bells to be rung" 
(Butler, 1991).
The National Audit Office have said that a greater sense of common 
purpose and mutual trust should be developed, and that the amount of 
information required by a Department should be limited to the minimum 
necessary. For instance, in the Historic Royal Palaces Agency, there 
is regular contact by the Chief Executive Officer with the parent 
Department, but this is limited to a briefing session every 2 or 3 
months.
However, a report on the relationship of Agencies within the 
Department of Transport with the central policy core showed that they 
had experienced more interference, not less, since achieving Agency 
status (National Audit Office, 1992). In another Agency, the Chief
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Executive had to get approval for spending from a central staff 
member three grades his junior.
Sir Angus Fraser said in his report (Efficiency Unit, 1991) that 
Departments and Agencies should maintain a clear and shared vision of 
the aims, objectives and priorities of the Agencies. He said that 
Departments should develop, for all Chief Executives, schemes for 
remuneration which offer significant rewards for achieving results 
and clear and effective penalties for failure. Sir Angus Fraser 
found that the areas where there could be more progress were getting 
the context right, empowering the Chief Executive, and re-appraising 
the role, organisation and size of Departments.
Agencies usually relate to Departments both vertically to the line 
"manager” and horizontally, to several different divisions within the 
Department. Inevitably, the risk is duplication and conformity.
Many of the Agencies’ Chief Executives were reported to be spending a 
considerable part of their working week discussing budgetary and 
other matters with staff back in headquarters (House of Commons,
1991).
The exclusion of any management of staff and resources from the Chief 
Executive's responsibility should be specifically justified by 
Departments, and the Chief Executives’ remuneration should include 
clear penalties for failure.
The advice to core Departments has been that they should formulate a 
clear statement of their evolving role and the part their Agencies
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play in the delivery of their policy objectives. Since Chief 
Executives are directly accountable to a Minister, in a 
quasi-contractual arrangement as stated earlier, Departments must 
establish arrangements for providing advice and support to Ministers 
in relation to their Agencies and identify their focal point at 
senior level for dealings with each Agency. In the Planning 
Inspectorate, this is an officer at Grade 7 reporting to a Deputy 
Secretary. In the Department of Transport, there is a supervisory 
board.
In 19931 the government took an innovative approach to considering 
the progress being made in the implementation of the Next Steps 
Initiative. Ms Sylvie Trosa, on secondment from the French Civil 
Service, was asked by the Office of Public Service and Science to 
study the relationship between Ministers, Departments and Agencies, 
the effectiveness of current arrangements in the Next Steps 
Initiative and, in particular, the target setting and monitoring 
process.
Ms Trosa found that there had been positive achievements, including 
freedom to find solutions to fit a "business”, more orientation 
towards the customer, greater efficiency gains, some improvement in 
communications between Departments and Agencies, direct 
accountability of Chief Executive Officers to Ministers, and 
improvements in performance.
However, she concluded that the variety of arrangements for 
relationships between Departments and Agencies should be replaced by
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Ministerial Advisory Boards for every Agency, to give clear strategic 
advice to Ministers on Agency performance, and to be a forum for all 
participants, with the Chief Executive Officer as a member, one third 
of members to be outside management specialists and experts in the 
business the Agency is in, and both the Department and the Agency 
with an equal number of participants (Trosa, 199*0 •
She also said that there should be a "Fraser figure" for each Agency 
from a neutral background, who should be a senior person in whom the 
Chief Executive Officer could have confidence as a source of advice, 
and with sufficient time available to fulfil that role. The 
Ministerial Advisory Board should be the principal source of advice 
for him/her; the role of the Advisory Panel for the Planning 
Inspectorate has been more limited than that, due to the particular 
role of the Agency’s Inspectors (Chapter 7)*
Ms Trosa found that relationships between Departments and Agencies 
were not good, with mutual distrust being a common feature, and in 
some cases too much interference by the Department and too little 
supportive discussion between the individuals involved. There was a 
lack of co-ordination between central initiatives and the two central 
Departments (the Treasury and the Office of Public Service and 
Science), and too many rules.
She recommended that there should be interchanges of staff between 
Department and Agency, clear targets and objectives for the central 
core of Departments, and clearer delegation, particularly in the 
financial area.
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Ms Trosa's findings were welcomed by the Minister in charge of the 
Next Steps Initiative, and her conclusions on performance indicators 
and other aspects of the process are being taken forward.
An example of the effect of the Agencies on the existing civil 
service pattern is shown by a discussion with staff in Tollgate House 
in Bristol which was reported in Environment World in May 1993• They 
said that moving from an Agency back to part of the central 
Department showed that traditional civil service problems, including 
slow responses, emerged again; staff felt that bold and fresh ideas 
were needed in the centre. The best way to achieve improved support 
services and cut costs was said to be to untie services, and charge 
according to usage, as sought by the introduction of market testing.
Central services should not have to be used where cheaper 
alternatives could be found, including payroll services (DOTp, 1991)* 
It was considered that this would leave Chief Executives (and other 
budget holders) free to decide where they can obtain best value for 
money.
An 1991 inter-Departmental study identified significant shortcomings 
in the costing information available to Chief Executives, and 
scepticism in the private sector about centrally provided services in 
the civil service being cost-effective. In some cases, anticipating 
the findings of the Trosa study, the responsibility within 
Departments for Agencies was seen as diffused and confused, 
contrasting with the practice in the private sector. Similarly, 
reductions in central staffing in private companies where
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responsibilities had been de-centralised were not matched within the 
civil service.
Whether an organisation needs to reduce its staff depends of course 
on from what viewpoint the situation is being considered.
"We are an indispensable team; you are overmanned; they are 
redundant."
(Anthony Sampson, The Observer, 1981.)
Sir Angus Fraser has said that the most effective way for the 
remaining central policy cores of Departments to achieve both savings 
on staff costs and changes in methods of working is to impose a major 
reduction in the number of posts in their personnel and finance 
divisions, and thus force the decentralisation of functions 
(Efficiency Unit, 1991).
A study of the Treasury concluded that significant changes needed to 
be made in staff numbers, with reductions in staffing starting at the 
top, and this intention was being implemented in the early part of 
1995 on a voluntary basis, since sufficient volunteers came forward 
for redundancy (Purnell and Kirkbride, 199*0*
An aggregate reduction in the number of such staff across Government 
was suggested, and the Fraser report added that Departments should 
agree a timetable for establishing target staffing levels with the 
Treasury. As decisions on most aspects of staff management are
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delegated to Departments and Agencies, the functions and staff of the 
relevant divisions of the Treasury and the Cabinet Office should be 
appropriately reduced (Efficiency Unit, 1991)* There have been 
suggestions (Purnell and Kirkbride, 199*0 that up to 20% of the most 
senior civil service managers might not be needed. The Department of 
the Environment is currently reducing the number of its senior 
managers by at least this percentage.
Fry, Flynn, Gray, Jenkins and Rutherford took the view that Agencies 
may be defined more by their relationship to the parent Department 
than by their role or task (1988), since the careers of senior 
administrative staff in Agencies are still seen as being a 
Departmental rather than an Agency resource. With so much of the 
civil service being moved into Agencies, working in an Agency during 
the setting up period and its first years under the new status may be 
regarded as valuable experience for higher posts in the core of 
Departments. However, the location of an Agency outside London can, 
as we saw for the Planning Inspectorate, have the most important 
effect on these opportunities in practice.
The inter-Departmental study on the transfer of staff between 
Departments and Agencies concluded that geographical and social 
factors had more relevance for the majority of staff than 
opportunities within government. The study saw career opportunities 
at other levels in the private sector and local government being 
unaffected by variations in terms and conditions, and concluded that 
the civil service could adjust to similar differences caused by the 
Agencies in the civil service (Efficiency Unit, 1991)*
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Accountability
In Chapter 2, the importance of the accountability of the civil 
service to Parliament was set out, together with the particular 
responsibilities of the Permanent Secretaries in this respect for 
their Departments. The Next Steps Initiative is intended to 
delineate more clearly the responsibilities within Agencies, and 
their relationships with the politicians and civil servants in the 
central policy core.
This is a subject in which Parliament has taken an active interest 
since 1988 and an area which probably needs further clarification 
before a definitive view can be taken, since the new Agencies remain 
within the central civil service, subject to controls to which Chief 
Executive Officers must conform whether they are set out in the 
framework documents or not.
The roles of the Departmental Accounting Officer (the Permanent 
Secretary) and the Agency Accounting Officers (the Chief Executive 
Officers) seem not to be distinct, indicating potential problems, and 
reflecting the overlap between policy and operational matters 
referred to by Greer (1993)* Where queries are raised, Chief 
Executive Officers will reply directly to Members of Parliament, but 
only after they have consulted the parent Department.
In the past, Departmental accounting officers may have spent much 
time being briefed on detail before appearing before a Parliamentary 
Select Committee (Pliatzky, 1992). The advent of Chief Executive
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Officers in the new Agencies may reduce that burden and transfer it 
to a more appropriate location. However, the criteria by which 
Ministers decide the allocation of responsibility between the centre 
and the Agencies are not always made clear.
The government initially said in November 1991. following questions 
in the House of Commons, that written replies from Agency Chief 
Executive Officers would be published in a weekly parliamentary paper 
put in the House of Commons Library (Independent, 1991)* "Outsiders" 
such as the press and pressure groups found that they had no means of 
checking when an answer had been provided, and Members of Parliament 
were told that the replies were not public documents. Members 
complained of delays, and two Select Committees said that information 
which had been available to Parliament previously had become 
inaccessible. There were also considerable variations between the 
practices of different Departments in the use of the procedure. 
Following protracted protests by Members of Parliament and others, it 
was decided in July 1992 that the answers by and about Agencies would 
be published in Hansard.
Managerial accountability thus can require the Chief Executives of 
Agencies to appear before Select Committees, and several have done so 
including the Chief Planning Inspector as we have seen earlier. 
However, inevitably the effectiveness of the House of Commons Select 
Committee supervision of Agencies is constrained by political party 
influence, via whips' selection of members. The Select Committees 
also lack time and resources.
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As we have seen, since the Next Steps Initiative Agencies are still 
within the central Departments of government, they are subject to 
service-wide initiatives which affect all civil servants. Central 
instructions have been issued to the civil service on market testing, 
pay and grading, the Citizens' Charter and staff bonus schemes.
Chief Executive Officers therefore have to plan their pattern of 
control within these constraints, and can only have limited freedom 
to manage their organisation as they wish.
Quite apart from these requirements, often imposed by the Treasury, a 
Chief Executive Officer in a new Agency has other people who are 
interested in their activities. An example of this is Michael 
Bichard of the Benefits Agency. He has said that he is accountable 
to the Department of Social Security, the Treasury, the Citizens' 
Charter Unit, the Ombudsman, Members of Parliament, Select 
Committees, the media, and the general public as well as to his 
customers who use the services of the Agency. This is a rather wider 
range of responsibilities than the average managing director would 
list for a private sector organisation.
Finance
We noted in an earlier chapter that the control of the civil service 
in carrying out the functions decided by Parliament is largely by 
scrutiny of the money required for these duties to be executed within 
the various parts of government. The role of performance indicators 
will be looked at later, but there will be tensions between the 
Agencies seeking as much financial flexibility as possible and the
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Departments and Parliament seeking to oversee the expenditure 
incurred either directly, or through organisations such as the NAO.
One inevitable consequence of the Next Steps Initiative has been the 
undoubted but un-quantified costs of implementing the new Agency 
structures, including creating information and financial systems 
where these are lacking, defining reporting arrangements, developing 
strategies for personnel and training, and the use of consultants to 
assist in managing change.
In addition, the costs of the reviews of the framework documents and 
period staff contracts every 3 years needs to be taken into account. 
These costs have not been published and, in Agencies where adequate 
systems had to be put in place, may not have been capable of 
assessment at the time the Agency was created.
Figures for this do not appear to be available separately, but very 
considerable staff time have been used by the Departments, candidate 
Agencies, the Treasury and the Office of Public Service and Science 
in developing staffing structures, financial regimes, framework 
documents and agreements. Information technology will, as we saw 
earlier, have a significant role to play in financial control for 
those organisations with many and detailed records to be kept.
Whereas 30 Treasury staff used to handle pay bargaining for the civil 
service, there are now some 3000 civil servants in Departments and 
Agencies who have now been trained in the same area of expertise 
(IPMS, May 199*0* The Treasury is negotiating with more than 20
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Agencies who have to implement new pay and grading systems by April 
1996, and the central Departments are now also involved for their own 
staff. Without a settled basis for this, discussions with one Agency 
impact on those with another, and can overtake agreements on matters 
that had appeared to be settled.
The Treasury and Civil Service Committee Report in 1988 had sought to 
persuade the government that Agencies should be given such freedoms 
quickly, rather than introducing them gradually. However, this did 
not happen initially, although in 1991 the Treasury distributed a 
document setting out 40 pay and management flexibilities, and 
Departments and Agencies were encouraged to put forward suggestions 
for further flexibilities.
The Treasury is agreeing to greater delegations of pay and grading 
structures to Agencies (Management Matters, July 1993)* By April 
199*1. 21 Agencies and the 2 revenue Departments, altogether employing 
about 60# of the Home civil service, had taken delegated 
responsibility for their own pay and pay-related conditions of 
service (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster/Office of Public 
Service and Science, 199*0 • By April 1996, these responsibilities 
will be extended to all Departments and Agencies. Personnel 
delegations must, in the long run, mean variations in pay regimes 
between Agencies, encouraged, or at least only to some extent 
restrained, by the Treasury. Thus the allocation of resources by 
Agencies has to take place against an ever changing background of 
ground rules by government and the Treasury (McDonald, 1992).
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The financial regimes for Agencies were seen at an early stage as an 
essential element of the Next Steps Initiative concept, and finance 
tended to dominate negotiations before Agencies are established 
(Goldsworthy, 1991).
A feature of the Initiative has been the movement toward trading fund 
status, formerly enjoyed by only a few bodies in central government. 
Unless fees are charged or other types of outside income are 
available, this status is unlikely to be available and, in that it 
requires formal controls, it can be in some ways as onerous as the 
gross accruals system used by the Planning Inspectorate.
The 1973 Trading Funds Act was seen to be too limited, as it did not 
cover the monopoly and statutory services regimes of many Agencies; 
this restriction was resolved by the Government Trading Act 1990. A 
Trading Fund provides a financial framework covering operating costs 
and receipts, capital expenditure, borrowing and net cash flow. The 
organisation concerned is required to break even, taking one year 
with another, and to make a return on capital, and has powers to 
borrow to meet capital expenditure and working capital requirements, 
and to establish reserves out of surpluses. Within this framework, 
an Agency can meet outgoings without detailed cash flows passing 
through parliamentary vote (Goldsworthy, 1991).
Self funding Agencies clearly have the potential for more independent 
status should that be thought to be appropriate, and the more so 
where some or all of their work is for the private sector. Trading 
Fund status gives greater freedoms after the interim stage of net
211
running cost control, provided that stated ’consultation procedures” 
do not bring hidden bureaucracy. However, such freedoms must mean a 
reduction of the accountability to Parliament if they are to be 
effective. However, borrowing money requires detailed agreements 
with the Treasury which are avoided by a net accruals system.
Financial control
Whatever the financial regime in an Agency, the accounts are audited 
by the NAO. Now all Agencies, whatever their financial regime, are 
required to publish commercial-style accounts within 2 years of being 
launched (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster/Office of Public 
Service and Science, 199*0* This has required each Agency to recruit 
more staff, as we saw in the Planning Inspectorate, in order to 
produce its own accounts and institute its own controls, increasing 
the overhead costs of the Agency.
An inter-Departmental study in 1991 said that the Treasury should not 
try to challenge Agencies and seek flaws, but rather suggest and 
support solutions which would enable them to manage better 
(Efficiency Unit, 1991)* There has been limited published evidence 
that the Treasury is finding it easy to be innovative in these 
matters, and the initiatives seem mainly to be coming from the 
Agencies themselves.
Financial controls operate throughout the civil service, but 
inevitably the introduction of new procedures can threaten the 
perceived efficiency and effectiveness of the Departments' ability to
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oversee what is happening. Auditing has a role to play here.
However, as we saw earlier, the Treasury is being reduced in size, 
and many duties are being delegated to the Agencies. In preparing 
commercial-style accounts, the Agencies are leading the way in the 
civil service, since this approach is being extended to all 
Departments by April 1998.
The chairman of the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons 
has cited 17 examples of serious failings by Agencies in the handling 
of public money. The rules are, of course, different from spending 
money in the private sector, since taxpayers have no choice in paying 
taxes, and therefore are entitled to know that their money is being 
well spent.
In evidence given to the Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee
in February 199**. the head of the NAO in his capacity as Comptroller
and Auditor General said that he was concerned about businessmen 
being brought in to run semi-autonomous Agencies. He commented that 
all the emphasis had been on what these people could bring in from 
outside (Purnell, 199**). but they also needed to have regard to
public values and traditional ways of handling public money.
However, Sir Terence Burns, Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, has 
said that, with part of the Department’s business now decentralised 
in Agencies, the consequences for the Treasury itself need to be 
examined. Sir Colin Southgate, chairman of Thorn EMI and PowerGen, 
is quoted as saying:
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"there is too much second-guessing at the Treasury ... it 
should forget a lot of the monitoring stuff and concentrate on 
the really important things.”
(Smith, 199^ ).
A report issued in August 1991 by the Institute for Public Policy 
Research argued that Agencies were being controlled too tightly by 
the Treasury. Parliamentary control was seen by the Institute as 
being inadequate, and it was proposed that Agencies should be given 
their own statutory basis, setting out the Agencies' remits and 
detailing procedures for redress and the public's rights to 
information (Adonis, 1991)*
Performance indicators
In Chapter 1, we saw that Agency status is intended to be the 
beginning of a process of continuous development, and clearly a means 
of measuring whether this has been achieved is needed. This is one 
of the functions of performance indicators, which are set out in the 
first framework document for each Agency, and are subject to annual 
review by the relevant Department in consultation with the Chief 
Executive Officer. As in the Planning Inspectorate (Chapter 5). once 
an Agency is established, the current intentions of the Agency are 
also set out in the Business Plan and Corporate Plan produced each 
year (Chapter 5)* It is one of the roles of the parent Department to 
monitor progress by assessing whether these performance indicators 
have been adequately met.
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These targets may relate to finance, quality and/or efficiency, and 
the mixture of these can vary very much from Agency to Agency.
Whether they have been met is set out in detail in the government’s 
annual report on the Next Steps Initiative, issued late each year for 
the previous fiscal year.
The government issued advice to executive Agencies in 1992 on setting 
targets and judging performance. This was intended primarily to help 
the advisers in Departments who assist Ministers in assessing the 
target proposals which they receive; in setting and publishing the 
targets which are decided upon; and subsequently in assessing the 
implications of the results which are reported and the ongoing work 
of target setting after an Agency has been established.
The intention is to promote better measurement and assessment, to 
delegate more responsibility to local managers, and to achieve better 
results by encouraging managers to use the best public and private 
management techniques. Ms Trosa in her study of the Next Steps 
Initiative found that the system was working reasonably well, but 
that attention was needed in some instances to making sure that 
performance indicators and targets are suitable and appropriate 
(Trosa, Management Matters, May 199*0* Her recommendations were 
endorsed by the Office of Public Service and Science in the annual 
review of the Next Steps Initiative (199*0*
A further study (Massey, 1995) emphasised the need for a flexible 
approach by Chief Executive Officers; for Ministerial Advisory Boards 
(if established) to include representatives of business and the
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Agencies’ customers; for clarification of the boundaries and nature 
of Agency accountability; for the use of one budgetary system only 
using modern techniques; and for the need to have a statutory footing 
for future changes in the civil service.
A handful of robust and meaningful targets is needed to measure 
financial performance, efficiency and quality of customer service. 
Each framework document should establish that, within the overall 
disciplines of the cash inputs and targets set, managers are free to 
make their own decisions on the staff needed and resources to be 
used, except for any specially reserved areas (Efficiency Unit,
1991).
The government's reply to the Seventh Report of the Treasury and 
Civil Service Select Committee (House of Commons, 1991) showed that 
Agencies had achieved just over "]Q% of the overall targets set for 
them by Ministers at that time, with less success at hitting quality 
and efficiency targets; the Agencies were better at achieving 
financial targets (20 out of 26). In the 31 Agencies reviewed, 114 
out of a total of 159 targets were achieved (Prime Minister and 
Minister for the Civil Service, 1991). In 1992/93 overall, 77% of 
targets were achieved. This figure rose to 80% overall in 1993/9*+ 
(Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster/Office of Public Service and 
Science, 199*+). Success in this respect is closely linked to the 
resources which an Agency is allowed, as in the Planning Inspectorate 
(Chapter 7)•
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Scrutiny and the Prior Options Reviews
The Citizens' Charter is one form of outside scrutiny, which in 
giving the public the opportunity to comment, by itself is promoting 
more open government and the re-assessment of priorities within the 
civil service. Other familiar processes such as the activities of 
Select Committees are also ”service-wide", as is the annual scrutiny 
of Agency accounts by the NAO.
The NAO also carries out more searching investigations on specific 
topics in both central Departments and Agencies (Roberts and Pollitt, 
199^ ; Hogwood, 1995) which can enhance democratic accountability. 
These investigations, although they are not allowed to question the 
appropriateness of government policy objectives, can provide useful 
information on the progress of the Next Steps Initiative and the 
problems which may have arisen.
The Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee Sub-Committee has 
continued to examine the management aspects of Agencies and the Next 
Steps Initiative (Goldsworthy, 1991. and Treasury and Civil Service 
Select Committee, 199*0* The government has rejected criticisms that 
there is a lack of strategic thinking and direction about the role of 
the civil service; calls for a fundamental review of the Next Steps 
Initiative were said to be premature. Nor was a suggestion for 
standard terminology to be used in framework documents accepted.
Sir Peter Kemp has suggested (1993) that Select Committees should 
have a greater and more direct role as far as Agencies are concerned.
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He has proposed that they should scrutinise the operations of 
Agencies and the core of Departments on a regular basis, and oversee 
senior appointments in the Next Steps Initiative Agencies, as well as 
having direct access to the National Audit Office.
Lord Hunt, Cabinet Secretary between 1973 ancl 1979. has been quoted 
as saying that there should be an Inspector General to report to the 
Prime Minister on the Agencies set up under the Next Steps 
Initiative, to review the relationship between central Departments 
and Agencies, to ensure that there was no "second guessing" between 
them (Ford, 1991)*
Sir Angus Fraser said in his study (Efficiency Unit 1991) that the 
comprehensive 3 year Prior Options reviews of Agencies* achievements 
and plans would be very important opportunities for reappraisal.
There should be a firm timetable so that, by that time, Agencies had 
financial regimes to suit their business needs.
Richard Mottram, then Permanent Secretary for the Office of Public 
Service and Science, has said that the Reviews would look at 
performance, at whether Agency was still the best way of performing 
the functions, and whether the freedoms allowed by the framework 
documents could be increased. When Agency framework documents come 
up for review, the possibility of being a separate Department is 
considered for Agencies whose functions are independent of the rest 
of a Department.
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The 199^ Review of the Next Steps Agencies stated that in a changing 
environment, it is possible that the work of an organisation, or at 
least some aspects of it, may outlive its usefulness, so that the 
first question must be whether the activity needs to continue at all. 
We have seen this question being asked in the Inspectorate’s review 
(Chapter 7)* If not, the activity can be privatized, bought in, or 
structured differently. Alternatively, there may be scope for 
rationalising between Agencies, and between Agencies and other 
organisations (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1993 and Patent 
Office, 1993)* These are the matters which are being considered in 
the Prior Options Reviews (Chapters 1 and 7)-
Market testing
Market testing is one of the service-wide innovations mentioned 
earlier, so that the areas of government now covered by the Next 
Steps Initiative would have been affected in any event by the drive 
by the government to reduce costs and get more efficiency and 
effectiveness by this means, as we have seen in the Inspectorate both 
before and after Agency status (Chapters 4 and 7)»
Implementing market testing in Agencies has also revived the argument 
that the Next Steps Initiative is more about the hiving off of costs 
from government than achieving a better pattern for delivery, since 
it is likely to transfer functions away from civil service staff.
From 1992, the EEC Community Directive requires that work done for a 
public sector body by another (public or private) looking for payment 
will constitute public purchasing, and Agencies will be required to
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compete for contracts unless it is accepted that they are working on 
an ’in-house” basis.
The IPMS union took the view in January 1993 that market testing 
would have to protect the pay and conditions of staff because of the 
Transfer of Undertakings, Protection of Employment Regulations, and 
relevant decisions by the Employment Tribunals. The European Court 
of Justice had overruled the exemption of public services from the 
European Acquired Rights Directive 1977; contractors' bids for civil 
service work would therefore have to be based on current working 
conditions for staff transferred as a result of market testing.
After 18 months of market testing, 4 out of 21 Departments had 
completed their programmes or were near to doing so (Hasell, 199*0* 
Areas market tested in the central Department of the Environment up 
to September 1993 included training, registry, design and printing 
services, conveyancing, property services, travel and legal services, 
pay administration, personnel management, typing and library 
services, purchasing, supply and accounts (Market Testing Bulletin, 
Department of the Environment 1993)* Other tests had been done in 
the Department’s Agencies, including the Planning Inspectorate 
(Chapters 7 and 9)•
The work can be retained "in house" by a successful bid by the 
existing staff. An example is where links with private companies 
allowed civil servants in the Department of Trade and Industry to 
retain four out of six contracts which were market tested, albeit by
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halving the number of staff retained: the saving in cost was over 
£100,000 a year (Management Matters, May 1994).
However, the Annual Report of the NAO in 1993 expressed concern about 
the control of services contracted out following market testing. The 
report urged that public and private sector cultures must blend 
rather than clash. Government organisations must watch out for weak 
financial monitoring and controls, inappropriately applied, lack of 
clear lines of responsibility and conflicts of interest (IPMS, 1993)*
More recently, this concern has been re-iterated by the Public 
Accounts Committee of the House of Commons (Willman, 1994).
Hennessey (1994) has expressed concern about the prominence being 
given to market testing in the Next Steps Initiative and other 
reforms of government, and the problems for Ministerial 
accountability in Departments. He saw less difficulty in the 
Agencies where the Chief Executive Officers are Accounting Officers.
The Citizens' Charter
In some ways, the introduction of the Citizens' Charter throughout 
public services has paralleled the Next Steps Initiative, and it is 
unlikely that the effect of each of these measures can easily be 
separated from the other. Stowe (1992) points out that a public 
service is not efficient if it is serving the wrong ends, and 
monitoring with performance indicators are seen by government as an 
essential part of the Citizens' Charter process.
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Since the Next Steps Initiative came first, it can be said to have 
pioneered the process and, by being more visible in the new Agencies 
and other public bodies such as London Transport and the Post Office, 
to have made it more credible than the same efforts being made in the 
more central core of government.
Summary
The Agencies' framework documents provide a rare example of a formal 
document setting out the responsibilities of an organisation in 
central government, defining roles, setting out the terms of the 
agreement between Departments and Agencies, setting the scene for the 
new pattern, and answering elementary questions on areas which the 
OMCS consider to be important. Framework documents are not being 
suggested for those parts of government concerned with policy advice.
The programme of market testing is falling behind schedule. It has 
been suggested that it is most concerned with hiving off costs from 
the centre of government. There is scepticism in the private sector 
about centrally provided services for Agencies being cost effective. 
The NAO is worried about deficiencies in the control of market 
testing.
The Next Steps Initiative is intended to clarify the accountability 
of Departments and Agencies. The roles of their respective 
Accounting Officers are not entirely clear. The Chief Executive 
Officers of Agencies have accountability to a wide range of
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organisations and customers. Select Committees of the House of 
Commons have limited resources and time to spend on overseeing the 
accountability and activities of the Agencies. NAO special 
investigations are rare and unlikely to have a wide impact.
Whilst the "customers” of the potential Agencies were not consulted 
on the content of the framework documents, they are being involved in 
the Prior Options Reviews, which accords with the principles of the 
Citizens’ Charter, which in many respects has paralleled and followed 
the introduction and implementation of the Next Steps Initiative.
The alternative options for potential Agencies were not fully 
explored at the outset.
Framework documents tend to emphasise specific and measurable tasks. 
The role of the Departments needs to be clear, and they should 
delegate in accordance with the framework document, and not try to 
duplicate controls; this may be assisted by forthcoming reductions in 
the number of managers in Departments. Interchanges of staff with 
the core of Departments have been recommended, although these may not 
be so easy to achieve or effective in practice. There is general 
government advice on delegating pay and grading, and on setting 
targets and judging the performance of Agencies; the implementation 
of more IT would assist control and assessment. Nearly 80# of 
targets are being achieved now.
There is a changing background of ground rules within the civil 
service as a whole; these include reductions in central Department 
staff, which could affect the way Agencies are supervised. One way
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of doing this is the Ministerial Advisory Boards suggested by Massey 
to include representatives of business and the Agencies’ customers.
Having considered these more general aspects of the Next Steps 
Initiative process, we move on in the next Chapter to the experiences 
of a number of the Agencies created since 1988. In doing so, and 
with limited information being published, we shall necessarily only 
have a partial picture of what is being done. However, the examples 
given should assist us in assessing to what extent the intentions of 
the Next Steps Initiative are being achieved and, in due course, 
allow some comparisons to be drawn with the Planning Inspectorate.
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CHAPTER 9 - OTHER AGENCIES (Continued)
Promoting change is a basic tenet of the Next Steps Initiative, so 
that examples which show that change has occurred indicate, at least, 
that this intention has been achieved. Having considered various 
aspects of the introduction of the Initiative in Chapter 8, we 
therefore now turn to how individual Agencies have changed their 
practices since the introduction of the Next Steps Initiative, as 
examples of what the Planning Inspectorate might have been able to 
achieve. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 3. only those examples 
which have been referred to in public documents have been quoted.
In looking at what has occurred in the Agencies since 1988, we need 
to bear in mind the questions which were identified earlier, and 
which will be looked at again in Chapter 11. These were summarised 
in Chapter 2 as:
the consequences of the way in which the Initiative was 
introduced, without statutory measures, and the effect of the 
Prior Options Reviews;
whether the Initiative itself has led to more open government 
(bearing in mind also the advent of the Citizens’ Charter);
the effects of competition and the advent of market testing;
228
possible changes in the scope and allocation of accountability, 
including the role of the "customer”;
the control of Agencies’ activities, including the effect on 
the autonomy of the Chief Executive Officers, the role of 
accounting systems, of performance indicators, and fluctuations 
in workload; and the effect of the productivity requirement 
introduced by the Treasury;
the effect of supervision by the NAO, and whether the advent of 
the Initiative has led to better value for money;
the relationships between Departments and Agencies; the 
relevance of traditional civil service methods; the relevance 
of the type of casework or demand for an Agency’s services, and 
whether professionals will be affected differently from 
administrative staff.
Typologies
A considerable range of activities is carried out by the Agencies 
created by the Next Steps Initiative. Some are involved in functions 
traditionally considered as being part of government, for example 
dispensing benefits, such as Social Security and the Intervention 
Board.
Others duplicate some aspects of private commercial organisations - 
for instance the Central Office of Information (publicity); HMSO
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(publishing); the Recruitment and Assessment Agency (selecting 
staff); Transport and Security; and Forward Catering. Some are 
educational institutions such as the Civil Service College, or 
leisure providers, for example, the Historic Royal Palaces Agency, 
and CADW (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1992 and 1993)*
In Chapter 1, we anticipated that the use of typologies might assist 
us in considering the characteristics and experiences of Agencies 
under the Next Steps Initiative. Although many Agencies carry out 
mainly administrative functions in the traditional role of the civil 
service, there are several other ways in which the Agencies can be 
grouped.
Three possible typologies were set out in Chapter 1. One was 
suggested by Greer (1992)_- to classify them as "not self funding", 
and 2 types of "self-funding" - with and without a monopoly; these 
can also be labelled as charging or not charging for the services 
provided. That classification is considered later in this Chapter 
under the heading of Finance.
Another, set out in an inter-Departmental study by the Efficiency 
Unit (1991). identified four types of Agencies: Agencies dealing with 
mainstream policy; Agencies exercising statutory functions; Agencies 
providing specialist services to Departments; and those outside the 
main aims of a Department but reporting to a particular Minister.
This approach can be developed into a typology related more to the 
activities of the various Agencies, as mentioned in Chapter 1. The
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typology is set out below, with examples of the Agencies which will 







Planning Inspectorate; Patent Office; Land 
Registry: Companies House; Passport Office; 
Inland Revenue; Vehicle Inspectorate; DVLA; 
Intervention Board; Insolvency Service; Child 
Support Agency.
Historic Royal Palaces.
Employment Service; Forward Civil Service 
Catering; Benefits Agency: Contributions 
Agency; Resettlement Agency; War Pensions 
Agency.
HMSO.
Ordnance Survey; Meterological Office;
Central Statistical Service: Transport and 
Security.
Civil Service College; Central Office of 
Information; Recruitment and Assessment; 
Chemical and Biological Defence 
Establishment; Forensic Science Service; 
Building Research Establishment; Defence
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FIGURE 9.1 - AGENCY TYPOLOGIES
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Insolvency Service X X X
Planning Inspectorate X X X X
Patent Office X X X X X X X X X
Land Registry X X X X X X X X
Companies House X X X X X
Vehicle Inspectorate X X X X X
Passport Office X X X
Inland Revenue X X
DVLA X X X X
Intervention Board X X
Historic Royal Palaces X X X X X X
Employment Service X X X
Forward Civil Service Catering X X X X
HMSO X X X X X X X
Ordnance Survey X X X X X X
Meterological Office X X X X
Central Statistical Office X X X X X
Civil Service College X X X X X
Central Office of Information X X X X
Recruitment and Assessment 
Agency X X X X X X X
- ■
Chemical and Biological Research X X X X IX
Forensic Science Service X X X X X X
Building Research Establishment X X X X X
Defence Research Agency X X X X X
National Physical Laboratory X X X X I I X X
Research Agency; Information Technology 
Services Agency.
Figure 9*1 uses this classification to compare several Agencies 
against their other characteristics, with a note of the number of 
staff employed by them during 199 *^
As we have seen, the Planning Inspectorate is a regulatory Agency, 
but the range of developments which granting planning permission can 
allow encompasses development for all the general purposes set out in 
the headings above. As some Agencies have staff who have a quasi­
judicial role or a regulatory function, and deal with other types of 
intellectual property, comparisons with these Agencies may therefore 
be particularly useful in considering the options open to the 
Inspectorate.
The Patent Office (Figure 8.1) example shown earlier in the last 
chapter covered the matters which the Office for the Minister for the 
Civil Service (OMCS) considers to be important and which were set out 
in Chapter 8. These can be summarised as the Agency's aims and 
objectives; relations with Parliament, Ministers, and the parent 
Department, other Departments and other Agencies; financial 
responsibilities; how performance is to be measured; and personnel 
issues such as pay flexibility, training and industrial relations.
Since there is no statutory basis for the Next Steps Initiative, one 
indicator of changes in attitude and approach by Agencies and their 
staff may be innovations which do not fall directly within these
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specific areas. However, it should be borne in mind that documents 
such as the Annual Government Report on the progress of the Next 
Steps Initiative is based on submissions made by the Agencies.
Whilst major successes (and disasters) may be recorded, space and 
inclination may not promote publicity for the less dramatic or less 
flattering measures which may have had to be taken.
The classification of Agencies into types or functions may also give 
an indication of whether they are likely to maintain their present 
status, or may be considered for movement into the private sector.
Agencies creating Intellectual Property
In Chapter 4, we saw that Planning Inspectors employed within a 
regulatory Agency create an "intellectual property" when allowing an 
appeal and granting planning permission. Figure 9»1 shows that, 
although many Agencies provide services or carry out mainly 
administrative functions, there are several others in addition to the 
Planning Inspectorate whose staff have a statutory or regulatory 
function.
We saw in Chapter 2 that the "traditional" civil service has been 
essentially conservative and hierarchical. Where an organisation 
exercises a statutory function, that in itself implies that the staff 
involved already were less subject to political change and are likely 
to have had a more independent role, as is the case with the Planning 
Inspectorate. One characteristic we should therefore look for is
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whether being a regulatory body has meant more rapid progress to a 
more effective organisation once it has gained Agency status.
Not surprisingly, this type of Agency does not compete with the 
private sector. That is not to say that they will be immune from the 
threat of privatisation, or at least market testing, as we shall see 
later in this Chapter. It is more unexpected that Figure 9»1 shows 
that none are reported as seeking to balance their professional and 
administrative resources, as we shall see later is occurring in 
Agencies whose main function is research and development.
Although the information available from within the civil service has 
been very limited, it is clear that not all potential Agencies with a 
regulatory function were found to be suitable for that status. For 
instance, the Industrial Tribunals, although they form a body set up 
to exercise quasi-judicial functions by determining employment 
disputes (originally within the Department of Trade and Industry, now 
in the Department of Education and Employment), and with many 
operational similarities to the Planning Inspectorate, was rejected 
as a possible Agency.
The reasons for the decision have not been published, and this is an 
aspect of the Next Steps Initiative process within some Departments 
which has excluded outside comment and participation, and could be 
said not to accord with the principles of open government set out in 
the Citizens’ Charter.
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In the case of the Industrial Tribunals, the reasons may have 
included the legal qualifications of their chairmen, implying a 
possible precedent for other judicial functions and the status of the 
lawyers so employed - but we do not know whether this was the case.
The successful use of its procedures by a regulatory Agency creates 
an "intellectual property" with a commercial value in the 
marketplace. As Figure 9*1 has shown, the Land Registry, the Patent 
Office, the Passport Office, the Insolvency Service, the Driver and 
Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) and Companies House, all have 
regulatory functions.
Thus, as well as a favourable planning appeal decision, examples of 
"intellectual property" includes a successful application for a 
patent, trade mark or copyright (the Patent Office), a registered 
title (Land Registry) or a company incorporation (Companies House), 
or registering and licensing drivers and vehicles (DVLA) (Chancellor 
of the Duchy of Lancaster, 199^ ).
If the civil service had been created in a formal system based on 
legislation, it is possible that common rules would have been set out 
which required Agencies with similar functions to bring some of their 
requirements into a common format; it is not, however, difficult to 
imagine what delays that would have brought to the implementation of 
the Next Steps Initiative. It is probably just as well that 
regulatory and other functions were introduced over a period of years 
and in a timescale which, although underpinned by a political
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imperative, did take some account of the organisations' capacity to 
take on their new and more separate roles.
The practices in these other Agencies have significant differences 
from those used in the Planning Inspectorate. In most cases, the 
users need to conform strictly to laid down procedures; within 
those, the Agencies' staff have only very limited jurisdiction to 
make value judgments on the subject matter. Therefore a properly 
prepared application to most of these Agencies may be sufficient to 
achieve a favourable result. This contrasts with the Planning 
Inspectorate and the quasi-judicial functions of its Inspectors which 
were set out in Chapter 4.
Examples of Agencies where adherence to the strict procedures should 
be successful are Companies House, which registers all new companies 
in Great Britain, receives their accounts and other documents 
required by law, and makes information about them available to the 
public; the Insolvency Service which deals with company failure and 
misconduct; the Passport Office which processes applications for and 
issues passports; and the DVLA already mentioned. For instance, 
unlike Inspectors, the staff in the Land Registry have very limited 
discretion about whether or not to confirm a title to land if the 
appropriate procedures have been complied with, and the necessary 
information has been provided. The same applies to Companies House, 
dealing with company failure and misconduct.
Innovation relating to these procedures would require legislation, so 
it would be reasonable to expect that these Agencies would
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concentrate their performance indicators on showing annual
improvements in their practices on those aspects of their operations
which do not require the intervention of Parliament.
Of the regulatory Agencies, the Planning Inspectorate is one of the 
few whose users have the legal right literally ”to be heard” in the 
course of the established procedures. However, a hearing does not in 
itself indicate that the public may be involved, or that there is a
wide discretion as to whether an application may be granted.
The Patent Office holds hearings into contested applications for 
trade and service marks, designs, and patents - nearly 10,000 
hearings of various kinds in 1992. These hearings do not have the 
significance or the public dimension of those held by the Planning 
Inspectorate since, in carrying out its work, the Patent Office is 
only looking for precedents which might preclude a patent or other 
confirmation of rights being issued on a subject already protected, 
and for an application being sufficiently detailed to comply with the 
relevant regulatory requirements.
Innovative procedures
Customer service is, as we have seen in Chapter 1, regarded by 
government as an important part of the functions of the new Agencies. 
From the public’s point of view, new methods which deliver services 
more quickly and make the new Agencies more accessible are likely to 
create the most favourable impression on their customers (and to 
accord with the principles of the Citizens' Charter). Agencies can
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FIGURE 9.2 - AGENCY CHARACTERISTICS








FINANCE OR PRIOR 
OPTIONS
I
Insolvency Service YES MEDIUM HIGH N/A YES
Planning Inspectorate YES LOW HIGH falGH NO
Patent Office iYES HIGH MEDIUM MEDIUM YES
Land Registry 'YES HIGH HIGH HIGH YES
Companies House YES MEDIUM MEDIUM HIGH YES
Vehicle Inspectorate YES MEDIUM N/A N/A NO
Passport Office YES MEDIUM MEDIUM N/A NO
Inland Revenue NO N/A N/A N/A NO
DVLA NO HIGH MEDIUM N/A NO
Intervention Board NO N/A N/A N/A NO
Historic Royal Palaces NO HIGH MEDIUM MEDIUM YES
Employment Service NO N/A N/A MEDIUM NO
Forward Civil Service Catering NO N/A N/A HIGH "y e s
HMSO NO MEDIUM N/A HIGH YES
Ordnance Survey NO HIGH N/A MEDIUM YES
Meterological Office NO N/A N/A N/A N/A
Central Statistical Office NO MEDIUM N/A N/A N/A
Civil Service College NO N/A N/A N/A N/A
Central Office of Information NO N/A N/A N/A N/A
Recruitment and Assessment Agency NO HIGH N/A MEDIUM YES
Chemical and Biological Research NO MEDIUM N/A MEDIUM N/A
Forensic Science Service NO HIGH HIGH HIGH YES
Building Research Establishment NO N/A MEDIUM MEDIUM YES
Defence Research Agency NO MEDIUM N/A MEDIUM N/A
National Physical Laboratory NO LOW N/A MEDIUM N/A
also seek to encourage business either where "trade” is being 
diverted to other organisations, or where there is a potential loss 
of business due to the recession.
Figure 9*2 sets some of the known characteristics of Agencies within 
the Next Steps Initiative which are mentioned in this Chapter. The 
information available is limited, as will be seen by those areas 
marked as not available (N/A). Also, Figure 9.2 can be only a 
limited "snapshot” based on those details which the government and 
the civil service have chosen to publish. However, the Figure shows 
that the Agencies set out in Figure 9*1 have varying characteristics, 
and have not always reacted to their new status in the same way.
As the Next Steps Initiative Review stated in 1993:
"in many cases, the range of goods and services provided (by 
Agencies) has been extended to meet customer needs and a 
variety of improvements offered"
(Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1993)*
However, this statement does not highlight the difficulties in 
isolating what would have happened anyway without the Next Steps 
Initiative.
As we have seen, the Next Steps Initiative was introduced without 
legislation (Chapter 8) and the process might have been very 
different if that had been the case (Chapter 1), as in New Zealand
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(Boston, Martin, Pallot, Walsh, 1991)* Changes which need 
legislation are unlikely to be quick options, because of the 
pressures on Parliamentary time, even if the outcomes would save 
money for the taxpayer or the Agencies’ customers.
Promoting activities in addition to the traditional role of an 
organisation will be a less difficult and more attractive alternative 
if the result is that approbation can be gained by offering different 
or better services, and the more so if they would accord with the 
principles of the Citizens’ Charter (Chapter 1). Of course, some of 
these changes might have come about without the Next Steps 
Initiative, but it is not possible to isolate which these may have 
been.
So, in addition to staff working on the basic Agency functions (but 
unlike the Planning Inspectorate), both the Patent Office and the 
Land Registry now have about 15% of their employees occupied in 
marketing information services and publications (Chancellor of the 
Duchy of Lancaster, 1992 and 1993)* The Patent Office makes full use 
of the market value of the "products” which it processes, with a 
search and advisory service with a 2k hour turn round available to 
the public. With the Agency now based in Newport, Gwent, in an 
innovation clearly intended to meet customer needs in the small 
office left in London, it offers on-line trade mark searches as well 
as an out-of-hours service which is used by nearly 2*5% of those 
applicants submitting documents to the Agency there.
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In another regulatory Agency, the Land Registry, self financing 
telephone-based information services are being introduced using 
credit card payment, and market research is being used to define 
customer requirements. A telephone service was tested in 1991/2, 
trialling access to make inquiries about the progress of 
applications. The Agency’s customers have been given access to the 
Registry’s application database system. Companies House also has 
on-line information services available to professionals and the 
public, and is only one of several Agencies to offer faster 
turn-round times and out-of-hours services to meet customer demand.
Promoting existing services which can be charged for is a private 
sector practice which several regulatory Agencies are now using. For 
instance, the Patent Office received more than 3000 inquiries to an 
advertising campaign to alert investors to the benefits of obtaining 
patent protection (Patent Office, 1993)* The Land Registry and the 
Patent Office have held open days for the public and specialist 
interests to publicise their services, and plan to do this on a 
continuing basis. User groups are providing feedback on the quality 
of service offered, and ideas for further initiatives. Use of this 
type of survey, as in the Planning Inspectorate, in a sensible 
fashion should reduce the reasons for complaints, and again accord 
with the principles of the Citizens' Charter.
In the private sector, publishing houses can receive a steady income 
from sales of books published several years’ ago. This is an 
approach which some Agencies have the "products” to exploit. The
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Patent Office licences use of its past decisions (the trademarks’ 
database) to a number of commercial companies, and publishes relevant 
law reports, and technical monographs giving details of particular 
aspects of the Agency’s work. A training video on copyrights 
advertised in national newspapers has been produced for sale, 
featuring the TV presenter of ’Tomorrow’s World", Judith Hann. The 
Office also offers an interactive laser disk on patents; a trial of 
CD-ROM disks for viewing patent documents has been successful, and 
three interactive training packages are under development. The 
Agency organises meetings and "road shows", and produces information 
packs and leaflets (Patent Office, 1993) to promote its business.
Another example of an already relatively independent organisation 
which has used Agency status to extend its operations is Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office (HMSO), which operates in the publishing, 
reprographic, printing and business supplies’ fields. However, it 
would be wrong to assume that HMSO’s recent innovations necessarily 
owe much to the Next Steps Initiative, as the organisation had 
already learnt before 1988 to compete in the overcrowded world of 
publishing in a commercial manner. HMSO is also responsible for 
advising other parts of the civil service, such as the Planning 
Inspectorate, on matters of Crown Copyright relating to publishing 
ventures.
HMSO was the first UK publisher to get a full on-line electronic 
database system available to booksellers seeking some of the 160,000 
publications it lists, offering normally a k day delivery service. 
About 10,000 new publications a year are produced, with lk% of trade
2k 1
sales overseas. What Agency status has confirmed is that the 
historical links of HMSO with government Departments continue - for 
instance, there are sales of 2 million copies annually of the Highway 
Code, a contract which has recently been retained after competition 
with the private sector. Another innovation which Agency status may 
have encouraged is that HMSO is sponsoring a driver in the RAC 
British Touring Car Championship to "promote an enterprising new 
image for HMSO books" (Management Matters, May 199*0*
Another organisation which had a considerable degree of independence 
before the Next Steps Initiative is the Ordnance Survey, established 
in 1791 to provide maps for the military. It now sells about 2 
million paper maps a year to the military and the public, and is 
increasingly profitable.
There is strong growth in the overseas division, perhaps because its 
"products" are of a better quality than those of some of its 
competitors in the private as well as the public sectors. For 
instance, the Ordnance Survey's maps are 6000 times as detailed as 
those produced by the United States equivalent, the Bureau of Census 
(Arthur, 1992). In the USA, private operators make the profit by 
re-packaging the product for the public, a situation similar to that 
at the Planning Inspectorate at present, where decision letters by 
Inspectors are marketed by a private organisation. The Ordnance 
Survey distributes its products via general and specialist 
booksellers, as well as dealing direct with other organisations.
2k2
However, these practices seem to have little or nothing to do with 
the Next Steps Initiative, and are more likely to be related to
history, personalities and the reasons for which the organisation was
created and has continued to operate. The same could be said of 
another recent change, where key market executives in the Ordnance 
Survey have been appointed to handle the business of large commercial 
customers such as the water, gas and electricity companies, local 
authorities, telecommunications, and government including the Land 
Registry (Management Matters, 1993)* Segmentation of duties of this 
kind may be derived from private sector practices; however, they 
equally could be said to have some similarities to the division of 
tasks within the traditional civil service.
One change which one would like to think has been possible in the new
culture encouraged by the Next Steps Initiative was an innovative 
solution found by the Ordnance Survey to the task of caring for their
triangulation point pillars which record the height of land above sea
level, most of which are now redundant with the introduction of 
satellite mapping. After being widely condemned for proposing to
remove the pillars, the Survey invited anyone interested to ’adopt” a
trig point. Over 2000 have been allocated to would-be ’parents" 
(Economist, 1993). who are now cheerfully redecorating, 
personalising, and generally maintaining the points.
One organisation which prior to Agency status had a less open 
approach to the private sector is the Central Statistical Office 
(CSO), whose major role is to supply the Treasury with the statistics 
they need. There have been suggestions that the CSO’s figures for
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vital statistics such as growth in the Gross National Product and, in 
overseas trade, were so late and approximate as to have had little 
benefit or interest (Tyler, 1992). The first Director of the new 
Agency is reported to have insisted that other Departments cease to 
delay the issue of their statistics for political purposes, and he 
introduced a timetable for publication from all ministry sources 
(Marsh, 1991)* This new approach has caused problems for the 
politicians, who have not always been kept abreast of the new 
statistics (Hadfield and Reeve, 1993)*
In the past, the huge amount of data held by government was 
traditionally provided free or at nominal charges by the CSO to 
interested parties (Harrison, 1989). For the most part, the 
obstacles were technical, as central government services were in 
general regarded as public goods. Greater availability can be 
portrayed as more open government and accountability; more cynically, 
it could be said to be an easy way of increasing income or offsetting 
overheads. In that sense, using existing but untapped resources can 
produce deliberate fluctuations in an Agency's workload.
In some cases, of course, the provision of economic data may be 
competing with the private sector, and cause the NAO to consider 
whether that is cost effective for the taxpayer and is operating 
within the controls which they oversee on behalf of Parliament. 
Utilisation of assets to raise revenue can mean exploiting an 
existing database or disposing of the assets entirely (Harrison, 
1989). The Director of the CSO has said that his role is to produce 
numbers that people would actually use at a price that they are
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prepared to pay in the market place. That sounds very much like what 
a private sector company might say.
Some Agencies with their budgets constrained, and with increasing 
pressures on their research activities have been able to demonstrate 
benefits to the private as well as the public sector to offset their 
costs. These opportunities can arise in unexpected areas. One 
example is the Defence Research Agency, which does scientific and 
technical research in non-nuclear defence, previously only for the 
benefit of the Ministry of Defence. A more innovative attitude to 
new markets following the implementation of the Next Steps Initiative 
is shown by the Agency developing a thermal camera small enough to 
fit to the side of a fireman’s helmet, of which some 1500 have been 
sold to the USA. Another ’’product" of the research is a lightweight 
honeycomb sheet which has been found to be ideal for a new type of 
loudspeaker (Highfield, 1993)*
The character of an Agency's business must influence the 
opportunities for it to take its traditional business into new areas; 
some have been able to do so without competing with the private 
sector, with spectacular results. For instance, the Driver and 
Vehicle Licensing Agency has developed a thriving business in selling 
interesting car numbers to the public and trade purchasers. In the 
period up to 1993» the total proceeds were £125 million. The most 
sought after numbers are auctioned, two staff being employed to 
detect those which are likely to be most popular such as KIDDY,
K9PUP, and MUS1K, and those with a more local appeal such as NES1E 
(Economist, August 1992). This successful business appears not to
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have been deterred by the recession. However, in another area for 
which it is responsible, the Agency came under considerable pressure 
from the Police authorities before the senior staff of the Agency 
agreed that a 24 hour, 7 day a week, service would be provided to 
give information about vehicle ownership, although the junior staff 
in the Agency were said to be very happy to offer this service which 
their customers wanted (McDonald, 1992).
One Agency which is unique in both its origins, its role and the 
progress it has made under the Next Steps Initiative is the Historic 
Royal Palaces. The Agency is responsible for 5 properties owned by 
the Crown: the Tower of London, Hampton Court Palace, Kew Palace, the 
Banqueting House in Whitehall, and part of Kensington Palace. Since 
the Agency was created, it has moved from supervision by one 
Department (Environment) to another (Heritage). The changes at the 
Agency offer interesting examples of what can be achieved under the 
Next Steps Initiative, in an organisation which is constantly 
competing with private sector leisure attractions such as Madame 
Tussaud's Waxworks, and other visitor opportunities such as royal 
buildings at Windsor Castle and, more recently, the summer opening of 
Buckingham Palace.
The changes at the Agency have included training guide staff, so that 
they are not only janitors and security guardians, but also sources 
of information for the public. The role has since been privatised 
after market testing. Visual displays in the Palaces have been 
significantly enhanced; and there is a £10 million new home for the 
Crown Jewels at the Tower of London, opened in 1994, which has moving
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pavements to take the visitors past the display. This will increase 
the number of visitors who can see the Jewels daily from 15,000 to
20.000 at the height of the summer season (Kirkbride, 199*0* A major 
TV and radio advertising campaign for the Agency has raised customer 
awareness of the Agency.
Other measures to maximise use of the properties have included 
opening new areas of the Palaces to the public, the establishment of 
a new Hampton Court Flower show, evening celebrity concerts and other 
events after the Palaces normally close to the public, and recreation 
of the original garden layout at Hampton Court Palace to complement 
the refurbishment of the State Apartments. In the spirit of more 
"open government", customer satisfaction surveys are carried out each 
year; and it should be remembered that all this has to be achieved 
without compromising the way in which the Crown wishes the properties 
to be seen.
Customer participation has also been encouraged in a very different 
way by another long established organisation which is now an Agency, 
to increase customer loyalty. The Royal Mint now has a Coin Club 
with 150,000 members in this country, and another in the USA with
75.000 members (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1993)* In that 
coin sales are made in an international market, and collecting is an 
absorbing interest for the Agency's customers, the Club appears to be 




The Next Steps Initiative was introduced when the economy was 
prosperous and active, and when the provision of services to the 
public was unlikely to have too many constraints. The recession, 
although now easing, brought more onerous pressures to bear on 
several Agencies, especially those which compete partly or wholly 
with the private sector.
There has been an increasing emphasis by government throughout the 
civil service since 1988 on cost cutting, value for money, and 
greater efficiency and effectiveness. This has been given added 
urgency by the need to limit government expenditure due to the 
recession. The Agencies have had to manage their reactions to this 
within the service-wide productivity requirements and other 
constraints introduced by the Treasury which were mentioned earlier. 
We shall look at the financial implications later in this Chapter, 
but first the effect of variable workloads will be examined.
Like the Planning Inspectorate, the Land Registry is a demand-led 
organisation concerned with property and development casework where 
the annual ’activity rate” (number of transactions per registered 
title) had been rising consistently year on year in the period up to 
Agency status (plus 13% in 1970, plus 20% in 1987 and then forecast 
to be plus 25% by the year 2000), linked to the buoyant economy in 
the late 1980s (Land Registry, 1990). The downturn in the property 
market due to the recession reduced the number of applications by 37% 
in 1992/93. compared to the peak year of 1988/89. In the Land
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Registry, the most noticeable result of the reduction, noted in the 
Annual Report on the Next Steps Initiative, was that staff numbers 
fell by more than 26% between 1989 and 1993. to just under 9000
people (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1993)•
This change coincided with the move towards Trading Fund status, and 
the consequent introduction of appropriate financial controls.
Whether that resulted in a more rapid reaction to reducing staff 
numbers, it is impossible to say, especially bearing in mind that 
there were service-wide pressures from government at the same time to 
reduce the size of the civil service. Indeed, this is another example 
of how difficult it is to disentangle the various influences on the 
practices in a civil service organisation from those which have 
arisen from the advent of the Next Steps Initiative.
Nor would it be right to look only at influences which arise only
from within this country. The United Kingdom has been in the 
European Union for long enough that practices and organisations which 
cover all the countries concerned affect the operations of the 
Agencies.
One example of this is that the demand for patents obtained through 
the Patent Office has been declining for some time in the face of 
competition from within Europe. This was because the European Patent 
Office was set up to offer EEC-wide patents to those companies and 
individuals who did not want to have to make duplicate applications 
to several national authorities for the same product or process.
This change has left the Patent Office in this country with the
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smaller and less valuable patents to process, which may not be 
renewed for the full 20 year term available, thereby reducing fee 
income. As a result, new patent examiners were not recruited for 
several years until retirements outstripped the reducing workload. 
Other work done by the Agency (trade marks, copyrights and designs) 
is not all so directly linked to the economy. The publicity measures 
mentioned earlier in this chapter under "Innovative Procedures" 
should help to raise the profile of the Agency to those who might use 
it.
Any assessment of the effect of the Next Steps Initiative cannot 
ignore the financial climate in this country, which can increase 
workloads as well as reduce them. Whereas the number of appeals made 
to the Planning Inspectorate fell in the recession, the Insolvency 
Service’s workload rose rapidly, with the targets reflecting this - 
14,500 cases in 1991. rising to 53.000 cases in 1994. The result was 
that the caseload completed fell by 5*9#. as the Service concentrated 
on maintaining administrative standards for their customers rather 
than speeding handling times. A similar situation has arisen in the 
Inspectorate (Chapter 4).
However, the case productivity per head in the Insolvency Service has 
doubled, from 9:1 to 18:5 since 1989/90. Although the information on 
the reasons for this is limited (the introduction of more technology 
being one factor), the introduction of targets for the Agency should 
have had some effect. What cannot be certain, as we shall see later 
when considering performance indicators, is whether the targets were 
set to promote the maximum improvement possible.
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If the recession reduced the Planning Inspectorate's appeal workload, 
other Agencies who compete with in the private sector, for instance 
the Recruitment and Assessment Service, have been even more hard hit. 
That Agency has traditionally obtained all or most of their business 
from other parts of the civil service (IPMS, 1992 and Hencke, 1992). 
The pressures in some areas of government to minimise outgoings can 
have a strong impact on such Agencies. The Recruitment and 
Assessment Services Agency was reported in February 1992 to have told 
37 staff that they faced early retirement or dismissal, as their 
customers in government Departments were trying to save money by 
using private recruitment companies, rather than the new Agency, to 
fill executive job vacancies.
Another Agency which duplicates private sector activities is the 
Central Office of Information, which sub-contracts the production of 
advertisements and media buying for government advertising by "market 
testing". Its role is as a go-between, helping Departments to choose 
an advertising Agency, offering advice and negotiating media rates. 
Since the Agency does not have a monopoly, their customers in 
Departments can also go elsewhere, provided that they can show the 
NAO that it would cost less or give better value. With the 
traditional role of government in promoting road safety and deterring 
drinking and driving now being pursued by private companies, and the 
central Departments doing less public information advertising, the 
Agency is losing business. In 1992/93. for instance, the business 
handled for the Central Office of Information was halved, due to a 
reduced privatisation programme, the election in that year, and a 
fall in civil service recruitment (Chancellor of the Duchy of
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Lancaster, 1993). That is a situation which any private sector firm 
would have difficulty in accommodating easily, but strict controls, 
and linking of productivity in identified staff groups to performance 
benefits, enabled the Agency to contain costs and remain in control 
of the situation.
The introduction of more open government and the intentions of the 
Citizens' Charter has given some other public sector bodies more 
choice on where they buy the services they need. Another Agency with 
a strongly fluctuating workload is the Home Office Forensic Science 
Service, which provides scientific support in the investigation of 
crime. Within 8 months of becoming an Agency in April 1991. a poor 
response to the introduction of direct charging for services to 
police forces led to a 18% reduction in demand. The Agency was also 
not doing too well in its efforts to get further work from defence 
and private sources, and all this led to a shortfall in revenue of 
£450,000.
This could be described as an informal means of market testing; 
certainly, auditors could criticise police authorities if they 
continued to use the Agency when the services could be bought more 
cheaply to the same standard from the private sector. Thus this 
example shows the significance of the customers' individual decisions 
on the viability of, and the options available to, an Agency.
252
Staff
As mentioned earlier in this Chapter, personnel issues are amongst 
the matters which should be addressed in framework documents. This 
is not surprising since, if a higher standard of service is to be 
provided by civil servants, and the precepts of the Citizens' Charter 
are to be met, then measures which increase their job satisfaction, 
and increase and enhance their access to relevant training, have a 
role to play. With so many different functions being exercised 
within the new Agencies, the methods to be used must be varied and 
suited to the experience of the staff concerned, and the duties they 
are expected to perform. With Chief Executive Officers meeting 
regularly to exchange experiences (Chapter 8), the successful use of 
an innovation in one Agency is likely to benefit some others 
elsewhere where it is relevant and appropriate.
The Patent Office moved from London to Wales during the period 
leading up to Agency status, taking with it both specialist patent 
examiners and their support staff. Some additional civil servants 
were recruited to replace those who had not transferred to the new 
headquarters. These changes may have influenced the Chief Executive 
Officer's initiative in arranging for a local college to offer his 
staff a 2 year external course for a diploma, tailored to the needs 
of administrators in the Agency. 30 Non-specialist staff have 
recently become the first successful "products" of this process, 
giving them a useful qualification recognised in the world outside 
the civil service. The Agency's clerical staff have also obtained
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nationally recognised qualifications as a result of being offered a 
’competence based” training programme.
This move towards a more focused approach to staff development is 
seen in different guises in other Agencies. The Historic Royal 
Palaces Agency now employs some 415 full time and up to 100 part time 
staff, with senior staff on 5 year contracts. It needs a number of 
specialist staff, who have been recruited from the private sector, 
with open competition for all posts. The organisation is not run by 
committee in traditional civil service style, but by giving 
responsibility to suitably qualified and experienced people. A bonus 
scheme in 1992/93 gave all staff of the Historic Royal Palaces 
(except for the Chief Executive) an equal amount of £600. "People 
Plans" have been introduced for staff at all levels and locations in 
the Agency, to develop skills and their understanding of their roles, 
and assist them in their dealings with the public as customers 
(Historic Royal Palaces, 1993)*
The phraseology used in the Annual Report of the Agency is more 
reminiscent of a public relations consultancy than part of a 
government Department; this tends to confirm that the Agency’s 
management is accurately reflecting the nature of its business.
Managers in the Historic Royal Palaces Agency visit at least 6 other 
"attractions" a year, and any member of staff is reimbursed the cost 
of doing the same anywhere in the world, to widen their knowledge and 
experience. Staff receive a 20% discount in the shops and free entry 
to the attractions for themselves and their families.
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Another example of practical changes being made to suit the needs of 
the particular organisation is in the Employment Service, where a 
radical new clerical and executive recruitment and training package 
was introduced (Prime Minister and Minister for the Civil Service,
1991)* The new approach means that managers are now able to recruit 
locally, looking for staff primarily able to relate to people and get 
results, rather than relying on academic attainment. The Agency 
necessarily deals very frequently with people who are under stress. 
The Service has introduced the use of older, more understanding staff 
to interview middle-aged unemployed people, and is developing its own 
selection tests for recruitment with the help of educational 
psychologists. The promotion scheme advertises vacancies internally, 
and only those interested apply for specific posts. All this seems 
calculated to promote a more informal and friendly approach to its 
customers and the purpose of the Agency.
We saw in Chapter 8 that all Agencies, including the Planning 
Inspectorate (Chapter 5). are now being required to organise their 
own pay and grading structures, albeit subject to strict Treasury and 
Departmental control. In this Chapter, we have already seen that 
HMSO was operating in an independent manner before becoming an Agency 
in 1990. The Agency was the first to introduce major changes in 
grading and pay in November 1991, which removed the standard 
hierarchical structure and brought in new patterns relating to the 
work done (Management Matters, October 1993)* These has since been 
used as an example for other Agencies to consider, as all are now 
being required by the Treasury to introduce their own changes in this 
area.
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Another innovation to suit the needs of a particular Agency is the 
skills audit being used in the Ordnance Survey as the basis for a 
re-training programme to match the talents of the staff to the 
changing requirements of the business (Management Matters, 1993)*
With the use of information technology being given a high profile in 
the Agency, about 800 staff are being given Total Quality Management 
training, with a view to the organisation obtaining the BS 5750 
quality standard.
As we saw in considering the activities of the Planning Inspectorate, 
some Agencies depend heavily on the effective deployment of 
professionally qualified and experienced staff. One area now being 
given more attention in those Agencies where the purpose of the 
organisation is to use professional skills is focusing on the balance 
between their expertise and the nature and role of the administrative 
support. A report by the government's Efficiency Adviser found that 
the proportion of administrative staff was 50% higher in government 
research establishments than in their industrial counterparts 
(Blackhurst, 1993)* This situation may have been inherited from the 
bias towards administrative staff identified by the Fulton Report in 
1968.
An example of this is the Home Office, which has admitted that 
scientists in the Forensic Science Service spent nearly k0% of their 
time on administrative tasks; changes are planned (Chancellor of the 
Duchy of Lancaster, 1992, and IPMS, 1992). The National Audit Office 
(NAO) itself is setting an example to other parts of the public 
service by increasing its direct overheads work ratio from 50:50 in
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1989/90 to 60:40 in 1992/93 (National Audit Office Annual Report 
1993).
The need to focus on their core business and limit overheads has been 
recognised elsewhere. Other Next Steps Initiative Agencies employing 
significant numbers of professional staff, including the National 
Physical Laboratory and the Defence Research Agency, have or are 
aiming for a ratio of about two ”fee earning” staff to each 
supporting administrator (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1992 
and 1993). This is a similar ratio to that in large firms of 
chartered surveyors or lawyers of similar size, whose core business 
is project or site assessment and writing reports setting out 
professional advice based on established law and practice; these 
functions have many similarities to those in the Planning 
Inspectorate, which has not yet addressed this aspect of the 
organisation under the Next Steps Initiative.
Another example of an Agency employing professional staff is the 
Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, which is the authority 
in its field for all scientific and biological defence. The 
Establishment is also focusing on its core skills, with targets to 
increase scientific and technical staff from 65# of total manpower in 
1991 to 70# in 1993* in order to maintain the research programme and 
to respond effectively to operational emergencies. If this type of 
Agency is to be able to compete with the private sector, it needs to 
continue to refine its expertise and limit its overheads.
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Finance
As mentioned earlier in this Chapter, one approach to categorising 
Agencies would be that suggested by Greer - as "not self funding", 
and two types of "self-funding" - with and without a monopoly; these 
can also be labelled as charging or not charging for the services 
provided (Greer, 1992). We have seen earlier that the Planning 
Inspectorate is a monopoly, but not a self-funding Agency.
Financial responsibilities are a key area dealt with in all framework 
documents - how an Agency will be financed and what method of 
accounting will be used. We saw in Chapter 7 that the gross running 
costs regime distorts the ability of the Planning Inspectorate to 
react to a varying workload, and to plan its finances ahead to meet 
this and other long term problems. Another important consideration 
is the Agency’s lack of any independent income.
All Agencies are now affected by the Treasury's productivity 
requirements each year, but there is little evidence published or 
available which shows the effects of that constraint separately from 
the other factors which influence an Agency's financial affairs.
The Treasury's support for the Next Steps Initiative seems to be 
linked very much to the prospect of continuing financial savings, 
strongly reinforced by the introduction of market testing, although 
this also applies to other parts of the civil service. The Patent 
Office's central service costs show what can be achieved by radical 
change, these costs having been reduced by a move to a new building
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in Wales from £21.6 million in 1990/91 to £13*57 million in 1992/93. 
a reduction of *\0% (Patent Office, 1993)* Where an Agency shares a 
building, as the Inspectorate does with out-stations of the central 
Department, there must less scope for savings of this kind in the 
short term.
The differences in financing arrangements are often derived from the 
history and practices chosen for an organisation by its parent 
Department. The Land Registry is required to limit its fees to the 
minimum needed to finance the organisation. The process for 
establishing fee scales has recently been speeded up, from 12 months 
to 3 or 4 months. By contrast, the Patent Office charges fees on a 
staged basis (Patent Office, How to prepare a UK Patent application), 
kept as low as possible initially (with the major part due after the 
patent rights are granted) so that inventors are not deterred from 
seeking legal protection for their ideas. Both Agencies had been 
subject to restrictions imposed on them by the Treasury, so that they 
were not been able to retain their receipts to pay for future needs 
(Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1993)•
Both the Land Registry and the Patent Office have, like the 
Inspectorate, had a semi-independent position in the civil service. 
They have both been able to charge fees for their services, although 
the way in which they do so is also linked to the purpose for which 
each organisation operates. However, since achieving Agency status, 
both have been moving to the greater flexibility conferred by Trading 
Fund status within the formal controls overseen by the NAO.
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Before the advent of the Next Steps Initiative, the finances of the 
Historic Royal Palaces were controlled on the net difference between 
expenditure and income. The income from visitors was only £11 
million a year, and the taxpayer was paying £10 million a year to 
make up the shortfall needed to run the organisation. No more funds 
were available from the then parent Department of the Environment.
Investment in the fabric of the buildings was limited, and all the 
focus was on expenditure control rather than value for money, and the 
maximisation of income had not really been considered. In these 
characteristics, it was similar to the Planning Inspectorate then, 
and now.
An additional consideration was that the Department of the 
Environment's interest in the Royal properties was shared by English 
Heritage, the Royal Household, the Property Services Agency, the 
Royal Parks, and (in the Tower of London) the Ministry of Defence 
(Department of the Environment, I9B9), which made for diffused 
management and less effective decision making.
The theme since the Historic Royal Palaces Agency was created in 1989 
has been to develop and enhance the visitors' experience to increase 
customer satisfaction, so as to justify extra charges which would 
enable a continuing programme of improvements, in accordance with the 
role of the Agency. The Chief Executive Officer (appointed from the 
private sector), decided that visitors were being substantially 
undercharged, especially if the quality of their experience could be
260
enhanced (Beeton, 1991)* He considered that increased income could 
be produced to fund the £25 million needed for improvement schemes.
As we have already seen, special events, flower shows, sponsorship 
and other services, letting apartments for holiday accommodation at 
Hampton Court Palace, and increased sales from the tourist shops and 
catering, are contributing to the increased income which is funding 
the capital cost. £20 million a year is now being spent on 
maintenance and new improvements (Historic Royal Palaces, 1993)*
None of this would be worthwhile if the Agency’s customers felt that 
they were not getting value for money. However, despite increased 
entry fees (tripled since 1989 at Hampton Court), the Agency's income 
from visitors and their satisfaction from their visits continue to 
grow, as has been confirmed by the customer surveys. It is now 
anticipated that there should no call on the Exchequer for any sums 
at all for the Palaces by the year 2000 - the first time for over 250 
years (Historic Royal Palaces, 1993)•
As stated earlier, there is probably a tendency to highlight 
successes in the Annual Report on the Next Steps Initiative, and not 
to make too much of less satisfactory performance. However, one 
example of the concern expressed by the Public Accounts Committee to 
which we referred in the last chapter became public knowledge. The 
Chief Executive of the government's catering organisation, Forward 
Civil Service Catering, was suspended in July 1992 after it was found 
that poor management and cost control had resulted in financial 
losses of £400,000 and up to £450,000 in unpaid tax and national 
insurance (Shrimsley, 1992).
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The problems came to light at the Department of the Environment staff 
restaurant in the headquarters in Marsham Street, where there were 
fictitious employees on the payroll, and wages paid gross to avoid 
tax. National Insurance records had been destroyed in 20 of the 
restaurants (Linton, 1992). The publicity given to these events did 
not confirm that any of the deficiencies revealed were connected to 
the Next Steps Initiative or to Agency status.
The Public Accounts Committee investigated what had happened at the 
Agency following the outcome of a National Audit Office report, and 
consultants Ernst and Young have looked at all 322 outlets. It was 
announced in 199*+ that Forward Catering had been sold to a private 
company which is part of the Granada Group (Management Matters,
199*+)* This will not be a reason for privatisation that the 
government would wish to see repeated, but it does underline why 
strict financial controls are needed in relatively autonomous 
organisations spending public money.
As we saw earlier, the Recruitment and Assessment Services Agency was 
affected by the recession, and was said to be £800,000 "in the red". 
What the Next Steps Initiative does appear to be achieving is a more 
rapid and specific response to a situation of this kind, and less of 
a tendency to delay action, or to conceal what has happened. It was 
reported that the Agency was planning to give up the prestigious 
premises in Whitehall, and transfer staff to the provincial 
headquarters in Basingstoke to save money (IPMS, 1992). A 3 year 
review of the current split of recruitment responsibilities between 
the Civil Service Commissioners, the Agency, and Departments has been
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undertaken (Management Matters, May 1994), and a reallocation of 
responsibilities appears to be on the way.
The way in which the changing fortunes of an Agency are now more 
apparent is typified by the financial situation of the Building 
Research Establishment, which provides guidance and research on the 
performance of buildings, fire prevention and control. After a very 
successful first year as an Agency, with a 60% increase in income 
from research for the private sector, the second year results were 
affected by the recession. However, a fall in private sector income 
was offset by extra government expenditure, to give a turnover of 
£37*4 million (in the previous year this was £31.8 million). The 
prospects for the third year continued to be affected by the downturn 
in the economy, although capital investment programmes were planned 
to promote future work for both the Department of the Environment and 
other government Departments, as well as the private sector. Extra 
penetration of the local authority housing market was also planned 
(Kenny, 1992).
In some ways, these problems besetting some Agencies are only those 
which private firms have to accommodate, and which the effect of the 
Next Steps Initiative together with the Citizens' Charter has 
highlighted in government organisations. Another example is the 
Forensic Science Service which was mentioned under "Variable 
Workloads" earlier. That Agency's problems were increased when the 
Chief Executive Officer was told in 1992 that it would have to pay 
£487.000 a year to continue to rent laboratories in Aldermaston from 
the Atomic Weapons Establishment. As a consequence, it was decided
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to move the staff concerned to the Birmingham headquarters to reduce 
overhead costs.
A similar problem on a larger scale affected another Agency; after 
re-assessment of the organisation shortly after its attained Agency 
status, the Defence Research Agency shed 18 sites and 2,000 staff 
(Highfield, 1993)* After cutbacks by the MOD, the plan is to save 
£90 million annually by 1996/97. with rundown costs of £250 million 
borne by the Department.
However, it would be wrong to ascribe all such changes to the Next 
Steps Initiative requiring a more realistic approach to the use of 
staff and the cost of general overheads. Although the Planning 
Inspectorate has yet to gain full benefits from IT, technology is 
having a significant effect on the use of staff in other Agencies.
For instance, the number of employees in the Ordnance Survey has 
fallen from 3500 in 1979 to about 2300 in 1993. and is forecast to 
fall by 500 more by 1996/97. as the Agency becomes increasingly 
computer-orientated; but in the same period, the marketing department 
has doubled in size to promote the Agency's products and services, 
and now has about 160 staff.
Performance indicators
Performance indicators have, as mentioned earlier, rapidly become 
established as key features of the Next Steps Initiative. In theory 
they enable Ministers and Departments to gauge the progress of an 
Agency in the areas measured. This straightforward statement can,
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however, obscure the fact that performance indicators need to be set 
so that they are neither too simple nor impossibly complex. As 
mentioned in Chapters 2 and 8, they need to define value for money, 
and be designed to improve the service to customers, balancing 
reductions in costs with maintaining the service to the Agency’s 
customers.
However, what is less clear is whether there is any way to confirm if 
the performance indicators are providing a relevant target which 
should be met. As we saw in Chapter 2, there can be a tendency to 
concentrate on functions which are easily measured using existing 
data, such as the number of appeals being determined in the 
Inspectorate, which may not assess the real problems within the 
organisation.
Although performance indicators were originally included in the 
framework documents, they are now updated annually in the Agency 
Business Plans. As we saw in Chapter 8, Ms Trosa found in her study 
of relationships between Next Steps Initiative Agencies and 
Departments that, whilst performance indicators were working, in some 
cases they needed to be more appropriate to the role of a particular 
Agency. The comments by the Advisory Panel on the indicators chosen 
by the Planning Inspectorate (Chapter 7) reflect this view.
Where Agencies,•such as the Land Registry and the Patent Office, 
which already had a relatively independent status before the Next 
Steps Initiative, are at a mature stage with performance indicators, 
they are now seeking to radically reduce the number used to the very
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minimum. Both these Agencies have measured the work/case load 
completed per (administrative) officer (per day or week) as a base 
indicator for some years, and their targets include specified 
improvements on the current figures.
With a large number of applications to process each year, the Land 
Registry has had targets of computerising the titles for land in 
1991. 1992 and 1994 of 3.95 million, 6.0 million and 10.5 million. 
Targets for the completion of pre-screening of applications within 3 
days have risen from 91% to 98# in the same period, and the Agency’s 
turnover from £188.4 million to £231.7 million, whilst the number of 
staff has reduced from 9876 to 8600 during the same time. Thus 
simple numerical targets can reflect the beneficial effect of 
measuring tasks previously done by hand.
Another way to use performance indicators is the assessment of the 
productivity of staff throughout an Agency. As its key targets 
between 1990 to 1995. the Patent Office is aiming for a 1.5# increase 
in productivity on patent examinations, and 3# on trade mark 
examinations. Staff are, of course, only part of the cost of running 
an Agency and we have seen earlier that, after the move to Wales, the 
Patent Office achieved a substantial reduction in the cost of the 
common services over the 1989/90 baseline.
Despite the emphasis which is being given to open government in the 
Citizens’ Charter as well as the Next Steps Initiative, it can be 
very difficult to assess accurately what the real reasons may be for 
choosing particular types of performance indicators instead of
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others. The comments of the Advisory Panel on Standards for the 
Planning Inspectorate on the rationale for its performance indicators 
(Chapter 7) are relevant here.
It is crucial that performance indicators are tailored to reflect the 
precise role which an Agency is intended (in the framework document) 
to perform, in order to promote real progress in the quality of the 
service available to its customers. Allied to that is the need to 
know which factors accurately measure improvements in controlling 
Agency operations.
The Passport Agency is an organisation with interesting performance 
targets because of the fluctuations in its workload, which varies 
over the year, influenced by holiday patterns. Thus the performance 
indicators vary also, from 10 to 20 days handling times (Chancellor 
of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1993) depending on the season. The number 
of passport services provided increased from over 3 million in 1991 
to 5*9 million in 199^ * There is also a seasonal aspect to the 
lodging of planning appeals, although it is much less significant.
Some Agencies have gone for very limited and simple targets, but this 
may perhaps be due to the preferences of the Agency or Departmental 
managers, rather than for some other reason. The performance 
indicators for the Historic Royal Palaces Agency are more simple than 
most - visitors' ratings for enjoyment, value for money and 
helpfulness of staff (Hansard, 1992). However, these may accurately 
reflect the proper priorities for the Agency's operations.
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Well chosen performance indicators should record some of the other 
changes which have been examined in this Chapter following the 
introduction of the Next Steps Initiative. As we saw earlier, some 
Agencies are concerned to adjust the balance of their professional 
and administrative staff, and having a target relating to that gives 
a specific focus. The Defence Research Agency has a target to reduce 
the administrative and general overheads to 25# in 1993/^  and then to 
15% in 1996/7. by reversing the ratio of 1:2 support staff to 
researchers. The National Physical Laboratory has as one of its key 
targets to reduce the cost of administrative support to no more than 
20# of full economic cost, and to increase the amount of staff time 
spent on scientific programmes (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster,
1992). It will be interesting to see whether these targets are 
attainable.
The process of target setting is continuing to be seen as a 
significant way of promoting efficiency and change in the civil 
service. This was shown in March 199*0 when the government announced 
more than 100 new efficiency targets, ranging from information on how 
many hours of teaching a week school pupils receive, to job centres’ 
success in placing people in work, and higher standards for delivery 
of letters by the Post Office (Kirkbride, 199*0*
Clearly the government considers that these targets enable progress 
to be demonstrated, not only in the Next Steps Initiative, but also 
in meeting the aspirations set out in the Citizens’ Charter, by 
allowing Departments to evaluate the performance of Agencies against
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standards of service which the customer can reasonably expect 
(Chapter 1).
Information technology
Measuring performance against these indicators inevitably requires 
the collection and processing of numerous statistics within each 
Agency. Done manually, this is a mammoth, costly, slow and sometimes 
impossible task. This is why delays in the introduction of 
Information Technology, as in the Planning Inspectorate (Chapters 4 
and 7). can be so significant in terms of accountability and control. 
As mentioned previously, Information Technology can offer many 
improvements in efficiency to Agencies seeking to reduce costs.
Information Technology can be used to automate existing processes, 
bring in new services, or record how work is done. Examples are the 
Land Registry (National Audit Office, 1987 and 1991) and the Patent 
Office, both of which have had computer systems for some years. 
However, as in the Planning Inspectorate, IT did not automatically 
bring immediate benefits. The introduction of systems in the Land 
Registry caused considerable problems in the earlier stages, and led 
to investigations by the NAO (1987 and 1991)* Both Agencies are now 
actively installing networks to provide their customers with on-line 
services. The Land Registry is looking at Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS) for recording site areas and locations in the future, 
whilst the Patent Office is investigating the use of computers for 
recording full visual information about patents; this would be an
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expensive operation, with the need to establish international links 
eventually.
GIS is clearly a useful tool also for the Ordnance Survey Agency, 
which started to move to digital mapping in 1972. The task of 
digitising 220,000 maps should be completed in 1995; some 80# of 
digitising maps onto a computerised base is being done by the private 
sector, as a on-off exercise. By contracting this process "out", it 
took only 6 months. The £25 million project has paid off; updating 
maps on a digitised basis is 30# to k0% cheaper than redrafting on 
paper. Ordnance Survey maps can now be printed out on the spot at 15 
Agents’ premises, using a computer work station, CD-ROM reader and 
colour plotter. There is also the future possibility of three 
dimensional stereo pictures.
Other new services introduced by the Ordnance Survey include 
ADDRESSPOINT, which provides a national dataset combining correct 
postal addresses with digital data suitable for database and GIS 
applications. The Ordnance Survey help line for individuals now 
handles over 20,000 queries a year, using sophisticated computer 
software to access information. In the long term, this is an area 
for which the Inspectorate might find a demand from their customers 
if linked with appeal statistics.
Scrutiny and the Prior Options Reviews
We saw earlier that the NA0 has overall responsibility for auditing 
the financial accounts of all Agencies; the Treasury is also involved
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in annual discussions between Agencies and their parent Departments 
on budgets and financial allocations. A further and developing 
dimension is the appointment of outside experts, managers and 
customers to Advisory Boards, as has been done for the Planning 
Inspectorate (Chapter 7)» However, the information available on 
their deliberations is very limited so far. An NAO investigation can 
promote change and identify problems from which other Agencies can 
learn.
One example of specific scrutiny by the NAO is a report on the 
Vehicle Inspectorate Agency, which promotes road safety by conducting 
statutory tests on lorries and buses, and supervising garages which 
carry out MOT tests on cars (Department of Transport, 1991)* The NAO 
reported in February 1992 on the Agency's first 3 years, and said 
that it had become significantly more efficient and more responsive 
to customers’ needs, with an improved corporate identity, the removal 
of a layer of management, improved teamwork and internal 
communications, involvement of staff in decision making, and clearer 
targets.
However, a public organisation does not have the freedom to make 
decisions as a private company would, since regard must be had to 
statutory duties and other responsibilities in the public interest. 
The NAO report said that the Agency's obligation to keep open 
under-used (and therefore loss-making) testing stations had affected 
financial results (National Audit Office, 1992). The weak 
implementation of some services in the Agency has been criticised;
271
for instance, many customers had not been made aware of brake testing 
facilities or training courses.
The Agency’s annual report in 1992 said that tests for heavy goods 
vehicles would in future be available at operators’ premises, which 
should reduce waiting times and the distances travelled by operators’ 
vehicles for that purpose. Problems with some Area Offices having 
overspent on enforcement costs were addressed in 1992 by economising 
on other activities and transferring funds from other areas.
In September 1992, it was announced that some test fees were to be 
significantly increased, in some cases by more than a third.
Comments were invited from users of the service, whose initial 
reaction was very negative (Motor Transport, 1992). A proposal in 
late 1992 to privatise testing stations or introduce self 
certification were also rejected by the vehicle industry as being 
contrary to public safety, but the use of environmental targets 
linked with road safety was being investigated. More recently, 
privatisation of the Agency’s services was proposed by government, 
but rejected (IPMS, March/April, 199*0* Thus the managers must be 
constantly on the alert, to display the restlessness sought by Sir 
Robin Butler (Chapter 8), in order to demonstrate that the Agency 
style is the most effective basis for providing the service to its 
customers.
Many of the key principles which were mentioned under the Citizens’ 
Charter (Chapter 1) are reflected in the existing Agency framework
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documents, and the Prior Options Reviews are likely to give more 
emphasis to this aspect of their operations and targets.
Unlike the Planning Inspectorate, some Agencies, such as DVOIT, were 
launched under the Next Steps Initiative with the intention of 
privatisation being made explicit from the outset. Other Agencies to 
have gone in that direction since include the Transport Research 
Laboratory, the National Engineering Laboratory, and the Laboratory 
of the Government Chemist.
As a result of those Prior Options Review which have been completed, 
some other organisations have got close to privatisation, such as the 
Patent Office and the Insolvency Service, and then been reprieved.
The consultants, Price Waterhouse, reviewed the operations of the 
Patent Office and said that flotation as a company, a management 
buyout, a consortium of buyers, extensive market testing or sale to a 
single party were all possible options for the future (Purnell,
199*0.
However, customers, staff and professional bodies were all said to 
prefer the status quo, as has happened for the Planning Inspectorate, 
and Members of Parliament were reported as being concerned about the 
proposals because of the quasi-judicial role of the Office in 
intellectual property disputes (IPMS, November 1993)• It now seems 
that the regulatory and advisory functions will remain within 
government, with the administrative work contracted out (IPMS, May 
1994).
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A review in 1933 (the Cork Report) concluded that the Insolvency 
Service should be operated by civil servants independent of both 
debtors and creditors; subsequently, the Insolvency Act 1986 rejected 
privatisation. The workload increased by 400# after 1986, with 
bankruptcy orders and compulsory company liquidations rising from 
just over 11,000 in 1987 to nearly 42,000 in 1992; the staff numbers 
increased only by 1% in the same period. However, the politicians’ 
view of the organisation has changed, as a review was set in train in 
1993 to consider privatisation, although that was not supported by 
the customers of the service. It now seems that the regulatory and 
advisory functions will remain within government, with the 
administrative work contracted out (IPMS, May 1994), as is being done 
in the Patent Office.
Market testing
Market testing is regarded by Ministers as a key part of their drive 
to reduce costs and ensure that the civil service provides value for 
money (Chapter 1). All government Departments are required to 
consult with its Agencies with this objective, and to ensure that 
they review these opportunities each year. The process in the 
Department of the Environment, and the progress in market testing in 
the Inspectorate and across the civil service in the first 18 months, 
are described in Chapter 7*
With targets being set for a significant percentage of civil service 
work to be contracted out by this method (or for in-house teams to 
reduce their costs in competition with outsiders), market testing has
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absorbed much management effort in the Agencies. The supervision of 
the process is expensive and time consuming and, as we saw earlier, 
the savings so far are not coming as rapidly as the government had 
hoped. The cost of supervision has rarely been published (the cost 
in the Home Office mentioned in Chapter 1 being an exception); the 
way in which supervision is being done is now the subject of a 
Cabinet Office Scrutiny.
In the meantime, only the consequent effects have been given 
publicity, and a few examples will give a flavour of what has been 
happening. As in the other activities mentioned in this Chapter, the 
scope of the work considered for market testing, and the 
opportunities which may arise, will vary according to the role and 
character of the Agency in question. In the Land Registry Agency, 
legal services, surveys, records management and various building 
services have been market tested (Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster, 1992 and 1993; and National Audit Office, 1987 and 1991)* 
Some 25% of the Patent Office operations have been contracted out; 
it is easier for an Agency employing some seasonal and professional 
or consultant staff to achieve a higher figure, as the 10% of work 
"bought in” by the Historic Royal Palaces Agency shows.
It could be added, no doubt, that the enthusiasm with which these 
opportunities are pursued may have to depend on the attitudes of the 
individual managers involved in the process, unless an overview is 
maintained across the civil service of what progress is being made, 
and why.
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In terms of value, the savings available will clearly be related to 
some extent to the size of the Agency's budget and, as mentioned 
before, they can arise from an in-house team succeeding in their bid 
to retain the work at a lower cost. Thus, in the Customs and Excise, 
£40 million of work was retained in-house out of a total of £60 
million which was market tested, and which had been done by full time 
civil servants before; however, the successful bid required the loss 
of 600 jobs (Management Matters, May 199*0 • It is this kind of 
result that prompted Sir Peter Levene to comment to Management 
Matters in December 1993 that these savings were a pleasant surprise, 
but made him wonder why they had not been found before.
The Citizens' Charter
With the Citizens' Charter having been introduced in 1993. clearly 
the advances in open government which Agencies may have achieved 
before then can be credited in part at least to the Next Steps 
Initiative rather than to the influence of the Charter. However, it 
is the formal position now that, when a new Agency is launched, the 
practical operations set out in its framework document and Business 
and Corporate Plans (Chapter 5) are intended to reflect customer 
service in the Citizens' Charter manner from the outset (Chancellor 
of the Duchy of Lancaster/Office of Public Service and Science,
1994).
The key principles of the Charter (Chapter 1) include improving 
customer service and publishing the standards that can be expected, 
giving clear information in plain language, taking users' views into
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account, publicising ways of complaining, and arranging for 
independent evaluation of performance against the standards. As we 
saw earlier, the use of performance indicators is a very important 
tool in providing a means of assessing performance and progress in 
these areas, and many of the indicators referred to earlier come into 
this category.
Other examples are the Driving Standards Agency, which has reduced 
the waiting time for car driving tests from 13 weeks in 1988 to less 
than 6 weeks. Another is the Passport Agency, which has reduced the 
average time for processing straightforward passport applications 
from 3*5 weeks in 1989 to less than 8 working days.
The Historic Royal Palaces Agency's Visitors Charter includes a range 
of measures, including target times for answering telephones and 
letters and name badges for those staff in contact with visitors, as 
in the Planning Inspectorate; an easily accessible complaints 
procedure; and the results of a self-completion questionnaire for 
visitors are included in the Annual Review of the Next Steps 
Initiative. Such surveys give opportunities for the parent 
Department to assess whether the quality of service is being 
maintained or improved. However, there continues to be a tendency to 
emphasise numerical targets which only require statistics to be 




All typologies for Agencies to some extent reflect their functions as 
set out in the framework documents, and can assist in indicating what 
the future status of an Agency may be. Those with a more commercial 
role have often demonstrated more inclination for change, especially 
in the content of a variable workload. Some Agencies were launched 
with the intention of privatisation from the outset, and others are 
moving in that direction as a result of the Prior Options’ Reviews. 
There is a constant need for managers to ensure that the style of the 
Agency is appropriate for the service to be provided, and the 
background and experience of a Chief Executive Officer can strongly 
influence this.
The decisions that Agency status is inappropriate for part of a 
Department has not always been publicised; however, a more formal 
structure for this would probably have delayed the implementation of 
the Next Steps Initiative.
Innovations in one Agency can benefit others, and customer surveys 
and input from professional organisations can have a useful role in 
this which meetings between Chief Executive Officers are intended to 
promote (Chapter 8). Competition from the private sector and the 
recent recession have had a significant influence on some Agencies.
Ministers see market testing as having a strong impact on the drive 
to reduce costs, either by contracting out work or reducing the cost 
of its being done in-house. Market testing involves considerable
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management effort (Chapter 8), and the costs of supervising the 
process have rarely been published. The scope for market testing 
depends on the character of the Agency, and perhaps the attitudes of 
individual managers.
The combination of a fluctuating workload, service wide staffing 
constraints and the government accounting system is difficult to 
reconcile in the interest of value for money, especially if the 
income of an Agency is limited or inflexible, as we saw in the 
Planning Inspectorate (Chapter 7)* Managers may have to choose 
between quality and productivity, and it can be very difficult to say 
whether the right balance has been struck or the correct performance 
indicators have been set.
Agencies with some statutory functions may have little scope for 
making value judgements in their work, but can be subject to only 
limited political control. Some agencies employing professional and 
administrative staff are beginning to develop the latter*s skills in 
a more volatile employment market, and to alter the ratio between 
staff working on the core skills of the Agency and the number of 
people supporting them. Agencies are taking a more flexible approach 
to recruitment and training, as well as pay and grading, and are 
being required to take on responsibilities for personnel matters 
(Chapter 8).
In those Agencies which had a measure of independence before Agency 
status, it may be less likely that changes since then are due to the 
Next Steps Initiative. However, the new system has encouraged
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innovation and extending the business of many Agencies into new 
areas, especially those which do not need legislation.
The principles of the Citizens' Charter are being reflected in the 
Prior Options Reviews, and more open government, although the amount 
of information published by government is relatively limited. 
Involving user groups can promote choice and change (Chapter 7). and 
enable Departments to improve their methods of control. User groups 
and customers may be able to oppose and sometimes prevent 
privatisation.
The focus in the past has often been to expand controls rather than 
promoting value for money; indeed, the customers of an Agency may not 
share the views held within the civil service about what value for 
money means.
Finance is a key area in the Next Steps Initiative, and the Treasury 
is continually seeking savings, as we saw in the Planning 
Inspectorate. The financial systems used may derive from the history 
of the organisation, and problems may not be due to the introduction 
of the new pattern of the organisation. Due to delays in setting 
budgets, performance indicators may be set after the beginning of a 
financial year, as in the Inspectorate (Chapter 7)*
Performance indicators can concentrate on easy measurements and 
existing statistics; they can be either too easy or too complex, and 
outside observers may have difficulty in seeing why they were chosen. 
Performance indicators should reflect the role of the Agency and be
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designed to promote change. If savings come from market testing, 
this may indicate that the performance indicators were not working 
well. Established Agencies are tending to reduce the number of their 
performance indicators.
The examples given in this Chapter show that the range of choices 
open to the new Agencies are many and varied, although the 
information available does not always allow enough detail to enable 
helpful conclusions to be drawn. The next Chapter considers and 
compares the experience in the Planning Inspectorate and other 
Agencies, and comments on the progress of the Next Steps Initiative, 
before we move on to conclusions on the questions in Chapter 2.
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CHAPTER 10 - DISCUSSION
Chapters 4 to 7 and 9 set out the experiences of the Inspectorate and 
of other Agencies with examples relating to these propositions, in 
the context of a typology which relates to their executive functions. 
In this Chapter, these experiences are compared and discussed, before 
we move on to the conclusions.
The Next Steps Initiative and the Prior Options Reviews
The government, by introducing the Next Steps Initiative on a non- 
statutory basis within the existing central civil service, appears to 
have changed the approach to the provision of executive services more 
rapidly in the 7 years since 1988 than would have otherwise occurred. 
As we have seen, 62# of all civil servants were employed in 102 
Agencies by 1994, with a further 64 organisations being seriously 
considered as candidates for Agencies (Chapter 8). In those terms, 
the Next Steps Initiative is a considerable success.
The initial impact in at least some of the new Agencies appears to 
have been identifiable improvements in service, greater freedom for 
local managers, more information about aims and responsibilities and 
making posts available to both those within the civil service and 
from outside (Chapters 5. 8 and 9)*
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The typologies and in particular that related to the functions of the 
Agencies referred to in Chapters 1 and 9 do appear to be relevant to 
how some Agencies have progressed.
The effect of the Next Steps Initiative should be more apparent when
the function has previously been managed on a traditional basis, 
where the impact of concentrating on business principles such as 
value for money, performance indicators and targets, efficiency and 
volume of outputs should be greater (Chapters 2, 5 and 9)* Here, so 
much must depend on the way new systems are introduced.
One of the aspects of the traditional civil service which the Next 
Steps Initiative sought to change was the lack of opportunities for 
staff to utilise their energies and innovations to revitalise the 
organisation (Chapters 1 and 2). As we saw in Chapter 9. many
Agencies have found opportunities to do this.
In this respect, it is important that framework documents should be 
reviewed, since these "contracts” are inevitably drawn up before the 
potential Agency has developed its strategies and discovered, at 
least in some cases, what opportunities are available to improve its 
service; for instance, to offset costs by marketing products or 
extending services (Chapters 8 and 9)* It seems not entirely 
accurate to say that such opportunities are less likely to arise in 
regulatory Agencies such as the Planning Inspectorate, which has 
quasi-judicial functions and statutory rules (Chapter 4). It is
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clear from Chapter 9 that other regulatory Agencies such as the 
Patent Office and Companies House have been able to do so.
The typologies to which an Agency can be assigned give an indication 
of whether it might be suitable for privatisation or other treatment 
when its functions are re-examined during the Prior Options Review. 
The evidence so far indicates that the customers are likely to resist 
the transfer of an Agency with a regulatory function, whereas other 
Agencies with research functions or already competing with commercial 
firms may move into the private sector if there is not too much 
opposition from its customers (Chapters 1, 8 and 9)* We have seen 
this reaction to the Prior Options Review in the Inspectorate 
(Chapter 7)•
The re-opening or, in some cases, the raising for the first time, of 
the possibility of privatisation as part of these Reviews may be very 
disruptive. It will be interesting to see if these customer 
interests are given a increasingly high profile in these examinations 
in accordance with the precepts of the Citizens' Charter as happened 
in the Planning Inspectorate.
Open government and the Citizens' Charter
The Citizens' Charter have many similarities to the ethos underlying 
the Next Steps Initiative. For this reason, it is very difficult to 
disentangle what effects in the new Agencies are due to one and what 
to the other. At least one can comment that the Charter’s
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introduction some 5 years after the advent of the Next Steps 
Initiative reinforced the "user-friendly" aspects of the latter.
The government seems to have considered that the benefits of the 
customer-favourable approach justified extending it to the central 
Departments and to other parts of the public service. The surveys 
done by the Inspectorate confirm that customers want both a speedy 
outcome and a friendly and approachable style from the civil servants 
they encounter (Chapter 6); neither of these views is unexpected. 
Investigations in other Agencies (Chapter 9) show, not surprisingly, 
that proposed reductions in service standards are likely to be 
resisted.
At present, the Agencies are not required to demonstrate formally 
that they are listening to suggestions made by their staff; this 
seems to be an area where it is very much left to the individual 
Chief Executive Officers to make use, or not, of the ideas which 
their employees can provide (Chapter 9). As it has to be shown, 
under the Citizens’ Charter, that the views of the external customers 
are being considered (Chapter 1), it may be that a similar approach 
is needed to show that the internal dimension is being accommodated 
as well. Where a significant proportion of an Agency’s staff work 
from home, as in the Inspectorate, improving internal methods of 
communication must be particularly important for this reason (Chapter
4).
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The reader will have noted the frequency of the references to 
"customers” made in the Chapters about the Agencies. Asking the 
customers of an Agency what their priorities are is one way of 
redirecting the targets towards more effective ways of improving the 
service being provided. This contrast strongly with the situation in 
the Planning Inspectorate in the period up to the 1980s just before 
the Next Steps Initiative began.
Having the targets overseen by the parent Departments, the Treasury 
and the Office of Public Service and Science, and monitoring the 
targets regularly, should also be promoting consistently higher 
standards, and the changes which have taken place over the past 5 
years show that some progress is being made in this direction 
(Chapters 7t 8 and 9)*
It may be that a greater involvement of the "customers", or their 
proxies in the form of representatives of interest groups (Chapter 2) 
as in the Inspectorate’s Advisory Panel (Chapter 7)» could be the 
means of maintaining the pace of change to meet new demands and 
resolve conflicting priorities. This would also be consistent with 
the ethos underlying the Citizens’ Charter.
Narket testing
Market testing is also clearly relevant here, although it places 
heavy demands on management time and resources, which inevitably must 
be reflected in extra costs (including monitoring any contracts
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placed) or in opportunities foregone to make progress in other areas 
(Chapter 8).
The Second Report on the Citizens* Charter said that the total value 
of new commitments to market testing was £830 million, involving 
35»000 staff (Cabinet Office, 1994, and Management Matters, May 
1994). Savings have been about 25% of the previous cost, whether the 
in-house team "won" or not. The price has been the loss of 
confidence by staff in their security of tenure and, to some extent 
at least, in their "vocation" as public servants.
The proportion of work being done by contractors does not necessarily 
remain the same even if no new functions are contracted out. For 
instance, in the Inspectorate the number of contract staff needed 
varies depending on authorisation by the Treasury and the Department 
for salaried recruitment and the amount of work suitable for less 
experienced staff, as well as on decisions on how IT development will 
be taken forward (Chapter 7)»
One of the most effective ways of requiring an Agency to reassess its 
operations and consider contracting out seems to be the productivity 
targets which reduce the available funds annually on an ongoing 
basis. This control, being imposed across the whole of the civil 
service (Chapter 2), requires the Agencies to find ways of limiting 
costs and seek more cost effective ways of operating, under the 
"supervision" of the parent Department. It also echoes relevant
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practices in the world outside the civil service in which private 
firms operate (Chapter 1).
The difficulty in the future will be, firstly, to know when the 
irreducible minimum cost of carrying out an Agency’s activities has 
been reached and, secondly, to then find some new way of promoting 
efficiency and effectiveness in what will continue to be a changing 
context for any Agency. As we saw in Chapter 7. the Department and 
the Treasury may have to agree to provide extra funds if serious 
delays are to be avoided in a demand-led organisation such as the 
Planning Inspectorate.
Accoun tabi1i ty
It does appear that the Next Steps Initiative has extended the 
concept of accountability to more people (service users, customers, 
and to some extent interest groups, for instance), and in more 
situations, than the original responsibilities of Ministers and civil 
servants to Parliament could possibly have done (Chapter 2). One 
could also add that the Initiative has achieved this in a remarkably 
short time-span.
This is an area where the Planning Inspectorate was in advance of 
other Agencies as far as their professional staff were concerned. As 
to whether accountability has improved, if openness is important, 
then certainly more information is now being made available in many
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Agencies (Chapters 8 and 9). and that again echoes the practice in 
the Inspectorate (Chapters 6 and 7)*
One of the changes now taking place is some re-orientation of the 
accountability of administrative civil servants within the new 
Agencies, who previously looked to the Secretary of State and 
Permanent Secretary, rather than to the head of their part of the 
organisation and the customers they service. We saw the contrast 
between the different approaches in the Inspectorate (Chapter 4). It 
may be that the less certain employment framework in the civil 
service as a whole may promote a different view by administrative 
staff within the executive units (Chapter 8 and 9)* This is an 
aspect where the style and personality of the Chief Executive Officer 
may be significant.
We saw in Chapter 6 that the managers in the Inspectorate still tend 
to act through committees rather than assuming personal 
responsibility for a particular function. This contrasts with one of 
the intentions of the Next Steps Initiative and the practices 
developing in, for instance, HMSO. The fact that line management 
responsibilities are restricted (Chapter 4) and that devolved budgets 
are very limited in scope due to professional autonomy (Chapter 7) 
does not necessarily mean that individual responsibility cannot be 
assumed for other duties.
The National Consumer Council's minimum conditions for accountability 
are standards to be aimed for (Chapter 1), but it seems unlikely that
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many Agencies are meeting them all at present. An interesting aspect 
of these is the proposal that there should be sanctions for non- 
observance (Chapter 1), although it is not clear what these should 
be, particularly in a quasi-judicial organisation.
Chief Executive Officers coming from outside may be less familiar 
with the requirements of public accountability, and perhaps more 
needs to be done to explain civil service procedures to them, and 
ensure adequate monitoring (Chapter 8). However, people need to be 
allowed to make legitimate mistakes without being ridiculed, if a 
less risk adverse culture is to develop in the civil service (Chapter 
2). Indeed, it could be said that many of these considerations 
should also apply to policy staff in central Departments in the 
context of the Citizens' Charter and more accountable government.
Control
Inevitably the new Agencies are formalising procedures at a rapid 
rate, which is taking up management capacity and reducing the 
percentage of staff time being spent on the role for which the 
organisation exists. These greater "overheads" may to an extent be 
unavoidable, as we have seen in the Inspectorate (Chapter 5). but it 
could be a useful marker for all Agencies to show what percentage of 
staff time is spent on its primary tasks, and what on demonstrating 
adherence to service wide requirements such as the financial regime, 
changes in pay and grading and personnel management, for instance.
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Comparisons between Agencies in this respect could be illuminating, 
providing that the character of each Agency’s role was made explicit.
As the Next Steps Initiative has been introduced within the 
established pattern of government, existing methods have been used in 
the new Agencies too - Treasury supervision, patterns of accounting 
and finance, reporting to Department managers, audits by the NAO, for 
example. However, too much ’harmonisation” of procedures and 
practices between Agencies may need to be resisted, if each is to 
develop the most effective way of meeting its particular obligations 
and responsibilities, especially where these have very special 
characteristics which have been recognised by independent observers 
(Chapter 4).
The traditional financing of Agencies on an annual basis, which 
prevents them planning ahead and fully taking into account the long 
term consequences of the various alternatives available to them, 
seems to be a major stumbling block to the most effective use of 
public funds in the Planning Inspectorate and other Agencies 
(Chapters 7 and 8). This is a particular problem for Agencies with a 
variable workload, as is the rule that money cannot be transferred 
between contract and salaried budgets.
Agencies with at least some income from their activities can adopt a 
more flexible approach and, for those who have achieved a self 
funding situation, the Trading Fund status gives the opportunity to 
act more as a private sector company would (Chapter 9)* It is,
295
however, interesting to see that one of the most successful Agencies 
in turning around its financial situation, the Historic Royal 
Palaces, does not have Trading Fund status, and appears to be 
managing very well without it. That Agency does, however, have a 
regular and rising income.
Trying to make sure that the targets are not only sufficiently 
stringent, but are also relevant and covering a sufficient range of 
issues, appears to be one of the most difficult areas to get right.
It appears doubtful that the OPSS - a small organisation with an ever 
increasing number of Agencies to supervise - has the ability to do 
this, and the relevant central Departments are getting smaller.
The Planning Inspectorate's approach of having a Panel of 
professional "users’* monitoring quality may be one way forward on 
this (Chapter 7)* At one extreme, the targets can be so simplistic 
as to be almost meaningless. At the other, they can be numerous but, 
in practice, only repeat statistics which the organisation had 
collected in any case before Agency status (Chapter 8).
In a demand-led regulatory Agency "business" such as the 
Inspectorate, it can be easy to label existing statistics as 
numerical targets (Chapters 2 and 8) because quality targets are more 
difficult to devise (Chapter 7). Devising appropriate performance 
indicators is crucial, as the Advisory Panel for the Planning 
Inspectorate has said (Chapter 7)*
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The evidence appears to indicate that Agencies have the ability to 
improve their performance over time, as shown by the higher standards 
being progressively required by the targets in the annual business 
plans and monitored in the Next Steps Initiative Review. Such 
targets can, of course, be manipulated by being less demanding 
initially than can be achieved with the available resources, so they 
can be achieved, for the first few years at least, without pain.
The pattern of re-assessing the performance against targets on a 
yearly basis in Business Plans and Annual Reports (Chapters 7 and 8) 
may well mean that efforts go into making sure they are met, to the 
dis-benefit of making improvements in areas which are not being 
monitored.
Any changes needing legislation, even though they might achieve a 
better service to the public or offer better value for money to the 
taxpayer, will be slow and likely to be difficult. This will be even 
more likely where the possibility of making charges for existing 
services are concerned.
The NAO and value for money
The financing system for Agencies is, of course, linked to the 
accountability for the money voted annually by Parliament. However, 
it encourages the tendency to spend any surplus towards the end of 
the financial year on short term projects, rather than encouraging a 
more strategic approach (Chapter 7)*
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Auditing can reveal, after the event, what has happened. But an 
Agency not spending the money voted for it runs the risk of getting a 
lower allocation for the following year, thus rewarding the more 
spendthrift rather than the prudent. None of this is new, but it is 
a symptom of how part of the regime under which Agencies operate has 
changed very little for the better.
The role of "external” observers, such as the Departmental sponsor, 
Advisory Panels, the Treasury and the NAO (Chapters 7. 8 and 9. can 
have some influence here. It must, however, be doubtful whether, 
even before the present emphasis on reducing the size of the central 
parts of the civil service, they could have sufficient knowledge of 
the processes involved to be aware of what all the most appropriate 
and effective targets should be at any particular time.
The NAO has, as we have seen, promoted the use of more detailed 
accounting methods in those organisations where they were absent 
before (Chapters 7. 8 and 9)• Where a special NAO investigation is 
instituted, a more radical overview and assessment can be taken but 
this will always be a rare event bearing in mind the very 
considerable span of the organisations for which the NAO now has an 
auditing function (Chapter 8).
Elizabeth Mellon of the London Business School in her report to the 
Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee (1993) said that Agencies 
tend to ask for targets which they feel safe with, and aim only for 
those which they think they can achieve. However, it is too
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simplistic to assume that an Agency such as the Planning Inspectorate 
relies more on numerical performance indicators for this reason, when 
IT is really needed for a more refined approach.
Better value for money for the taxpayer as one customer of government 
by charging for services has, as we have seen in the Inspectorate 
(Chapter 5) to be balanced against the possibly adverse effects of 
deterring recourse to government services and quasi-judicial 
procedures by appellants as other customers because of the costs to 
be paid. The advent of charging for some court services (Chapter 7) 
may be used in future as a justification for changing the previous 
policy.
Relationships with Departments
However, some of the difficulties which have arisen have had little 
to do with the nature of an Agency's business, and much more to do 
with matters common to other parts of the Departments and unconnected 
with the Next Steps Initiative. Perhaps it is true that:
"the performance of any organisation improves in proportion to 
its distance from political control.
(from "Is politics compatible with management ?", the Royal 
Institute for Public Administration Conference paper on 
Politics and Administration, Durham, 20 September 1986.)
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We have seen that one of the problems, referred to by the Trosa 
Report amongst others (Chapter 8), is the tendency for some 
Departments to act as though little has changed as a result of the 
Next Steps Initiative (Chapters 7 and 8). In some cases, it seems to 
need service-wide initiatives by the Treasury, such as delegating pay 
and grading, personnel duties or accounting functions, to alter the 
established pattern. The most effective way of avoiding too much 
intervention by Departments appears to be already taking place - to 
reduce the size of the central core to reflect the responsibilities 
transferred to the new Agencies (Chapter 8). Pressures on staff time 
will therefore require choices to be made, and encourage a "hands- 
off” approach to all but the most strategic decisions.
Another aspect which is very difficult to quantify is the influence 
of the personality and inclinations of the Chief Executive Officers, 
whether they have previously been serving civil servants or not. 
Where, as in the Historic Royal Palaces, the Chief Executive Officer 
comes from a relevant background outside the civil service with a 
very clear vision of what is needed, very great improvements and 
changes can be achieved (Chapter 9).
The influence of the character and nature of an Agency's workload
It is difficult to be certain of the reasons which have prevented the 
Inspectorate from introducing some of the more user-friendly services 
now being promoted by other Agencies (Chapter 9)* The professional 
autonomy of the Inspectors and the variable workload of the Agency
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continue to affect the way the organisation operates (Chapters 4 and 
6). Unlike some other Agencies (Chapter 9). the Inspectorate has not 
sought to streamline its administrative procedures on casework to any 
significant degree to balance staff resources.
It is perhaps inevitable that a quasi-judicial organisation will 
incline to a more cautious approach with regard to public relations 
and promoting the benefits of its activities, especially when it is 
coping with a rising workload (Chapters 4 and 7)* The recent 
decision in the Inspectorate to publish a professional Journal 
(Chapter 7) is not, at present at least, seen as leading to any other 
marketing activities such as on-line services.
However, being a regulatory Agency as classified in the typology in 
Chapter 8 is not necessarily a negative factor. When the workload 
reduced in the Patent Office, a much more active stance towards 
publicity and innovation is seen. Companies House and, perhaps to a 
lesser extent, the Land Registry, have taken a similar approach.
It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the need to retain a 
minimum quantity of work in a function which is seen as being in the 
public interest can overcome any hesitancy which might arise about 
using various techniques to promote extra business. It appears that, 
even in less likely places such as the Defence Agencies, the 
pressures of balancing the books and minimising staff losses may have 
encouraged a more innovative approach to new markets (Chapter 9)•
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Where an Agency, such as the Planning Inspectorate, has a monopoly in 
its field, it would be surprising if the movement towards changes was 
seen to be as pressing as in those organisations which compete with 
the private sector, such as the Historic Royal Palaces Agency 
(Chapters 4 and 9)• Again, where an Agency has had a long history of 
retailing its services to the public, such as HMSO, the Royal Mint 
and the Ordnance Survey have for instance, more pro-active measures 
are likely to be taken than in a part of government which has 
previously had little or no experience in that area.
The Next Steps Initiative Agencies have seemed in most difficulty in 
adapting to their new status where they have been exposed, sometimes 
at very short notice after being established, to the cold wind of 
change or competition from the private sector. In that situation, 
they have fared no better than a private firm would do, and perhaps 
worse (Chapter 9)* In particular, it seems possible that the short 
term basis of planning for civil service financing on a year to year 
basis may have prevented them from coping better with problems 
created by the recession or competition (Chapter 2).
Summary
There have been significant changes and innovations in many Agencies 
as a result of the Next Steps Initiative. Overall, the bureaucratic 
approach seems to be out of favour, and the changes appear to be, in 
the widest sense, in the public interest. However, the financial 
systems used in many Agencies at the behest of the Treasury, as well
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FIGURE 10.1 - Progress of the Planning Inspectorate
Before Agency Questions to be answered After Agency
Franks’ principles being 
implemented of openness, 
fairness and impartiality
Limited performance targets
Limited surveys of customers in 
the late 1980s
Informal procedures available
Open government and the 
Citizens' Charter
Open government; the Citizen's 
Charter, and Performance 
Indicators
Does the organisation deliver 
what its customers want
Open approach continues
Tending to re-label existing 
statistics as performance indicators 
and not measure quality accurately
Surveys of customers increased
Advisory Panel introduced
Delays occurring in appeal workload
Some professional contract staff
Market testing
Contracting work out; and 
market testing
Additional contracting out being 
considered, but percentage overall 
may vary due to caseload and use of 
specialist staff
Open professional approach was 
explicit




has the context of 
accountability changed
has accountability and 
responsibility been devolved 
within the organisation
Interest groups now formally 
consulted
Managers still tending to act as a 
committee rather than individually 
on relevant matters
Senior managers' accountability for 
Inspectors limited because of nature 
of their role, and budgets cannot be 
devolved because work allocated by 
others
Annual financing prevents 
adapting to short term 
variations, and long lead time 
for training not met
Control
Is there an inherent conflict 
between formal control and 
using the most effective 
methods
No transfer of funds between 
salaried and contract/fee paid staff
System not adapted to a variable 
workload
Legislative changes slow and 
difficult
Used Department of the 
Environment methods
Very limited use of Information 
Technology
The NAO and value for money
Has control over public money 
improved
Treasury annual accounting system 
restricts effective forward planning 
of staff resources
More detailed accounting methods 
introduced at the behest of the NAO
Slow introduction of Information 
Technology
No charging for processing casework
Professional decision making
Personnel and finance not 
devolved
Department of the Environment 
had typical civil service 
pattern
Relationships with Department
Has the Department devolved 
functions
Have the duties of central 
civil servants altered
As required by Treasury on personnel 
and pay and grading, and accounting
Department still taking detailed 
interest in Agency affairs
Reduced staffing now being 
introduced in central Department
Administrative pattern similar 
to Department, but Inspectors 
independent
Choice of 3 appeal procedures 
before Agency status
Character and nature of the 
Agency's workload; and does 
the Next Steps Initiative 
affect professionals and 
administrators differently
Is the Inspectorate still very 
different from the Department
Is the Agency innovative
Still much more professional 
autonomy and variable workload
New journal proposed, but not use of 
decision letter "collections"; no on 
line services
No change to administrative 
procedures or balancing of staff 
resources
as in some cases political decisions, have limited the extent of the 
improvements which can be made.
Ronald Reagan, the former American President, once said that 
governments tend not to solve problems, only re-arrange them.
Without change, we should remember that the first Project Manager 
said that all that would occur in the Next Steps Initiative would be 
’’badge engineering” (Kemp, 1990). Some observers feared at the 
outset that this might be the fate of the Next Steps Initiative as 
far as the strategy of the Cabinet Office was concerned. In that no 
very major changes have occurred in the Planning Inspectorate, this 
could be a reasonably accurate description of the effect of the 
Initiative.
Bearing in mind what has been achieved in other Agencies, Figure 10.1 
sets out the various propositions referred to in the Introduction to 
this thesis, under the headings used in this Chapter recording the 
situation in the Planning Inspectorate before, and then after, Agency 
status. In the final Chapter, we use the same headings to consider 
the achievements to date in the Next Steps Initiative, the problems 
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CHAPTER 11 - CONCLUSIONS
This study has sought to use the practical experiences in some of the 
new Agencies, together with literature and articles about the civil 
service and the Initiative, to examine a particular aspect of the new 
system and one Agency’s progress (Chapter 3)* There are many other 
ways in which the Next Steps Initiative could be studied.
However, having the opportunity to use my knowledge of how one Agency 
with a rather unique role had progressed under the Next Steps 
Initiative indicated that comparisons with those Agencies which had 
some similar characteristics, and the most innovative practices 
adopted in others, would give a useful approach. No study can, of 
course, be more than a limited view in a field where experiences and 
the literature are developing on a daily basis. Further, as 
mentioned earlier, the amount of information being published by 
government and the Agencies can never give a full picture of what is 
occurring.
As explained in Chapter 3. the methodology used has been to refer to 
relevant literature, carry out a series of interviews, and use the 
experience of the Planning Inspectorate to examine traditional civil 
service methods, and the changes which have come about through the 
Next Steps Initiative over the past few years.
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FIGURE 11.1 SUMMARY OF QUESTIONS RAISED IN CHAPTER 2
The questions which arise in considering the introduction of the Next 
Steps Initiative can be summarised as:
the consequences of the way in which the Initiative was 
introduced, without statutory measures, and the effect of the 
Prior Options Reviews;
whether the Initiative itself has led to more open government 
(bearing in mind also the advent of the Citizens' Charter);
the effects of competition and the advent of market testing;
possible changes in the scope and allocation of accountability, 
including the role of the "customer";
the control of Agencies' activities, including the effect on the 
autonomy of the Chief Executive Officers, the role of accounting 
systems, of performance indicators, and fluctuations in workload; 
and the effect of the productivity requirement introduced by the 
Treasury;
the effect of supervision by the NAO, and whether the advent of 
the Initiative has led to better value for money;
the relationships between Departments and Agencies; the relevance 
of traditional civil service methods; the relevance of the type 
of casework or demand for an Agency's services, and whether 
professionals will be affected differently from administrative 
staff.
The introduction to this thesis noted that the Next Steps Initiative 
is usually designed to separate the executive and policy roles of 
central Departments; to promote the use of relevant practices from 
private industry to improve value for money, whilst retaining 
accountability to Parliament and increasing efficiency and 
effectiveness. The Initiative also seeks to extend accountability 
and responsibility to named officials at lower levels in the civil 
service hierarchy. The objective of the transfer to Agency status is 
to bring about better management, better value for money, and a 
better service to the public (Chapter 1). Other service-wide 
innovations such as market testing and the Citizens' Charter are 
directly linked with this.
In this concluding chapter, the background outlined earlier, and the 
information on individual Agencies in Chapters 4 to 9 together with 
the discussion in Chapter 10, are used to consider the questions 
posed at the end of Chapter 2. For convenience of reference, these 
are repeated in Figure 11.1.
The Next Steps Initiative, and the Prior Options' Reviews
Compared to the way in which the civil service had traditionally 
operated (Chapter 2), it was said at the outset that the Next Steps 
Initiative would be a quite different way of conducting the business 
of government (Improving Management in Government, 1990).
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However, in practice, the consequences seems to have been to put the 
mainly executive functions into more separate units rather than to 
create new freedoms for the managers of those units. Although some 
functions have been devolved from the centre of the Departments to 
their Agencies, the scope for change has been limited by the desire 
of the Treasury and the parent Departments to oversee and control 
many of the aspects of the new Agencies which might allow innovation 
and change.
As the Next Steps Initiative was introduced very quickly (Dunsire, 
1995). there was only a brief examination of the alternative options 
available for carrying out each Agency's activities and duties at 
that time. The Prior Options process in reviewing these operations 
after three years is therefore significant (Cabinet Office Efficiency 
Unit, 1991), but it may lead to more upheaval for civil servants if 
different choices are made for the future of any organisation.
The experience of the Planning Inspectorate in introducing new 
procedures, initially by informal means, confirm that avoiding the 
need to legislate can mean more rapid, and perhaps more effective, 
change. The practice at the time the Initiative began (Gray and 
Jenkins, 1995) was not to consult "outsiders" on how the civil 
service was organised, and this plus the absence of legislation 
(Chapter 1) probably explain why there was little or no public 
consultation before the new Agencies were created (Chapters 2 and 8).
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The customers and other outside organisations have been involved much 
more with the current review processes in the Next Steps Initiative 
(Chapters 7 and 9)* One consequence has been that the government’s 
preference in some cases to privatise or otherwise alter the status 
of established Agencies as a result of the Prior Options’ process has 
been contested, in some cases successfully, by the customers 
exercising their rights to have their views taken into account under 
the government’s move towards more open government (Chapter 9)* This 
has been so particularly where the Agency has a quasi-judicial role 
and the issue of impartiality has arisen (Chapters 7 and 9)«
Before the Initiative was introduced, the role of staff in 
Departments were only rarely defined. There does appear to have been 
a tension between about revealing information in advance of decisions 
being made, and concern about flexibility and security in the first 
years of the Initiative (Kanter, 1989). This was shown by the late 
disclosure of framework documents (Chapter 8) to one of the Select 
Committees of the House of Commons (House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee, 1990-1), although perhaps the civil servants would be less 
secretive now than several years ago.
The framework documents are in practice forming a written 
constitution for the Agencies (House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee, 1990-1). Their common features (Chapters 5 and 8) have 
brought some consistency in practices between individual Agencies, as 
do the responsibility of the Treasury and what is now the Office of
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Public Service and Science in overseeing the creation of the Agencies 
and their activities once established.
In general, this appears to be beneficial provided that the best, 
rather than the easiest, practices are promoted. However, too much 
consistency would be unlikely to permit Agencies to operate in the 
most effective way, bearing in mind their very different roles and 
the needs of their customers (Chapters 1, 5. 8 and 9)*
Open government and the Citizens' Charter
In order to assess the effect of the Next Steps Initiative on the 
various Agencies, it is first necessary to deal with these procedures 
and requirements which have been introduced service-wide. Since the 
management of government functions can never be static (McDonald,
1992), an accurate assessment of the impact of the Next Steps 
Initiative must be complicated by the more recent innovations of the 
Citizens’ Charter and market testing (Chapter 1). Both potentially 
limit the autonomy of the Chief Executive Officers of the new 
Agencies to manage their largely executive functions (Chapter 8).
The Citizens' Charter appears indeed to be a form of substitute 
democracy (Dunsire, 1995) by including customers of government 
services and professional observers such as the Inspectorate's 
Advisory Panel (Chapter 7) in commenting on how they are delivered.
As the Next Steps Initiative preceded both the Citizens' Charter and 
market testing, it is reasonable to assume that where either has
features in common with the Initiative, the government saw benefits 
arising within the Agencies that could usefully be extended to the 
rest of the civil service and other bodies serving the public.
Customer-friendly initiatives are particularly visible in the 
executive Agencies, which tend to deal more directly with the general 
public at large than do most central policy divisions in Departments.
There seems to be a need recognised in many Agencies to release 
creativity (Hunt, 1986). The practical results of involving 
customers (Chapters 7 and 9) show that the more open approach to 
government processes and decisions which is part of the Citizens’ 
Charter (Chapter 1) does have a positive effect. As the Charter has 
been introduced for Departments and Agencies alike, it is not always 
possible to say where the Next Steps Initiative ends and the 
Citizens' Charter begins as far as their effects on some Agency 
operations are concerned.
The extent to which a more open ’private sector” approach can 
increase business for some Agencies (Chapter 9) shows that those who 
originally proposed the new Initiative were not too optimistic. What 
is not clear from the limited information available is whether the 
Treasury always fully appreciates that some options for income and 
innovation are closely related to the purpose for which the Agency 
was created, or that there is a need to plan ahead, for instance in 
Agencies where the staff need training over a period of several 
years. Without this, delays can build up in dealing with a variable
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workload, as we have seen in the Planning Inspectorate (Chapter 7)* 
The type of assessment and control which the parent Department uses 
should accommodate the same characteristics.
The fact that, as in the Inspectorate, the overheads levied by the 
parent Department are now made more explicit is another aspect of 
more open government. However, such changes cannot be credited to 
the Next Steps Initiative on its own, and the Citizens’ Charter 
itself is a costly exercise (The Prime Minister, The Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 199*0*
The ethos of the Franks’ Committee’s principles (openness, fairness 
and impartiality: Chapter 4) mean that the Planning Inspectorate has 
been endeavouring to provide a more open approach for more than 35 
years. For this reason, the impact of the Citizens' Charter and the 
more open and accountable approach which is part of the Next Steps 
Initiative has been less significant in the Inspectorate than in many 
other Agencies. Changes since Agency status have related more to 
matters of detail, such as simple target times for answering 
telephones and replying to correspondence (Chapter 7)*
Whatever the function of an Agency, the introduction of the Citizens' 
Charter will have overlapped with procedures which an efficient and 
forward looking Chief Executive Officer might have introduced on his 
or her own initiative (Chapter 9)* Their personal responsibilities 
to demonstrate progress and meet targets (Chapter 8) should have 
hastened the introduction of changes, such as customer surveys, which
might have taken much longer to achieve if the functions had remained 
within the central core of government Departments. However, there is 
always the danger of labelling existing statistics as performance 
indicators which do not necessarily promote service quality or 
effectiveness.
The annual meetings between Chief Executive Officers, which give them 
opportunities to exchange experiences and harmonise their procedures 
where that is relevant, have reinforced the comprehensive approach 
which the Citizens’ Charter is intended to promote (Chapters 1, 2 and
8). To that extent, it is probable that the Initiative has led more 
rapidly to more open government throughout the civil service than 
would otherwise have been the case.
Market testing
Market testing is, like the Charters, also a feature which 
Departments and Agencies have in common as a continuing requirement 
(Chapter 1). The responsibility of all government organisations to 
show that they get value for money (Chapter 1) and their ability to 
’buy in” services where that can be justified could be said to be a 
form of market testing, which may reduce the costs to the taxpayer.
Some savings have undoubtedly been achieved in the provision of 
executive functions as a result (Management Today, May 199^ )* One of 
the disadvantages has been the upheaval and loss of confidence for
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civil servants whose jobs have been tested, even if the work in the 
event is retained in-house. Market testing could also remove the 
learning process of direct experience from central government, which 
could handicap those civil servants in controlling the operations in 
the future.
One possibility which has been excluded is what might have happened 
when the contracts come up for renewal. The government has decided 
that a team of civil servants from an Agency or central Department is 
not allowed to bid to reclaim the work even if their bid might have 
been lower than any contractor can make. Otherwise, that could have 
led to some of the contractors then being hired as civil servants as 
part of the in-house team.
The cost of the testing processes, and of the supervision of outside 
staff if the internal bid is not successful, can be very high as we 
saw in the Home Office (Chapter 1). Yet as the size of central 
Departments is being reduced, adequate supervision may not be 
possible, and the NAO's concerns about the level of control (shared 
by the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons) could be 
justified (Chapter 8). There is no obvious solution to this as yet.
Savings comparable to those in local government may be possible 
(Economist, 2 May 1992). Perhaps the greatest benefit which market 
testing offers is the sharpening of people's attitude to costs, 
whether the services are contracted out or not. If the Prime 
Minister's target of market testing 30% of Departmental/Agency
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business (Chapter 1) is met in due course, market testing will have 
had a major impact on the organisation of government.
One aspect of employing people, as in the Inspectorate, for an 
independent function based at their homes is to reduce costs (Chapter
7). If this approach were to be extended to the staff of other 
Agencies, it would not be too difficult to quantify the financial 
implications, and could be seen as one alternative to saving costs by 
market testing.
The evidence does not indicate any significant difference in the 
progress of the Planning Inspectorate in market testing compared to 
other Agencies, except that the use of contract Inspectors 
considerably pre-dated the introduction of Agency status (Chapter 4). 
As we saw earlier, employing contract Inspectors was related to the 
need to accommodate a fluctuating workload in the context of 
restrictions on the employment of full time staff, rather than to any 
matter of principle. In that sense, the Inspectorate anticipated 
current restraints being imposed on the civil service as a whole 
(Chapter 8). However, the increase in the number of contract 
Inspectors would depend on the nature and size of the various 
caseloads at a particular time and the need to retain a core of full­
time expertise.
It is likely that the changes due to market testing might not have 
been very different in the absence of the Next Steps Initiative, 
since the requirement to introduce and continue the innovation has
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been imposed on Agency Chief Executive Officers by their parent 
Departments, reinforced recently by the interest of the European 
Community in this aspect of modern government (Chapter 8).
Accountability
The introduction of the Next Steps Initiative was in part intended to 
improve accountability to Parliament through Ministers, by generally 
separating policy development and strategic management from 
operational tasks and direct responsibilities for executive functions 
(Chapters 1 and 8), in a government "machine" which was seen as too 
big and diverse to be managed as one unit (Fulton Report, 1968). The 
consequent innovation of the Citizens’ Charter has overlapped with 
this, and widened the accountability of Chief Executive Officers to 
the customers and other groups for an Agency's services (Chapter 8). 
Thus it has become more difficult to ascribe particular changes to 
the Initiative rather than to other factors.
As we saw earlier in this Chapter, the more open approach adopted in 
the Prior Options’ Reviews has given power to an Agency’s customers 
so that they are sometimes able now to influence its future status 
(Chapter 9). The same may happen as a result of the influence of 
groups such as the Advisory Panel on Standards in the Planning 
Inspectorate (Chapter 7)* This may not necessarily be an outcome 
which the government foresaw as part of the Review process, or indeed 
intended if it prevents further cost reductions. It could however,
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at least as far as the public are concerned, be said to be a form of 
substitute democracy (Chapter 2).
The framework documents do have a key role (House of Commons Home 
Affairs Committee, 1990-1) in ensuring that the devolution of 
responsibility and the greater freedoms conferred by Agency status do 
not compromise accountability. Although the details included in them 
do vary to reflect the particular functions of the Agencies, the 
documents seem to be fulfilling the function of being publicly 
available contracts which make the purposes of creating an Agency 
explicit (Chapter 8).
The framework documents, together with the Business Plans, Corporate 
Plans and Annual Reports (Chapters 5 and 8), give Departments and the 
Treasury a means of identifying change and making some assessment of 
how well individual Agencies are demonstrating their accountability 
to Parliament and to Ministers (Stowe, 1992). However, the present 
methods of deciding why performance indicators are to be chosen, in 
as far as there are any (Chapter 7). are probably an inaccurate means 
of showing what progress has been made. It may be that specialist 
’target setters”, perhaps from outside government, are needed to 
devise the appropriate performance indicators for each Agency.
There are considerable limitations to Parliamentary control by Select 
Committees (Davies and Willman, 1991)* As we saw in Chapter 8, now 
that Members of Parliament have made sure that information is more 
readily available to them about Agencies, there is the potential for
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the House of Commons to take a more active interest. However, 
constraints on Members' time may mean that little changes in 
practice, unless a specific body is set up and funded for this 
purpose (Kemp, 1993)*
The intention is that the Chief Executive Officer will, for most 
practical purposes, be the person held to account (Chapter 5 and 8). 
However, the fact that two commentators commissioned by government 
have said that the relationship between the Chief Executive Officer 
and the Permanent Secretary as Accounting Officers to Ministers and 
to Parliament needs clarification (Trosa, 1994 and Massey, 1995)» is 
significant, at least in traditional terms (Chapter 2). In practice, 
it may matter less (Chapter 6) provided that the information is 
available, and action can and is taken when problems arise.
Chief Executive Officers from outside the civil service may need to 
be more aware of the implications of accountability in government 
(Purnell, 199*0* Exceptions to this accountability, at least in 
theory, is those Agencies such as the Planning Inspectorate where 
individual civil servants are intended by statute to take decisions 
entirely on their own on the basis of openness, fairness and 
impartiality (Marshall, 1984).
However, this situation has not been created, only continued, within 
the Next Steps Initiative (Chapter 5)» although it did anticipate the 
approach which the Initiative encourages within Agencies as a whole, 
of reducing senior managerial control in favour of devolving
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particular duties to named individuals further down the line (Chapter
8). More commitment and effort are likely to be made where managers 
have more control over what they do (Richardson and Richardson,
1989).
It is also the case that a ’’hybrid" situation may exist, as in the 
Planning Inspectorate, where administrative staff still operate in a 
traditional civil service pattern (Chapters 2, 4 and 5)» and the 
professional line management of Inspectors has to be limited to 
exclude interference in their decisions. This may affect the 
inclination of their managers to take responsibility. We have also 
seen how limited their budgetary responsibilities can be in this 
situation (Chapter 7).
The variety of performance indicators used in Agencies shows that the 
customers of an Agency, at least, can be added to those to whom a 
Chief Executive Officer is effectively accountable or responsible 
(Chapter 9). This tends to be confirmed by the characteristics of 
modern government organisation observed by commentators (Chapter 2).
In that Inspectors see themselves as being responsible both to their 
’customers" for planning appeal decisions and to Ministers in whose 
name they act (Chapter 4), that can be seen as foreshadowing this 
approach now developing within the Next Steps Initiative.
However, a continuing emphasis on open government and freedom of 
information is needed if accountability to the public is to be
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demonstrated fully, particularly where the Agency has a monopoly 
(Chapters 1, 8 and 9)* At least, this emphasis can be seen more 
frequently in the new Agencies than in the central core of government 
Departments, and the Next Steps Initiative can take credit for that.
Frequent references to the ’’customer" are, as we have seen, a common 
feature of the Next Steps Initiative, and there are many examples of 
their being consulted on what they want from Agencies (Gliniecki,
1992). Customer surveys (Atkins, June 1993 and Atkins, December
1993) are one way of showing whether Agencies are demonstrating 
accountability to their needs (Chapters 6 and 9)* New innovations 
such as the Advisory Panel on Standards introduced for the Planning 
Inspectorate (Chapter 7) may be another way that the customers’ 
interests can be taken into account.
The more traditional accountability to the legislature in Parliament 
(Stanyer, and Smith, 1976), remains, and is monitored by Select 
Committees, by the National Audit Office and, occasionally by the 
Ombudsman (Chapters 1, 2, 7 and 8). However, the time and resources 
available to them being limited, there seems little likelihood of 
more detailed control over all Agencies by these means on a 
continuing basis.
Too much emphasis on structures (Gray and Jenkins, 19&5) rather than 
on desired outcomes may absorb too much staff time, but many, if not 
most, of the minimum conditions for accountability listed by the 
National Consumer Council (Chapter 2) are being met in the new
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Agencies. Perhaps the difficulty which remains, although perhaps 
less so within an Agency such as the Planning Inspectorate dealing 
with quasi-judicial functions, is that the standards and ethics 
essential to the operation of the civil service are not seen by the 
Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee as being well understood 
by the civil servants (Chapter 2).
Finally, there is the possibility of the chain of accountability 
being changed by outside influences. The current challenge in the 
European Court to the status of a planning inspector, if successful, 
could require Ministers and Parliament to decide that the Planning 
Inspectorate should be moved to become a more independent 
organisation, distanced from political control (Chapter 7)• The 
increasing influence of Europe may mean that aspects of the other 
Agencies in the Next Steps Initiative also come under similar 
scrutiny in due course.
A change in status for the Planning Inspectorate would probably be 
seen by those favouring the traditional role of the civil service 
(Chapter 2) as a negative step, taking the Inspectorate Agency 
further away from political control (Chapter 2) and the executive 
role of other Agencies towards the judicial functions of the Courts. 
This is not a situation which is likely to arise for many Agencies. 
However, it could be viewed as the opposite end of the spectrum to 
those Agencies who have been privatised (Chapter 9)•
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Control
There is little evidence that the Treasury is being too permissive 
(House of Commons and Civil Service Committee 1991) and much more 
that very limited autonomy on financial flexibilities is being 
delegated (Hennessy, 1989). It appears likely that the Treasury 
should be seeking solutions in many cases, rather than what is seen 
as flaws (Cabinet Office Efficiency Unit (1991)*
It may be unfair to say that finance dominated negotiations on the 
framework documents (Goldsworthy, 1991) and there is of course a need 
to establish what the costs of government are (Boston, Martin,
Pallot, and Walsh, 1991)* There must be a need to define the task of 
each Agency (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster/Office of Public 
Service and Science, 199*0 but there is also a need to encourage 
enterprise and innovation by discouraging risk adverse behaviour 
(Tomkins, and Colville, 1989) since the success of the Next Steps 
Initiative depends on the improvement of performance by the Agencies 
(House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 1990-1).
One aspect of the Next Steps Initiative which has not been apparently 
been subject to monitoring is the cost of creating the Agencies 
(Chapter 5)• Nor is it clear whether the expenditure needed every 
year for the Departments supervising each Agency is always being 
quantified. These costs may balance out with subsequent savings 
made, but it is likely that the "birth" of the first Agencies was 
expensive. Even for later arrivals such as the Planning
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Inspectorate, the processes leading to Agency status will have 
diverted energies and money which could otherwise have been used 
elsewhere. All that can usefully be said is that, in the longer run, 
those costs may be recovered by greater efficiency and effectiveness, 
not to mention value for money for the customers of each Agency.
One aspect of control sought by the Next Steps Initiative is more 
personal identification of the budgets assigned to individual civil 
servants, delegating responsibilities, and the ability to call to 
account, staff at lower levels in the hierarchy than before (Chapter 
1). However, as we saw in the Planning Inspectorate (Chapter 7)» 
sometimes responsibilities cannot be assigned to individuals because 
they have no real power over the work being done by those on whom 
they report. To allocate responsibility otherwise would create a 
false certainty.
The autonomy of Chief Executive Officers over their Agencies is 
clearly limited by the need for accountability and the controls seen 
as necessary by the Departments and the Treasury. For instance, 
funds cannot be transferred to pay full-time salaried rather than 
contract staff (Chapter 7)* Their responsibilities for their more 
senior staff are also less than absolute (Chapter 8) as long as the 
Departments wish to see senior Agency managers as a wider resource. 
That may prove to be a source of conflict in the future, depending on 
how reluctant or otherwise central staff are to move into Agencies 
for short periods during their careers (Chapter 2). It may not be 
the creation of the Agencies which is beginning to limit the movement
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of civil servants between government functions; the general 
government intention to limit the size of the civil service and 
restrain public expenditure may be much more significant (Chapter 8).
Another aspect of control is the incorporation into the framework 
documents, and annual Business and Corporate Plans (Chapter 7 and 8), 
of performance measures and indicators. As we saw when looking at 
the Planning Inspectorate (Chapter 4), these "targets" pre-dated the 
Next Steps Initiative in some Agencies.
There can be a danger of concentrating too much on achieving targets 
and forgetting that the need is also to provide more efficient 
services overall (Stewart and Walsh, 1992). The emphasis should 
therefore be on improving the quality of the performance indicators 
(Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster/Office of Public Service and 
Science, (199*0 as it has been since the early days of the Next Steps 
Initiative (RIPA/Peat Marwick McLintock, 1988). The question should 
be whether the desired results have been achieved (Day and Klein, 
1987).
The level at which these targets are set are often linked to the 
amount of public money to be expended on a particular service or 
activity (Chapter 7). and therefore they are the consequence of 
decisions which are being made within the organisation or the 
Department about the use of resources mentioned in Chapter 2. If 
these indicators are set without recourse, at least from time to 
time, to user surveys, then the wishes of the customers are unlikely
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to be reflected in the outcomes. However, it would be wrong to 
assume that a full range of choices can ever be presented to those 
surveyed, since in some cases these will seem to be infinite when 
resources certainly are not (Chapter 2).
However, at least performance indicators should be aids to management 
in Agencies and supervision by Departments. Properly chosen, they 
can make explicit the targets and levels of activity agreed between 
Departments and Agencies, and provide some measure of what can be 
achieved within a particular financial year (Chapters 7 and 9)» 
Comparisons over a period of several years can also show that 
improvements are being made in productivity and customer service.
The intention is that there should be a programme of continuous 
development (Goldsworthy, 1991)* There seems, however, some reason 
for concern about the considerable variations between Agencies in the 
range and complexity of performance indicators (Chapters 2, 8 and 9). 
and how many are used, which may not always be related to the 
character of each Agency's activities.
The accounting methods used in the civil service can, as we have 
seen, inhibit making the most effective use of public money (Chapters 
2, 7 and 8). The significant number of Agencies now using, or moving 
towards using, trading funds confirms that more useful financial 
controls are being achieved (Chapters 8 and 9)* Concerns about 
Parliamentary control being diminished as a result should not be 
justified in practice if NAO supervision continues at an adequate 
level (Chapter 8).
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It is part of the purpose of the Next Steps Initiative to promote 
change until it becomes an effective pattern across the Agencies 
(Bryson, 1988). It seems likely that these changes and improvements 
in the new Agencies would not have come about, all least as rapidly, 
without the introduction of the Next Steps Initiative (Chapters 8 and
9). However, where there is the need to obtain legislative backing 
for changes, this can involve a considerable delay.
The Treasury systems of accounting are not well suited to Agencies 
with a variable workload. One effect of a fluctuating workload is on 
the choice of performance indicators; carefully selected, these 
should be able to distinguish the reasons for such changes from the 
underlying effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency’s management. 
Some Agencies have indicators which vary, for instance, through the 
seasons, to accommodate this (Chapter 9)*
One change which has occurred is that financial arrangements, and 
Departmental overheads imposed on Agencies, are becoming more 
explicit and the reasons for them are sometimes being given (Chapters 
7 and 8). Although these improvements must be viewed together with 
the need for most Agencies to appoint staff to take on, and to a more 
minor extent to duplicate, functions such as personnel, pay and 
grading, and accounting which the Departments used to handle, overall 
it seems likely that better control is now possible over this aspect 
of the Agencies' costs.
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The standstill on government expenditure announced in November 1993» 
and the productivity savings being imposed annually by the Treasury 
have also been factors in making the new organisations more aware of 
the need to assess where their income is going and making savings 
(Chapters 2, 5 and 9)* This emphasises the need to obtain a wide 
range of possibly small improvements (Wass, 1984) and to use an 
incremental and low-key approach as a way of avoiding resistance to 
change (Polidano, 1995)*
However, as we have seen, the restrictions are laid on the civil
service as a whole, although their outcome may be made more explicit
in the details given in an Agency’s Annual Report and Accounts than 
in the Departments. As mentioned earlier in this Chapter, market 
testing will also have made a contribution to productivity, although
again not one confined to the Agencies.
The NAO and value for money
The supervision of the NAO has made a major contribution to the 
present financial regimes in the Agencies, since there are minimum 
requirements for the detailed systems needed before accounts can be 
audited by them. Information Technology useful for these purposes is 
far from universal to date (Chapters 7. 8 and 9)* The future 
challenge may be not to require the provision of statistics or too 
many controls which would inhibit flexible and innovative management 
by the Chief Executive Officers.
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As we saw in the Planning Inspectorate and other Agencies, the 
implications of bringing in charges or increasing existing fees for 
some government services may be difficult politically (Chapters 5 and
9), at least for a quasi-judicial function, even though that could 
overcome many of the problems of a fluctuating and demand-led 
workload. That dilemma will not go away, and is made more explicit 
by the emphasis in the Next Steps Initiative and the Citizens’
Charter on more open procedures (Chapters 1 and 8). The introduction 
of fees could promote a search for a cheaper and simpler procedures 
for some work in order to reduce costs as well as speed decisions 
(Chapter 2). Both these aspects would benefit the customers, which 
would accord with the principles of the Citizens' Charter.
We have seen that the resources available to the NAO only normally 
allow for auditing accounts; the special projects carried out may be 
detailed (Roberts and Pollitt, 199^ . and Hogwood, 1995). but will be 
rare. The greater challenge to the auditing profession in government 
is the assessment of the effectiveness of changes in the Agencies 
(Glynn, 1985).
It therefore seems that the burden of demonstrating value for money 
is being provided falls on the Agencies themselves and their 
supervision by the parent Departments. Departmental supervision is 
now a more uncertain area with the reducing size of the central core 
of Departments (Chapter 8). Not everyone will be as confident as 
Wraith and Lamb were able to be in 1971 about the value for money 
provided by the Inspectorate (Chapter 4). If outside ’assessors” are
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not to be introduced, this may be an area with problems in the 
future.
The real indicators of quality are very probably doing the routine 
things in an Agency well (Carter 1991)* Many improvements to the 
ways the organisations work have been reported in the annual overview 
of their activities by the government (Chapter 8) and in each 
Agency’s Annual Report and Accounts (Chapters 7 and 9)* The Next 
Steps Initiative can be credited with many of these, or at least that 
they will have been achieved at an earlier date than would otherwise 
have been the case. Some, at least, are derived from practices in 
the private sector (Chapter 1) which the Initiative is intended to 
promote.
Some of these improvements have been achieved by the painful 
processes which have led to the privatisation of some Agencies, 
changes to the services offered by others, and major alterations such 
as staff reductions and moving offices to cheaper premises for others 
(Chapter 9)» Serving civil servants will not regard these as 
benefits of the Next Steps Initiative but, if costs have been reduced 
and service levels maintained, the taxpayer may not share that view.
As we have seen, many more successful Agencies have adopted new 
working practices as a result of the various requirements and 
controls which have benefitted the public and fulfilled the aims of 
the Initiative (Chapter 9)• The challenge to those who oversee the 
Agencies will be to make sure that this progress is maintained;
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information technology, as we have seen, will have a significant role 
here (Muid, 199*0*
Relationships with Departments
The Next Steps Initiative is intended to promote a more "hands-off” 
approach by Departments to their Agencies (Chapter 8). There have 
been positive achievements (Trosa, 199*0* if* only that the Treasury 
has required the delegation of personnel, pay and grading, and 
accounting functions. However, the Departments have not so far been 
required to promote an innovative approach to liaison with their 
Agencies.
The published information available to date on the relationships 
between Agencies and Departments is limited. As the examples given 
in earlier Chapters show, this is an aspect where there is some 
progress still to be made, particularly if duplication of effort is 
to be avoided. The most significant change is probably the new 
requirement to reduce the numbers of the civil servants in the centre 
(Chapter 8).
Departments do probably need to delegate more (Butler, 1991). but the 
difficulty may be more the controls as required by the Treasury 
(Smith, 1994). It is the balance between reasonable control and 
responding rapidly so as to allow the most effective use of Agencies’ 
resources that needs to be right in each case. However, Departments 
retain responsibility, albeit not always well publicised, for
329
ensuring that money is spent in Agencies in accordance with the 
normal prudent principles controlling public expenditure (Chapters 8 
and 9)•
It would be unreasonable to expect all Departments' relationships 
with their Agencies to be identical, especially bearing in mind the 
wide range of executive responsibilities for which the latter are 
responsible. Perhaps the "Fraser figure" recommended by the Trosa 
Study may be the best solution (Chapter 8); a continuing overview of 
Agencies by the Office of Public Service and Science is likely to be 
needed also to maintain some consistency.
The informal co-ordination on which so many relationships within the 
central civil service rely (Chapter 2) has less importance now that 
framework documents have set out what should be dealt with in 
discussions and decisions between Departments, their Agencies and the 
Treasury (Chapters 5 and 8). Even where, as with the Planning 
Inspectorate, the prime purposes of the Agency must be carried out at 
arms length from the Department (Chapter 4), this has not altered the 
close interest taken in the Agency's activities by the Department of 
the Environment (Chapter 7)•
The political sensitivity if delays occur in determining appeals or 
making errors are one reason that the past history of the Planning 
Inspectorate shows that the Department has felt the need to regularly 
review and overhaul the procedures in the Inspectorate. As we have 
seen, the skills required by some Agency staff are very different
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from those needed in the centre of the civil service (Chapters 2, 4 
and 9)• It would be surprising if this did not on occasion led to 
less effective co-operation than might otherwise be the case (Chapter 
8).
It is difficult to say whether the Next Steps Initiative has shown 
the difficulties more clearly which arise between Departments and 
those former responsibilities of theirs which are now in Agencies 
(House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 1990-1), but it is always 
easier to do business with someone who "speaks the same language" as 
you do.
Professionals and Administrators in the Next Steps Initiative
The Planning Inspectorate is a useful example of the different 
approaches which can be taken to the recruitment, work and 
responsibilities of professionals (Purdue, 1991). and of 
administrative civil servants (Chapter 4). That a less rigid 
approach to both recruitment and training seems to be developing in 
other Agencies (Chapter 9) should imply more choice and a better 
"fit" to the roles to be filled, both of which accord with the 
intentions behind the Next Steps Initiative.
The introduction of market testing threatens the jobs of the civil 
servants affected, and reinforces the good sense of the practices of 
some Agencies in giving administrative staff training and 
qualifications which have a value outside the civil service (Chapter
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9). This seems to be a significant, and rather necessary, change 
from previous practices, since otherwise professionals may have more 
options available to them (Chapter 2 and 7)*
The quasi-judicial role of Inspectors makes them more than usually 
sensitive to the needs of their customers. All Agencies need to 
concentrate on their "core business” if they are to maximise their 
service to their customers. Raising the quality of the output and 
minimising overheads are all part of that (Chapter 9)* The value of 
having a group of outsiders in the Panel overseeing the quality of 
output is beginning to be shown in the Inspectorate (Chapter 7). and 
it is significant that Ministerial Advisory Boards are being 
suggested for other Agencies too (Chapter 8), although the problems 
of trying to cover too wide a range of topics are seen in the Panel's 
latest report on the Inspectorate. Constraints on resources are thus 
as much a problem in relation to Agencies as they can be elsewhere in 
government (Chapter 2).
The exercise of statutory or regulatory functions can mean less 
political control and more autonomy for organisations and/or 
individuals, as we have seen in the Inspectorate (Chapter 4) and in 
other Agencies whose customers have resisted new arrangements 
(Chapter 9)» It may also mean less likelihood of a task being 
contracted outside the civil service, if that is seen by outsiders as 
threatening the quality and impartiality of the service (Chapters 7 
and 9)* Therefore, such activities are more likely to remain within 
Departments, whether or not they are self financing, than others
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which compete with the private sector or are in financial trouble 
(Chapter 9)•
Has the Planning Inspectorate been a good advertisement for the Next 
Steps Initiative
The planning appeal system certainly has led the way in being in many 
ways more open and accountable (Purdue, 1991) than many parts of 
government. Introducing new procedures initially by informal means 
can be effective, as the experience of the Planning Inspectorate 
shows (Chapter 4). However, in some instance the use of legislation, 
unless it is essential, might lead to more bureaucracy and less 
progress by an Agency in the future.
We have seen in earlier Chapters the independent role of the 
Inspectors, the very variable workload of the organisation and, in 
more recent history, the limited changes which the Next Steps 
Initiative has brought. With each framework document having a 
generally common format, that for the Inspectorate is not unusual, 
apart from recording the independent role of the Inspectors.
However, each framework document is a major innovation compared to 
the basis on which the civil service as a whole operates, by setting 
out clearly and openly the purpose of the organisation, and how it 
should operate (Chapter 8). In that respect, the Next Steps 
Initiative has taken the same approach as has developed in the 
Inspectorate over the years (Chapter 4).
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Since this openness occurred much earlier as far as the users of the 
planning appeal system were concerned, the situation has altered less 
for them in the subsequent introduction of the Citizens’ Charter than 
in other Agencies. However, the Charter has probably required a more 
explicitly detailed demonstration of aspects of the Inspectorate’s 
activities (Chapter 6).
The Next Steps Initiative is intended in most, although not all, 
Agencies (Greenaway, 1995) to separate the executive from the policy 
functions in central government (Chapters 1 and 8), and, as we have 
seen, the Planning Inspectorate had anticipated this before 1988, 
through the increasingly independence of its Inspectors from the
policy role of the central Department of the Environment (Chapter 4).
However, it would be misleading to conclude that this characteristic 
of what was to become the new Agency meant that the whole 
organisation operated previously in the more flexible way now sought 
in the Next Steps Initiative (Chapter 8). The Department of the 
Environment had very specific control over financing, transferring 
money, and the political consequences of the Inspectorate’s decisions
(Chapters 5. 6 and 7)* Certainly, it is difficult to control
spending when external professionals seek quality (Harrison, 1989) 
and lack of it may have legal consequences (Chapters 4 and 7)*
Compared to some of the other Agencies studied, there have been few 
changes in the Planning Inspectorate (Figure 10.1), even compared to 
other Agencies which were classified in the typology as having
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regulatory and/or quasi-judicial functions (Chapter 9)* The 
differences which continue now between the ways in which the 
professional and administrative staff are required to carry out their 
duties (Chapter 6) serve to emphasise that the traditionally 
hierarchical pattern (Chapter 2) remains in the civil service, 
whatever the functions of the organisation in question. Innovations 
have been confined to the means of determining the appeals themselves 
(Chapter 4).
For an organisation which developed towards its present pattern after 
the Franks Report in 19571 this illustrates the rigidity of the 
established methods of working in the civil service. As mentioned 
earlier, the limited role of information technology so far has 
constrained the ability of the organisation to identify detailed 
costs (Chapter 7)* More sophisticated systems would also allow use 
of the appeal decisions in publications and on-line services similar 
to those issued by the Patent Office, for instance (Chapter 9)*
Although the Planning Inspectorate has been subjected to a continuous 
series of reviews over the years (Chapter 4), sometimes prompted by 
rapidly rising workloads with the potential for political interest in 
backlogs and delays (Chapter 7). these investigations sought to 
streamline administrative procedures, rather than address the needs 
of the customers of the organisation.
With the exception of the Rayner Scrutinies, the outcome of these 
studies have not been published - a strong contrast with the public
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availability of the appeal decisions. Three years have passed in the 
Next Steps Initiative regime without change in this respect until the 
proposals currently under consideration as part of the Prior Options 
Review (Chapter 7)* This echoes the traditional approach to its 
internal affairs adopted by the civil service (Chapter 2).
The challenge now is to find ways of carrying the improvements 
forward in all the Agencies; of finding performance indicators which 
can measure and promote the most cost effective methods of carrying 
out the Agency’s activities with or without market testing; and of 
involving the customers or their representatives in the process to 
maintain quality and utilise ideas from both outside and inside the 
Agencies.
Finally, the changes being made within the Agencies need to be fully 
reflected in the relationships with and the arrangements within the 
central Departments if the Agencies are to be able to fulfil their 
functions in the most effective way.
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